As they craft a post-Brexit Russia policy, UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. The first is that policy must be based upon clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia, the outlook for bilateral relations and the UK’s Russia-related interests – not upon comforting but unrealistic and imprecise assumptions. A good place to start is the final paragraph of the ISC’s Russia report. This queried the weight that the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy appeared still to attach to eventual cooperation with Russia:
The authors agree. Russia might indeed become more cooperative, as UK policymakers define the term. Yet the likelihood of that happening in the foreseeable future is remote. And even if it did happen, the history of bilateral relations suggests that a more cooperative phase would probably be transitory.
The second proposition is that an essentially adversarial relationship with Russia is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Rather, it tells us that core UK and Russian interests are at odds; that the reasons why this is the case need to be understood; and that the difficulties that arise should be recognized calmly and addressed soberly. Mirroring the approach to relations with the Soviet bloc adopted by NATO in the 1960s, much of the UK’s Russia policy will continue to be about managing differences: firstly through deterrence, and secondly through dialogue designed to minimize the risks of misperception, misunderstanding and miscalculation. Engagement on these latter issues should be conducted bilaterally with Russia, and in coordination with allies and partners. But expecting dialogue to resolve deep-seated differences of interest in the foreseeable future, particularly as regards the defence of the UK and Euro-Atlantic security, would be a profound mistake.
Proposition three is that Brexit makes it more difficult for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. While its full effects will not be known for years, Russian observers already judge that Brexit is weakening the UK politically and economically, thus confirming it as a lesser power than Russia. Simultaneously, the coalition of EU member states favouring a robust line towards Russia has lost its biggest advocate. The Russia policies of both the UK and its former EU partners will therefore be less coherent and less effective. Has there been a frank discussion in Whitehall of how Russia perceives this state of affairs, and the far-reaching policy implications? And has the cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy been re-examined to account for the very different geopolitical situation in which a post-Brexit UK finds itself? If the answers to these questions are ‘no’, the UK government cannot credibly claim that it is looking the Russia challenge in the eye.
The final proposition of this paper is that an effective post-Brexit Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence, and an end to delusions of UK (or, more accurately, English) exceptionalism. Ideas of national greatness have clouded assessments of the UK’s place in the world, its interests and its relationship with Russia. It is time to discard the conceit of ‘Global Britain’, which has been widely criticized and appears to be viewed by Russian commentators with borderline incredulity. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is a wealthy and important, yet middling, power which is in decline relative to its past and the countries overtaking it in a disorderly world. UK interests are concentrated in the Euro-Atlantic space, where in large measure they clash with Russia’s.
Brexit has not altered the basic elements of the Russia policy challenge that have confronted UK governments for decades. It has, however, further reinforced the need for the UK to identify and prioritize its interests rigorously, address its internal vulnerabilities, repair its external reputation and, on these foundations, maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours – albeit on less advantageous terms than it enjoyed as a member of the EU. Some will not welcome that message. Like the unpromising outlook for relations with Russia, however, that is the reality now facing the UK.
