Russia’s approach to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean
Russia views the South Pole in geopolitical terms due to the increased number of actors present in Antarctic affairs – notably including China – and overlapping interests between claimant and non-claimant states like Russia. The Kremlin is seeking to ensure Russia’s future place within the ATS: approved in June 2021, Russia’s new Antarctic action plan for 2030 continues to reflect such ambitions.
Moscow is preparing for the future and its actions equate to contingency planning. In security terms, this translates into the strengthening of Russia’s maritime presence and activities on the Antarctic continent, often with suspected military and intelligence purposes.
Beyond the future of the ATS, two main issues stand out. First, there are Russia’s efforts to obtain stronger regulations for marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention). The Kremlin does not oppose the creation of MPAs, but wants to ensure that activities within them are strictly monitored and are consistent with UNCLOS and International Maritime Organization regulations.
Russia portrays itself as seeking to prevent a ‘free for all’ approach that would undermine official conservation goals. In reality, this demonstrates its fear of missing out if other states increase their footprint in the Southern Ocean.
Russia portrays itself as a guardian of MPA regulations seeking to prevent a ‘free for all’ approach from claimant and non-claimant states that would undermine official conservation goals. In reality, this demonstrates its fear of missing out if other states increase their footprint in the Southern Ocean. Moscow wants to ensure MPAs cannot be used by claimant states as a springboard for extended territorial claims and increased control over the continent.
Second, Russia has been using fishing activities as an excuse to regulate the presence of foreign actors in the Southern Ocean. As it does on MPA regulations, Moscow regularly denounces what it alleges are instances of discrimination over Russia’s restricted access to regional bioresources, mostly for the purposes of krill and toothfish fishing. Russia has a self-serving, ‘all or nothing’ approach to fishing rights: if Moscow cannot have unrestricted access to fishing grounds, nobody else should either. Blocking future developments in Antarctic fishing allows Russia to alleviate its concerns over territorial claims.
However, Russia still suffers major limitations in distant-water fishing: its current fleet is a shadow of that during the Soviet era, and annual fishing volumes have dropped since then. Recent plans to increase national production of seafood (and of krill in particular) are unlikely to change the situation dramatically.
Russian capabilities and infrastructure in Antarctica
Under the ATS, Antarctica is officially a demilitarized and nuclear-free continent, where military activity is strictly regulated and limited to ‘peaceful purposes’. This, of course, leaves room for interpretation. With regard to Russia, the main concerns over its potential military activity relate to two key areas: ground-based space research and Antarctic stations; and expeditions that can have military and intelligence purposes.
Space research and the placement of satellite technology assets on the continent are often considered a form of military activity in disguise, notably for ISR purposes and communications. Through the state corporation Roscosmos, Russia has been increasing the deployment of remote-sensing capabilities, satellite relays and ground-based Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) installations in Antarctica.
As GLONASS is a dual-use system, there are suspicions that Russia is using it for military and intelligence purposes – mostly to track missiles and to increase command and control (C2) capabilities. In the context of the 2021 Antarctic action plan, the reopened Russkaya station is set to host GLONASS installations in the coming years. A worrying sign would be the covert deployment of electronic warfare or anti-satellite capabilities on the continent, both of which would be clear violations of the ATS.
Russia’s network of stations in Antarctica – inherited from Soviet times – is in relatively bad condition and suffers from crippling infrastructure problems. Of the 10 Russian research stations on the continent, only five are reported to be working year-round. The modernization and refurbishment of these stations is integral to the 2021 national action plan. Wintering complexes planned at the Mirny and Vostok stations to accommodate future expeditions could also be used for military purposes and for military training for operating in extreme weather conditions.
Navy-led oceanographic research trips, such as the 2016 Admiral Vladimirsky expedition, are another cause for concern. Indeed, hydrographic surveys conducted in the Southern Ocean could be equally used for naval intelligence and surveillance purposes, notably to track submarine activities outside the perimeter covered by the ATS.
Russia is also investing in technologies hardened to extreme weather conditions that could be employed by the armed forces, while defence industry companies have been conducting growing numbers of aerial drone tests on the continent.
Antarctic flashpoints
Russia’s current posture and the growth in dual-purpose activities are both considered fundamental to safeguard the country’s interests within the ATS, as well as allowing it to contest the maritime and naval activities of other states in the Southern Ocean. However, such Russian activities increase the risk of miscalculation and confrontation.
Antarctic governance and the future of the ATS
The question remains whether Russia would become a revisionist party to the ATS if it did not consider its national interests to be protected. This represents a potential flashpoint within the legal architecture of the Antarctic region.
As elsewhere in the world, Moscow holds misconceived grievances regarding its role and place in Antarctic affairs.
As elsewhere in the world, Moscow holds misconceived grievances regarding its role and place in Antarctic affairs. The Russian leadership thinks the country has been marginalized and that the ATS is ‘unfair’ to Russia. Russian policymakers often denounce the ‘geopoliticization’ of the ATS and the possibility for claimant states to make pre-emptive extended claims over Antarctica. These grievances are further reflected in media propaganda, which claims the West intends to ‘capture’ the continent from Russia.
This narrative means that Russia will oppose any attempts by claimant and non-claimant states to modify the ATS. Russia is not a revisionist party in Antarctica but would not exclude the possibility of acting first should the ATS show signs of disunity or collapse.
Such contingency planning is best exemplified by the growing number of geological and seismological surveys carried out by the state holding company Rosgeologia in the Weddell Sea, the Riiser-Larsen Sea and off Queen Maud Land. These expeditions are designed to give Russia a better understanding of the offshore hydrocarbon potential of those areas and possibility of future extraction. Other expeditions are conducting hydrographic surveys of mineral potential, notably for rare earth metals and uranium.
This issue has also been crystallizing around fears that the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection (also known as the Madrid Protocol) could collapse. In 2048, the ban on mineral extraction in Antarctica will potentially be open for review. There is little chance, however, that Russia would seek a renegotiation of the Madrid Protocol, and it certainly would not initiate such a review alone. Nevertheless, Russia is ensuring that if such a situation arises, it will have positioned itself to benefit from the extraction of Antarctic natural resources.
Legally speaking, such activities fall into the doctrine of uti possidetis, which means that Russia is intending ‘conquest and subjugation’ against claimant states or should the Madrid Protocol be contested. Russia is unlikely to abandon the ATS. Moscow, however, reserves the right to do so if it perceives a need to fight for Russian interests in Antarctica.
Managing incidents at the South Pole
As Russia becomes more assertive in its Antarctic posture and increases its presence there through expeditions, bases and suspected dual-purpose activities, the potential for accidents that could lead to miscalculation and escalation grows.
The ‘Novo incident’ in 2018 is an example of this. Under ATS provisions, Norway conducted an official inspection of the Novo and Perseus runways at the Novolazarevskaya air base. During this inspection, however, Russia deliberately blocked access to the Perseus runway, raising concerns over the nature of Russian activities at the base. The Norwegian report noted the ‘level of activity at the air base’, citing a ‘potential tendency toward a larger number of aircraft’. This not only increases the risk of aerial incidents in the region, but also raises questions regarding military and intelligence activities.
A more recent example is the case of the Russian fishing vessel Palmer. In January 2020, a New Zealand patrol aircraft spotted the Palmer fishing illegally in protected waters in the Ross Sea. New Zealand accused the crew of falsifying its vessel monitoring system and required that the Palmer be added to the list of illegal, unregulated and unreported vessels. However, Russia threatened to use its veto power at the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) as leverage, and the Palmer retained its fishing licence.
Although they do not yet form a systematic pattern, these examples show that Russia is contesting what it considers efforts by claimant states to delegitimize Russian interests and activities in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Such incidents are likely to increase in number and magnitude in the coming years, which would give Moscow an excuse to strengthen its regional presence and posture – or even to become an active ‘spoiler’ within the ATS.
