In a largely adversarial relationship with Russia, and considering the competing pressures on UK decision-makers and the finite resources at their disposal, how should the UK use these policy tools to advance its interests? The following section identifies four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted and valued ally and partner; and augmenting UK soft power.
Rebuilding domestic resilience
Meeting the Russia challenge in the 2020s requires the UK to put its house in better order. Despite the importance attached to the Fusion Doctrine, however, the 2015 NSS/SDSR and the NSCRs that followed conveyed little idea of the scale of the challenge.
Rebuilding domestic resilience primarily means becoming better able to deter and withstand hostile Russian activities. To counter the threat of assassinations on UK territory, the government should focus on deterrence. Besides continuing to make the UK a more hostile environment for Russian operatives (‘deterrence by denial’), it should consider using the 2018 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (SAMLA) against senior Russians (officials and other members of the elite) who enable the current leadership, not just those directly implicated in an attack (‘deterrence by punishment’).
The UK should also continue to strengthen its cyber defences. According to the Integrated Review, the UK aims to be a ‘responsible cyber power’ and to establish norms in cyberspace. The Review speaks of using ‘the UK’s full spectrum of levers […] to detect, disrupt and deter our adversaries’. So far, however, the UK (unlike the US) has not imposed or threatened sanctions against Russia for hostile cyber activity. That may lead Russia to believe that the rewards of disruptive, as opposed to purely intelligence-gathering, cyber-enabled attacks on the UK outweigh the risks of retaliation.
More often, however, hostile Russian actions will be subtler in nature. The threats posed by Russian espionage and covert influence-peddling justify a carefully drafted Foreign Agents Registration Act, as recommended in the ISC Russia report, and reform of the UK’s 2014 Lobbying Act. The UK also needs to ensure the integrity of election and referendum campaigns: the ISC and DCMSC reports refer to evidence of Russian attempts to influence the outcomes of the 2014 Scottish independence and 2016 Brexit referendums.
Regardless of potential short-term embarrassment, the UK government must rectify failings in the current system of political party funding. The Conservative Party, in particular, has been wilfully blind to the risks posed when large donations from British citizens of Russian origin or others with possible high-level links in Russia are exchanged for access to the prime minister of the day or other senior ministers. Donors are not driven by altruism; they calculate that access brings influence. It is not enough to say that donations comply with current laws and regulations: the law should be tightened to mandate closer scrutiny of donors and a prohibition on meetings with them in the absence of advisers or civil servants, so that discussions touching on public policy are properly recorded.
Similarly, the UK government must urgently address the threat posed by illicit finance, including from Russia, using its position at the heart of the international financial system to provide stronger leadership, improving the resourcing of its own supervisory agencies and working more effectively with the private sector to manage risk. Such efforts must be mirrored in the Crown dependencies and British overseas territories: the Panama Papers investigation and other scandals – most recently, the Pandora Papers revelations of 2021 – have shown UK offshore jurisdictions to be conduits for the alleged laundering of dubious financial flows from Russia (and elsewhere). Besides gradually strengthening the integrity of the UK’s institutions, this would weaken charges of double standards. At present the UK is understandably seen as hypocritical, a perception that damages its reputation and weakens its influence: not meeting the ethical and legal standards that it urges on others, in this case the rule of law, accountability and transparency. Values and interests do not always converge, but it is imperative that UK governments eliminate the worst inconsistencies, thus closing the gap between their words and actions.
The Tier 1 (Investor) Visa regime, which has been described as ‘a significant corruption and money-laundering risk’ requiring urgent reform, is a related issue. Though numbers have fallen sharply since 2014, Russians received an estimated 20 per cent of the 12,649 investor visas issued by the UK between 2008 and 2020 to high net-worth applicants and their dependants in return for investment in UK government bonds or businesses. If a reformed scheme is to be retained, the authorities must rigorously scrutinize the sources of applicants’ wealth, and financial institutions must ensure that anti-money laundering checks on them are more than a mechanical exercise. Both should take an expansive view of what constitutes a ‘politically exposed person’, bearing in mind the intertwining of political and economic power that is central to Russia’s system.
Countering Russian disinformation involves addressing not just the ‘supply’ side of the problem – through rebuttal and counteraction – but, more importantly, the ‘demand’ side: why are certain UK audiences receptive to disinformation, not just from Russia? Although there are no easy or quick solutions, the UK should study the experience of countries like Finland and Sweden, which emphasize societal resilience in their national security policies and include media literacy in school curriculums. The UK should also work with US and other regulators to press social media companies to invest more resources in identifying and removing disinformation from their platforms.
Lastly, rebuilding resilience means addressing the UK’s internal divisions. More than any aspect of Brexit, this is what diminishes the UK in Russian eyes, potentially increasing the risk of hostile action because Russian decision-makers do not take the UK as seriously as it thinks it is or should be taken. Tackling division requires dealing with contested and complex problems such as inequality, social mobility, electoral alienation and apathy, disempowerment among minority communities, identity cleavages and low levels of trust in public institutions. Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, which acknowledges the difficulties involved. But domestic division has implications for national security, and should be addressed at least partly in this light.
Concentrating on the Euro-Atlantic space
The Integrated Review rightly identifies the Euro-Atlantic space as the area ‘where the bulk of the UK’s security focus will remain’. For the UK, the bedrock of regional security will remain NATO. As noted, the Integrated Review is emphatic in its commitment to the alliance, stating that the UK ‘will continue to exceed the NATO guideline of spending 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, and to declare our nuclear and offensive cyber capabilities to Allies’ defence under our Article 5 commitment.’ For these commitments to be fully credible, the UK must address shortcomings in its conventional ground force capabilities, as noted earlier. The authors’ conversations with analysts in Central and Northeast Europe show uncertainty about the UK’s ability to reinforce its 900 troops in Estonia and 150 in Poland in the event of a crisis involving Russia. The UK needs to invest more seriously in the capabilities needed to deploy suitably armed troops quickly to reinforce the region.
Even within the Euro-Atlantic area, the UK must not spread its limited resources too thinly. It should focus on the Baltic, the High North (broadly speaking, the Barents Sea and adjacent sea areas, as well as land in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia) and the Western Approaches (the Atlantic Ocean to the west of the UK and Ireland) because of their geographical proximity to the UK, and the high level of Russian activity in those areas. It is also vital that the UK works closely with the EU and other partners to improve Ukraine’s security, given the latter’s geopolitical importance and the heightened Russian military threat to it since 2021. The 2020 UK–Ukraine Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement provides a platform for continued UK support in such areas as governance reform and defence cooperation. The UK government should view the partnership as a complement to the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, which (with other fundamental reforms) remains the long-term anchor for stability in Ukraine. Both the EU and the UK are major donors to projects and programmes for Ukraine; excluding macro-financial assistance, the EU and associated institutions have mobilized more than €13 billion in loans and €2 billion in grants since 2014, while the UK spent more than £40 million on projects in Ukraine in 2019–20 alone. In the defence field, the UK is a significant contributor of assistance and advice to Ukraine. In 2021 it agreed to step up assistance to the Ukrainian navy, including through the joint production of ships. In June, the Royal Navy’s HMS Defender sailed close to Crimea to underline the UK government’s view that the peninsula remains Ukrainian territory. The UK should continue to deploy ships regularly to the Black Sea to assert the principle of freedom of navigation, and to conduct training exercises with Ukraine and other partners. In January 2022, in response to Russian military deployments possibly presaging a further invasion of Ukrainian territory, the UK delivered 2,000 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine and announced that it would send 30 troops to train the Ukrainian forces in their use.
In the defence field, the UK is a significant contributor of assistance and advice to Ukraine.
At the same time, the UK should not seek a leading role everywhere. In the Western Balkans, for example, given the aspirations of most countries to join the EU, it makes sense for the European Commission and EU member states to be at the forefront of efforts to combat Russian actions that damage Western interests.
As before Brexit, some of the UK’s cooperation with EU member states will be through bilateral or ‘minilateral’ channels. Two important formats will be the E3 and the Nordic/Baltic countries. The E3 comprises the UK, France and Germany. It played a leading role in the negotiation of the JCPOA and brings the UK together with the Western members of the Normandy grouping, responsible for managing the conflict in Ukraine. The UK would like to broaden the E3’s agenda, but fractious relations with France (over Brexit, but most of all over the AUKUS pact) make this less likely. If the UK wants to use the E3 to influence the direction of EU policy from the outside, it will have to lower the temperature in its relations with France.
Under David Cameron and Theresa May, the UK took part in more or less annual summits with the Nordic/Baltic countries, with whom there was considerable common ground, including on Russia, although the last such meeting was in 2018. The UK should take the initiative to revive this format, perhaps tying it to the multinational Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). This UK-led force, which is theoretically capable of deploying more than 10,000 troops, focuses on the High North, the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic. It demonstrates the UK’s commitment to regional security, and brings together a group of NATO and non-NATO countries with shared security interests. The UK should deepen political and military cooperation with these partners, learning from their experience of developing societal resilience when dealing with Russia. The JEF is not, however, a standing force; nor does it create new capabilities.
Being a trusted and valued ally and partner
Contrary to the warm words in the Integrated Review about cooperation with the EU, the UK’s handling of Brexit since 2016 has shaken its international reputation for good governance, reliability and trustworthiness – much more so than some UK decision-makers acknowledge or appear to realize. The UK has tried to isolate tensions over its relationship with the EU from its bilateral security and defence relations, and its cooperation in NATO. The more toxic relations become with the EU, however, the harder it becomes to sustain good relations in other formats. Strong alliances require mutual confidence, and by threatening to rip up commitments – most recently, as regards the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland – the UK is calling into question its trustworthiness. Improved relations with the EU, especially over Ireland, would strengthen the UK’s other core partnerships, notably with the US. The UK will otherwise find it harder to mobilize the coalitions essential for an effective Russia policy.
Augmenting UK soft power
The UK government will need to work out how to counter the Kremlin’s efforts to limit the reach of UK soft power in Russia. One way would be to increase people-to-people contacts. The Russian authorities have long sought to persuade the UK and the EU to ease barriers to entry for holders of Russian diplomatic and ‘service’ passports (issued to state officials, members of the Federal Assembly and the like); the UK should reject this. Instead, it should look at facilitating entry to the UK for Russians not associated with the state apparatus, especially young Russians. For example, it could lower visa fees for students and other Russians under the age of 25.
The UK should encourage Russians to study at British universities through scholarships and bursaries, seeking commercial sponsorship where necessary. It could increase the number of its flagship Chevening Scholarships, offered to outstanding Russian students, and the shorter-term Chevening Fellowships, aimed at mid-career professionals, or set up a Russia-specific scheme similar to the Marshall Scholarships, around 40 of which are offered to US students each year.
BBC News Russian should be a high priority for investment in staff and technology, to enable it to gather news within Russia (including via citizen journalists) and reach its audience there despite official obstructionism. It already has a presence on the encrypted Telegram private messaging service, widely used in Russia. In the cultural sphere the UK government should fund the British Council to give Russians online access to British culture and English language resources, drawing on the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which much content, from school classes to virtual gallery tours, has been delivered via the internet.
Post-Brexit flexibility
The downsides of Brexit for the UK’s Russia policy are clear, but there are benefits. In principle, the UK can act more nimbly, because it no longer needs to wait for an EU consensus to form. For example, since the adoption of the 2018 SAMLA, the UK can impose sanctions independently and is not subject to the constraints of working with countries, such as Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, whose relationships with Russia are much warmer than the UK’s. The UK has already used the SAMLA against Russia, most recently following the poisoning of anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny. Further use of it should be expected if Russia’s political system becomes even more authoritarian, as seems probable, or if Russia significantly escalates its use of military force against Ukraine. The City of London’s role as a global financial services hub gives the UK more leverage than many of Russia’s other commercial partners – if the government is prepared to tolerate the hit to specific (and politically well-connected) sectors of the UK economy that would result from more stringent sanctions. Even so, the UK will still need to coordinate with partners, primarily the US and EU; the latter, Russia’s largest trading partner by some distance, has much greater economic clout than the UK.