The EU has struggled to maintain solidarity during the pandemic, which has tested its ability to agree on common policies on matters ranging from PPE to vaccines.
For most of January and February 2020, EU countries resisted the idea that the novel coronavirus identified in Wuhan would seriously affect them, as the previous outbreaks of SARS and MERS had not. On 23 February EU member states even supplied 25 tons of PPE to China. That was the very same day that Italy quarantined 10 small towns in Lombardy, only three days after the first person tested positive in Italy. From then on events moved very rapidly. On 4 March Germany, realizing its severe shortage, banned the export of all PPE. It was reported that the German authorities were even impounding PPE items passing through Germany to third countries. In that environment, there was a sense that European solidarity was disintegrating, particularly in Italy, which felt abandoned in its hour of need; according to a German MP, ‘the Italians [are] saying the Germans are taking our masks away’. In the face of vociferous complaints from neighbouring countries including Switzerland and Italy, Germany soon ended the ban when the EU Commission introduced export controls for the EU as a whole.
Meanwhile, as the epidemic rapidly escalated, almost all EU countries introduced partial or complete border closures, something most EU countries repeated in the second wave in early 2021.
A massive test of EU solidarity was the subsequent attempt to launch a COVID-19 recovery fund designed to help EU members most affected by the pandemic (mainly in southern and eastern Europe). Historically, as in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Germany had been resistant to EU emergency schemes that involved fiscal transfers to weaker member states. Under the urging of President Macron and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, EU members including Germany eventually agreed in July 2020 to a scheme whereby the European Commission could borrow money for a €750 billion fund, just over half of which would be grants. But the negotiations on the details of this scheme were fraught. In one of the longest EU summit meetings ever held, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden resisted the idea of using borrowing to fund grants to member states. Agreement was reached only after the opposing countries were offered extra budget rebates. A further condition of this agreement was that member states must submit to the Commission their plans for allocating the money. The deadline for submission was April 2021, with a view to disbursement beginning in the second half of 2021.
At the same time, the EU was active on the international stage, with Macron and von der Leyen co-hosting the launch of the ACT-A initiative on 24 April 2020.
The EU experience with vaccine procurement has been a major test of European solidarity. The EU was a slow starter compared with the efforts made by other countries, notably the US and the UK, to invest in the development of vaccine candidates, as well as to make advance purchase agreements. France and Germany stepped into this gap and, together with the Netherlands and Italy (the so-called Inclusive Vaccine Alliance), began negotiating with producers of vaccine candidates. Before the Commission finally launched its vaccine strategy for joint EU procurement on 17 June 2020, the Alliance had already reached an agreement with AstraZeneca for the supply of up to 400 million doses. It was agreed that the Commission would take over the AstraZeneca deal and ongoing negotiations with Johnson & Johnson.
Under the Commission scheme, deals were negotiated with vaccine companies; vaccines, when available, would be distributed to member states in quantities proportional to their population. Member states agreed not to negotiate separate deals with those contracted to the Commission. Nevertheless, in August and September 2020 Germany negotiated deals with two of its producers, BioNTech and CureVac, for a total of 50 million doses, although this happened before the Commission had finalized contracts with these companies.
As the first vaccines began to be approved around the world, the problems of a joint approach emerged. The EU had negotiated deals later than the front runners such as the US and the UK, which had also invested in vaccine development, and it was alleged it had focused too much on driving down prices in negotiation rather than providing incentives for secure delivery schedules. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) was also slower than some other national regulators to authorize marketing of the vaccines.
In January 2021 it became apparent that the EU would not be receiving the supplies it was expecting in the first quarter of 2021, in particular because AstraZeneca was unable to meet its promised delivery schedule. The EU was expecting over 250 million doses in the first half of the year, but only 100 million were likely to be delivered. As a result, the EU has initiated legal action against AstraZeneca. It resorted to the already noted regulation that required EU member states to submit to the Commission proposed export authorizations. So far, this has only been used to block one shipment of the AstraZeneca vaccine to Australia.
As the first vaccines began to be approved around the world, the problems of a joint approach emerged.
While vaccine deliveries were to be allocated in proportion to population, EU member states had insisted on flexibility in choosing the vaccines they actually used. Countries that intended to rely more heavily on the AstraZeneca vaccine, which was cheaper and easier to handle, therefore found themselves losing out disproportionately as a result of the AstraZeneca shortfall. This led to acrimonious discussions at the EU summit on 25 March 2021. The shortage has encouraged some EU countries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, to purchase vaccines from China and Russia, although these are not yet approved in the EU.
The tribulations of the EU vaccine roll-out have been further amplified by politicians badmouthing the AstraZeneca vaccine – President Macron notoriously said it was ‘quasi-ineffective’ for people aged over 65. Many national EU regulators initially confined its use to those under that age, although the EMA (and WHO) had approved its use for all adults. Further controversy was stoked in March 2021, as many EU countries, again acting against the recommendation of the EMA (and WHO), suspended AstraZeneca vaccinations while a number of cases of thrombosis were investigated. These suspensions took place after discussions at the highest political level between Italy, Germany, France and Spain.
While some of the blame for this bad publicity can be laid at the door of AstraZeneca (and the regulators) for the piecemeal nature of its first Phase 3 trials and its confusing, or even misleading, reporting of the results, as well as the shortfalls in its supplies to the EU, the apparent politicization of the issue has contributed to public distrust.
