There are theoretical and practical limitations, uncertainties and complexities associated with Russia’s greater emphasis on strategic non-nuclear deterrence. Some pose a challenge for Russia to overcome; others pose a challenge for NATO to appreciate fully what it faces. It is possible that these uncertainties and ambiguities are intentional on Russia’s part. Without clear communication from Russia, however, uncertainty can give rise to misinterpretation and to potential miscalculation. Counterproductively for Russia, it is also more likely to cause NATO to adopt countervailing measures, which could include more confrontational deployment patterns for existing weapons or the development of new weapons.
Limitations
In Russia’s case, these limitations include the capacity of Russia’s non-nuclear strategic deterrent, which is open to question. For example, the Russian Navy continues to be limited in the number of Kalibr missiles it can deploy, given the limited number of ships in service (single digits in each of the main three classes, though more units are being built or retrofitted) and their shallow magazines.
The presumed shorter range of the Iskander surface-to-surface missile system is compensated for by its far greater number, although the missiles also have to be dispersed across Russia from east to west (albeit likely with a larger concentration in the west). The original plans reportedly called for at least 10 brigades of 12 two-missile launchers each, for a total of 120 launchers (240 missiles) to be in service by 2020. In each brigade, the number of two-missile launchers is reported to be matched by the number of two-missile reload vehicles, 12 per brigade, for a total of another 240 missiles. More recent reports, however, state that the number of Iskander brigades is now 13, for a total of as many as up to 624 missiles deployed operationally (plus any stockpile in reserve).
In the sub-strategic hypersonic category, the Kinzhal’s availability is likely to remain limited given the relatively small number of MiG-31K platforms planned for deployment (unlikely to exceed 50). This is despite talk of the Kinzhal’s adaptation for other aerial platforms such as the Tupolev Tu-22M3/-22M3M Backfire intermediate-range and Tu-160M/-160M2 Blackjack strategic supersonic bombers, or even the Sukhoi Su-34 and Su-57 Felon fifth-generation fighter aircraft. All of them would require extensive modification, as the MiG did. By contrast, the Tsirkon, if successful, is likely to proliferate, as it will be launched from universal vertical launch systems aboard submarines; modern frigates, corvettes and upgraded Soviet legacy ships; and coastal defence systems. Once deployed aboard submarines such as the Yasen-M class, the Tsirkon could put the US coastline at risk. Overall, and in view of hypersonic weapons’ perceived greater efficacy, the Tsirkon could become an important element of non-nuclear deterrence. It is also more versatile than other systems, with greater implications for escalation management or war-fighting concepts – but only if the design proves viable and Russian industry can ensure sufficient production.
Russia has limited production capacity to sustain a numbers-game arms race, which any attempt to match NATO system for system in conventional arms would entail. To be truly effective, conventional strategic deterrence must rely on a massive arsenal of weapons. However, conventional high-precision weapons remain especially expensive to manufacture. Russia is unlikely to be in possession of enough such weapons at the moment and is unlikely to possess enough soon, although in the eventuality of large-scale conflict, considerations of the opposite side’s pain threshold apply. What is more, the military-industrial complex cannot be isolated from technological, institutional, structural and increasingly financial problems in Russia’s economy.
Estimates put current annual Kalibr and Iskander-M production at more than 100 and around 50 respectively, and they project an annual maximum Tsirkon production volume of 50. Even if production were to continue apace or gather momentum, the availability of Kalibr and Tsirkon launch platforms in particular, which these systems share (not only with each other but also with other mission-specific members of the Kalibr family, such as its anti-ship variants), is likely to remain a bottleneck unless these systems are adapted for other launch platforms, such as aerial, or new similar systems enter service.
Two further challenges have been identified by Russian military analysts. First, the need to modernize the stock of warheads to improve destructive power, as current capabilities require considerable expenditure of missiles to destroy critically important targets: a ratio which the military wishes to reduce significantly. Second, the need to improve the terminal accuracy of the emerging groups of hypersonic systems. Inescapably, factors such as these reignite the debate on the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
While hypersonic systems are hard to intercept, they suffer from deficits in the ability to target moving objects at significant ranges. There is a capable ‘reconnaissance-strike’ contour or kill-chain that links sensors, communications and strike systems at tactical-operational depths; however, longer-range capability of this kind (beyond the 500-km range) is thought to be limited, especially at sea. Tsirkon and Kinzhal are constrained in what Russians describe as the ‘far sea zone’ because of the limited assets available to target them at their maximum range. Maritime patrol aviation is limited in availability and is vulnerable to interception. Larger and stationary over-the-horizon radar arrays are of limited utility at engagement ranges of more than 500 km from the Russian coastline. Space-based assets consist of several electronic intelligence satellites. In effect, the Russian forces are heavily armed but in some respects blind, notably at sea.
Russia’s selection of targets for conventional precision-strike effect is particularly relevant in view of its proclivity to target an adversary indiscriminately, as seen in Syria and Chechnya. Attention must therefore be paid to Russia’s views on the use of non-nuclear strategic systems against counterforce or countervalue targets. According to one Russian military academic:
Therefore, it would perhaps come as no great surprise that countervalue applications are prioritized if the conventional long-range strike arsenal remains limited.
Calculations compare the quantity of conventional firepower and the number of nuclear warheads deemed necessary to disable a target. From this perspective, the territorial expanse of NATO creates a large theatre of war, with hundreds of potential military and non-military targets to engage. The ability to attack such a large number of critical targets is likely to remain a challenge for Russia for the time being at least, given economic and capacity constraints on amassing a quantitatively, if not qualitatively, adequate conventional long-range precision-guided strike capability.
Ambivalence
Russia’s military thinkers are said to believe that strategic conventional capabilities have the flexibility to function as an element of strategic deterrence. Yet Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in rhetoric, declaratory policy, military writings, practical activities and capability development.
On the one hand, some of the rhetoric suggests that Russia’s leadership is aware of the potential benefits that a greater emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence could bring. In 2017 Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated: ‘In the future, a gradual transfer of the deterrent factor from the nuclear to the non-nuclear plane is possible, which should reduce the level of international tension [and] strengthen confidence measures’. Yet time after time, nuclear weapons are rhetorically emphasized and in effect prioritized in discussions concerning strategic deterrence, even when accompanied by reference to non-nuclear deterrence.
Some of the rhetoric suggests that Russia’s leadership is aware of the potential benefits that a greater emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence could bring.
Even as the 2014 Military Doctrine introduced the notion of non-nuclear deterrence, it continued to prioritize nuclear weapons for conflict prevention. In addition, since its publication and that of the 2015 National Security Strategy, several doctrinal and other declaratory documents have addressed nuclear deterrence. The use of non-strategic nuclear weapons has also been directly referenced in the naval context. Yet no non-nuclear military deterrence doctrine exists. Thus, although parts of the non-nuclear deterrent are well established, threats that would warrant a non-nuclear response remain largely unidentified in theoretical and official writings.
Russian military writings are equally ambivalent about the merits of non-nuclear deterrence. Though one of the recent articles mentioned above considers its value, that article also posits that conventional weapons are not as cost-effective as nuclear weapons – and that Russia will continue to rely on the latter to deal with threats at the global and regional levels, including through greater integration across the conventional and nuclear domains. In the past, others have argued against greater reliance on conventional precision strikes on the grounds that these are not as cost-effective as nuclear weapons and are less credible than preventive nuclear threats in regional conflicts. Non-strategic nuclear weapons in particular have also often been commended as an asymmetric tool of choice.
In another example, a 2019 article argued that Russia will still need to rely on preventive nuclear threats as its ability to retaliate with its strategic conventional weapons is not sufficient to prevent regional or global war. No one, the argument goes, has ever prevented such a conflict with a threat of non-nuclear retaliation. A presentation in October 2020 tellingly referred to nuclear as ‘a poor man’s weapons’, arguing:
In practice, Russia’s budgetary and other constraints may come to trump any theory.
Dual capability
Most – if not all – of the Russian systems listed above are dual-capable, as are most new Russian missile systems. They are clearly of value for strategic deterrence purposes, as any nuclear-capable systems are. But the flexibility that this dual conventional/nuclear capability affords can also be of value in operational terms.
The perennial question is whether Russia perceives nuclear weapons as having battlefield utility – as a war-fighting weapon rather than a deterrent. For strategic deterrence purposes, the answer could be both. It is possible that Russia behaves as though nuclear weapons have a battlefield utility and as though it is planning future warfare with that in mind as a way to enhance the deterrent value of its nuclear weapons. It is also possible that emphasizing the dual capability of these systems serves to boost their deterrent value.
Meanwhile, the flexibility derived from dual capabilities can serve various purposes and supports the flexibility that Russian planners seek to derive from the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear.
The relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear can be said to be zero-sum: any increase in the proportion of one results in a decrease in that of the other, with implications for the operational-utility value attached to dual capabilities. Given the limited numbers involved and other constraints, it is prudent to assume that where dual capability is present, nuclear is more than just a deterrent and could be used in a global or even regional conflict.
