Perimeter defence around the Kola peninsula is achieved via the Bastion defence concept: an Arctic-hardened, multi-layered protective dome, effectively seeking to create an interdiction perimeter at sea and in the air around key military installations. In this, Russia does not seek ‘area denial’ but rather to impose a high cost on access within the perimeter. The Bastion network extends towards the Barents and Norwegian Seas.
The Bastion network is intended to provide defence in depth, and freedom of navigation for the Northern Fleet and for other Russian naval assets. It protects entry into the NSR on the European side, while also guarding critical energy infrastructure located on the Yamal peninsula and other Arctic locations.
In addition to the Bastion, Russia seeks to extend its sea- and airspace-denial capabilities beyond the Kola peninsula and the AZRF to create an out-of-area layer of defence. This second layer aims to increase the security of strategic submarine activities, while also allowing unhampered access for Northern Fleet assets beyond the AZRF.
Russia’s intention is to place foreign military assets – particularly those of NATO and its allies – at risk of operating in a contested environment should they attempt to move closer to the AZRF. The ambition is also to disrupt access towards the North Atlantic and sea lines of communication (SLOC) around the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) and Greenland–Iceland–Norway (GIN) gaps.
Such ambitions to ensure denial beyond the AZRF are feeding off a sense of vulnerability. The creation of a second defence layer beyond Russia’s Bastion is driven by fears of NATO and US regional surface missile deployments and increased submarine activity that could put the Kola peninsula at risk.
Removing tensions from the Bastion and the AZRF
In Moscow’s calculations, sea ice no longer acts as a natural border in the Arctic. The impacts of climate change and increased human activity on Russia’s European Arctic have created a new de facto border and maritime boundary that require both perimeter control and the enforcement of sovereignty beyond the AZRF.
The Russian leadership is seeking to push any threat of military activity and escalation away from the Kola peninsula and the Bastion, instead moving it closer towards the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. This does not mean, however, that Russia would automatically conduct ‘SLOC interdiction operations’ in the North Atlantic, and this notion should not become a new trope when discussing alleged Russian military intentions.
The extension of Russia’s reach and disruption activities towards the North Atlantic is designed to support perimeter control over the Kola peninsula, with the aim of increasing threat perception for NATO and its allies in the region. This increases the risk of escalation not only in the North Atlantic, but also in the Baltic Sea region, to ensure defence in depth for Kola-based installations. Thus the defence and enforcement of sovereignty explains why Moscow has been remilitarizing the AZRF, with an emphasis on military infrastructure in the European Arctic.
The extension of Russia’s reach and disruption activities towards the North Atlantic is designed to support perimeter control over the Kola peninsula, with the aim of increasing threat perception for NATO and its allies in the region.
The High North is an area where Russia practises such force projection. This is achieved through the assets of the Northern Fleet, which is the mainstay of Russian capabilities in the region. The Northern Fleet was upgraded to a joint-level strategic command in January 2021, effectively creating a new geographical military district (OSK Sever). This upgrade illustrates the increased importance of the Arctic in Russian strategic thinking.
Potential navigational chokepoints and flashpoints in the High North
Russia’s ambition to exercise control and denial beyond the AZRF as well as its willingness to push military tension towards the North Atlantic is increasing pressure on regional chokepoints – namely the GIUK and GIN gaps – and the Svalbard archipelago, with direct consequences for NATO and its allies.
The GIUK and GIN gaps and North Atlantic SLOC
Russia’s extension of its disruptive capabilities beyond the AZRF is putting greater pressure on the North Atlantic chokepoints, particularly around the GIUK gap and the GIN gap between Svalbard, Bear Island (Bjørnøya) and mainland Norway. Further east, Russian assets have the potential to threaten the North Atlantic SLOC and NATO deployments with contestation.
This region is ‘effectively the border between Russian and NATO-dominated seas’. This has direct consequences in terms of freedom of navigation for NATO and its allies, notably regarding reinforcement and resupply from North America to theatres of operation in Europe, especially those in the Baltic Sea area.
This situation is compounded by risks linked to the security of transatlantic underwater telecommunication cables that Russia could target, as well as to the deployment of advanced weapons systems capable of reaching NATO and US military assets in Greenland (Thule), Iceland (Keflavik naval air station) and northern Europe (Bodø air station in Norway).
Russian capabilities, however, should not be overestimated. The GIUK gap does not feature in current Russian military thinking and Russia does not have either the air superiority or the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to conduct interdiction operations over long distances in the North Atlantic.
Russia is not seeking to ‘close the gap’ or to conduct out-of-area interdiction operations around the SLOC. But that does not mean Russian military assets will not be able to contest the operating environment in the region and create issues for NATO and its allies.
The Svalbard flashpoint
Alleged Russian operations against the Svalbard archipelago are feeding persistent myths of ‘land grabs’ and other invasion scenarios that have been consistently debunked by the expert community.
That said, the Russian leadership does not hide its resentment of Norway’s management of the archipelago and interpretation of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, notably with regard to fishing. Russian naval assets have been increasingly patrolling the area around the archipelago and Svalbard is a potential site for diversionary, false-flag or grey-zone operations.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the archipelago represents the ‘hill overlooking the battlefield’ in terms of sea-denial and -interdiction operations from the Barents Sea down to the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. Svalbard is also a strategic location to place air defence systems and sensor capabilities.
The risk remains that Russian forces could conduct an amphibious operation on Bear Island – situated about halfway between mainland Norway and the main islands of the Svalbard archipelago – to deploy sea and air defence capabilities. Such an intervention would hamper the movement and operation of regional NATO and allied assets, while also hindering reinforcements. However, this remains unlikely: although Russia would increase its strategic depth and the access and safety of Northern Fleet assets by invading the archipelago, it would also trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on NATO collective defence.
