|
|
Burkina Faso
|
16%
|
Burundi
|
40%
|
Cameroon
|
31%
|
Chad
|
8%
|
Comoros
|
97%
|
Djibouti
|
97%
|
Ethiopia
|
8%
|
Eritrea
|
74%
|
Gambia
|
75%
|
Guinea
|
32%
|
Kenya
|
46%
|
Madagascar
|
21%
|
Malawi
|
8%
|
Mali
|
10%
|
Mauritania
|
76%
|
Mauritius
|
177%
|
Mozambique
|
39%
|
Niger
|
11%
|
Nigeria
|
29%
|
Rwanda
|
37%
|
Senegal
|
55%
|
Seychelles
|
107%
|
Somalia
|
81%
|
Tanzania
|
12%
|
Uganda
|
15%
|
Zambia
|
3%
|
Zimbabwe
|
35%
|
Average total
|
23%
|
Source: FAO (2021), Cereal supply and demand balances for sub-Saharan African countries.
Experts expressed concerns about the compounding risks of multiple and synchronous breadbasket failures, as highlighted in Section 3.3.1, and it is clear that this is an increasingly near-term threat.
The global food crisis of 2007–08 led to a doubling of global food prices, food insecurity for importing countries, social unrest, and mass protests in at least 13 countries, including Cameroon, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Peru, Senegal and Yemen., The severe global food price inflation in both 2007–08 and 2010–11 arose in part from climate impacts (Australian drought, and Eastern European crop failures). These impacts interacted with other factors (low food stock transparency, depleted grain stores, and biofuel policy diverting grain to ethanol production), leading to runs on grain markets and to the implementation of export bans by some countries, further amplifying food price increases.
Looking in more detail at the 2010–11 food price spike, the primary trigger was exceptional summer heat in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine and western Russia,, particularly the severity and duration of extreme heat in Russia. Wheat yields fell by around one third., At the same time, unprecedented rainfall and resulting flooding of the Indus river in Pakistan in 2010 affected the lives and livelihoods of 20 million people. Evidence suggests that these events were linked, and more likely due to climate change. To maintain local food supplies, Russia imposed an export ban. Uncoordinated responses from other countries, driven by internal politics and national self-interest, led to rapid price inflation on global markets. Both panic buying and speculation contributed to the food price increases.
In developing countries, low-income group responses included reducing (by necessity) food intake and expenditure, as well as participating in demonstrations. As citizens often identified the causes of food price inflation and shortages as attributable to politicians and big business, and their disregard for the needs of the poor, food-related civil protests and unrest were sparked across multiple countries. Many countries in East Africa and the Sahel, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, experienced food riots, among them Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Oman, Iraq, Uganda and Syria.
Not only are food riots widely understood to reduce the political stability of countries; instability and unrest can also spread to other countries in an affected region. There is some evidence that the 2010–11 food price spike was a factor that fuelled the Arab Spring uprisings, resulting in regional geopolitical instability. The potential consequences for future regional and international security, arising from climate-induced food insecurity as well as other climate impacts, have recently been raised as a concern by experts from multiple disciplines. There are fears that such impacts could lead to the rise of extremist groups, paramilitary intervention, organized violence, and conflict between people and states.
Experts expressed concern over food security due to direct near-term climate impacts in East Africa and the Sahel, coupled with the increasing probability of climate induced synchronous multiple breadbasket failure:
First, when these vulnerable regions experience yield reductions or harvest failure due to climate, they are likely to turn increasingly to global and regional markets for imports. Second, as the probability of multiple breadbasket failure increases globally, countries in vulnerable regions are increasingly likely to experience inflated prices and lack of availability on global markets. This will exacerbate food insecurity at a time when these regions most require imports. Third, given the evidence that food crises can cause political instability, unrest and conflict, the global community should be concerned not only about increased demand on global markets during synchronous breadbasket failure periods, but also about the cascading security risks that may as a consequence arise both within and between countries.
Addressing socio-economic vulnerabilities (Table 2) provides a vital opportunity to minimize the potential for such cascading risks. Effective action could significantly decrease the likelihood that climate hazards will translate into falling crop yields, diminished food security and increased reliance on potentially strained global food markets.
For this reason, monitoring of socio-economic vulnerabilities needs to be improved, particularly in the areas of most concern – i.e. East Africa and the Sahel. Without such monitoring and subsequent action to reduce risks, the risks of near-term climate impacts will not only remain, but relentlessly increase over the next decade and beyond (Section 3.6).
* This case study also draws on Chatham House research separate to the expert elicitation described in this paper.