The Biden administration’s more robust approach towards China, embodying elements of both cooperation and confrontation, will continue to pose a policy challenge for South Korea. However, Seoul’s active support for multilateralism may help moderate any potential pressure to take an explicitly confrontational approach towards China.
Looking ahead amid the reality of tense Sino-US relations, the options for South Korea (and also, it might be argued, for other East Asian states) are likely to be influenced by two major and challenging questions. Firstly, will Biden and his new foreign policy team define more accurately and persuasively the core areas where and how China constitutes an existential threat to the US? Doing so would demonstrate more clearly and convincingly the need for greater restraint and pragmatism in dealing with Beijing.
Secondly, will the Biden administration be minded to conclude that the heyday of American military dominance across maritime Asia has ended? A polarized US electorate may turn inwards and constrain Biden from maintaining US predominance in Asia, or at least oblige Washington to work more closely with other regional partners such as South Korea and Japan – allies that will in future need to assume a greater share of regional defence and diplomatic responsibilities.
Alternatively, a Biden administration that, reflective of Sullivan’s Atlantic essay, focuses on reinvigorating US exceptionalism while tethering a more explicitly patriotic foreign policy to the interests of America’s middle class, may find itself engaging more vigorously, albeit selectively, in addressing regional challenges, including handling a more assertive China. This focus on alliance cooperation has been demonstrated very publicly by the visits of Secretary of State Blinken, together with Secretary of Defense Austin, to Tokyo and Seoul in March of 2021; and the high-profile separate summit meetings between President Biden and the leaders of the US’s two key Northeast Asian allies, first with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan in April, and then with President Moon in late May 2021.
Whichever route the US pursues – whether enhanced activism within the East Asian region, or a more qualified approach – South Korea (that is, its leaders and public opinion), will need to become more explicitly engaged in supporting vulnerable populations and communities at the national and subnational level, both within South Korea and elsewhere in the region where the country has critical security and economic interests. It will also need to defend the norms and values of a shifting regional and global order.
The novelty of South Korea’s participation as an observer at the G7 summit in Cornwall in June 2021 has underscored South Korea’s innovative role in addressing a range of critical global issues, including the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change mitigation, technological contributions to developing critical infrastructure in both developed and developing countries, and support for the values and principles of open societies. Similar themes also emerged in the bilateral summit between presidents Biden and Moon in Washington in May 2021 and help explain President Moon’s confident assertion that the US–South Korea alliance has now been transformed into a ‘comprehensive and global’ partnership. With the Moon administration also stressing South Korea’s resolve to stand ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ with the countries of the G7 on public health, climate change and open societies, it is clear that the South Korean government is keen to stress its engagement with a wide range of global, as well as regional, concerns.
Notwithstanding this welcome new policy activism, the evidence to date, based on our exploration of three sets of policy issues – missile defence, diplomacy towards North Korea, and relations with Southeast Asia – suggests that the leadership in South Korea is acutely aware of the particular pitfalls in remaining closely aligned with the US while addressing the challenges and opportunities associated with a rising China. The current administration’s achievements in navigating these competing interests are notable, even if partial, and reflect the compromises and imperfect choices that smaller powers inevitably have to make when interacting with more powerful actors. To what extent Moon, or a future South Korean leader, will be able to preserve the country’s policymaking autonomy and status without antagonizing either the US or China is an open question. However, there is little doubt that this will remain a critical foreign policy challenge for South Korea in the months and years ahead.
