Russia’s increasingly militarized posture in polar affairs has two main consequences for Arctic coastal states and for the future of the ATS: it creates the potential for accidents and miscalculations, and will require policies to deal with Russia–China interaction at both poles.
Miscalculation, accidents and tactical errors
Russian stakeholders remain convinced that NATO is deliberately moving closer to Russia’s Arctic and that ATS claimant states are not respecting Moscow’s interests in the Antarctic region. This situation increases the risk of miscalculation and tactical errors, which could lead to unwanted escalation.
Polar miscalculations
At the South Pole, risks of miscalculation are linked to Russia’s increased presence and assertive posture regarding other parties to the ATS (see Chapter 5). These are longer-term prospects but could force the Kremlin to adopt a comprehensive and combined approach to both poles. Indeed, a similar pattern is slowly emerging between security issues in the Arctic and Antarctic regions – largely as a result of increased human activity.
In the Arctic, the equation is simple: under the impact of climate change, greater human access to, and presence in, Arctic waters (whether for commercial, civilian or military purposes) will increase the number and frequency of accidents and incidents both at sea and in the air. This will, in turn, raise the risk of miscalculation.
A greater number of surface vessels, underwater systems and aerial platforms in the European Arctic and Pacific Arctic – coupled with extreme weather events and the non-linear nature of climate change – will make day-to-day activities such as patrols and constabulary missions harder to manage. The Arctic is also not immune to environmental and safety risks, notably from nuclear-powered vessels and those carrying nuclear missiles. This is equally true for the Southern Ocean.
The situation is made worse by the reduction in official channels of communication with Russia since 2014 and further deterioration since early 2022. Russia’s behaviour and lack of restraint generally are also causes for concern – from its lack of transparency in dealing with serious environmental events to its military activities in peacetime. The latter include dangerous manoeuvres against Norwegian assets; ADIZ violations against Japan and South Korea; GPS-jamming in northern Finland and Norway during the NATO ‘Trident Juncture’ exercise in 2018; snap missile drills; and other military activity taking place beyond the AZRF. These activities particularly impact the overall security of the Barents, Norwegian and Bering Seas (see Chapters 2–4 for discussion of existing chokepoints).
The risk of miscalculation is compounded by Russia’s need to ‘respond’ to the expansion of NATO in the European Arctic (Finland and Sweden potentially joining the alliance being a case in point) and NATO’s supposed activities directed against the AZRF, as well as the increased US presence in the Pacific theatre. For the US, NATO and their allies, an additional risk is that their regional military assets could be threatened by Russian systems, and particularly by naval aviation groups and air-superiority assets, long-range missile systems and strategic bomber overflights.
Managing escalation
Military tension in the Arctic is slowly building around demonstrations of access and presence through naval and aerial missions. For example, in May 2020, the US and the UK conducted a maritime security operation in the Barents Sea. Russia denounced this operation as provocative and responded by deploying Northern Fleet surface vessels. At the same time, recent Russian violations of the Japanese and South Korean ADIZs indicate a similar intent to demonstrate uncontested access for Russia (see Chapter 4).
Such activities are likely to multiply in the short term, potentially leading to an escalatory dynamic between Russia and NATO partners and allies. From Russia’s point of view, Western-led operations in the Arctic and Antarctica encourage the Kremlin’s self-constructed perception of encirclement by NATO and US forces and consequent remilitarization of both regions.
In turn, the situation forces other coastal states to act to counter the Russian threat – especially in the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Indeed, an important risk factor is linked to potential horizontal escalation into and out of the region, notably from the European Arctic to the Baltic Sea and to the North Atlantic, as well as to northeast Asia and the Sea of Japan in the Pacific theatre.
There are further Russian insecurities around the status of the NSR and the perception in Moscow that Russia’s interpretation of the ‘Ice clause’ (see Chapter 3) will soon be contested by US-led FONOPs using surface assets or submarines. The reality, however, is quite different, and US-led naval FONOPs through the NSR are unlikely in the short to medium term. The US Navy has acknowledged the cost and risks linked to such operations, and the expert community is advising caution and restraint.
The situation in the Antarctic region is different but equally serious. An increased number of claimant and non-claimant states developing their presence in the Southern Ocean – not least for commercial and resource-prospecting purposes – will undoubtedly bring policing and/or military escorts to protect vessels and other assets.
The gradual destruction of the ATS provisions that enshrine the demilitarization of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean could then follow. Such a situation would have dire consequences for the wider security of the continent and the Southern Ocean, with the risk of creating a ‘free for all’ among claimant states.
Russia–China polar relations
China’s policy towards the Arctic and Antarctica is well covered by the expert community. It is, however, paramount to look at the relationship between Russia and China at both the North and South Poles and to assess its impact for the security of regional stakeholders.
Russia’s approach to China at both poles is pragmatic and compartmentalized. While for now it is developing cooperation within the ATS, Russia is much more cautious when it comes to the Arctic, where the Chinese presence is merely tolerated. At both poles, Russia needs to manage China’s attempts to shape the future of polar governance, and take steps to ensure that Russian interests are respected.
Bilateral relations in the Arctic
China has been an observer at the Arctic Council since 2013 and published its first Arctic white paper in January 2018. The document caused much consternation internationally, as it defined China as a ‘near Arctic state’ and presented the idea of a ‘Polar Silk Road’ linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, Beijing has been increasing its presence across the region.
This leaves Russia in a difficult position. The Kremlin needs China as a user of the NSR for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and energy exports. China has been operating in the NSR since 2015, and LNG cargoes to China represent roughly 20 per cent of transits each year. Beijing is also a key partner in both regional LNG projects and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. However, Russia remains mistrustful of China’s intentions in the Arctic. So far, China has been using the NSR but has not provided infrastructure investments to help Russia develop it.
Moscow is suspicious over China’s willingness to change norms and regulations in Arctic affairs. Beijing is interested in creating a China-friendly normative environment in the Arctic and turning the region into a part of the ‘global commons’. These diverging positions directly clash with Russia’s view regarding national interests (a view shared by Canada and Norway to a large extent). Privately, the Russian leadership is critical of China’s self-proclaimed ‘near Arctic’ status for fear of the precedent that might create, while also working to prevent the Polar Silk Road from overlapping with the NSR or even from ‘absorbing’ it in the future.
The situation is exacerbated by Russian negative perceptions of Chinese military interests in the Arctic, including the fact that a new fleet of Chinese nuclear-powered icebreakers is currently being built to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) specifications. Icebreakers could be used as escorts for Chinese ships transiting through the Arctic, as well as to support Chinese submarines conducting nuclear-deterrence operations against the presence of American nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and to challenge the US regional presence overall.
China began conducting naval operations in the Arctic in 2015, when PLAN ships sailed through the Bering Sea. More recently, the PLAN deployed several ships close to the Aleutian Islands in September 2021. There are also worrying signs that China might be interested in conducting submarine operations in the Arctic: indeed, Beijing raised the topic with Russia of stationing its submarines across the AZRF. That would leave the central Arctic Ocean at risk of contestation.
China’s presence in the Arctic is increasingly at odds with Russia’s current posture of control, and their relationship is defined as much by competition as by cooperation.
Finally, Russia suspects – as do other Arctic states – that Chinese Arctic bases and expeditions are dual-use in nature. The PLAN could thus be broadening its knowledge of the region, notably through intelligence-gathering and domain awareness for military operations, under the guise of ‘ocean science’ (including navigation, atmospheric conditions, and cold-water and under-ice operations). In support of this research, China launched its first polar observation satellite in 2019.
China’s presence in the Arctic is increasingly at odds with Russia’s current posture of control, and the relationship is defined as much by competition as by cooperation. Russia can use its influence as a ‘gatekeeper’ to the Arctic for China and access provider to the NSR. However, the impact of climate change and the potential opening of the projected Transpolar Route in the central Arctic Ocean could render the NSR irrelevant for Chinese commerce. For those reasons, ‘China’s role will determine the future of the NSR’.
Bilateral relations in Antarctica
The South Pole is also seeing increased interaction between Russia and China. China became a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in 1985, which gave Beijing veto powers and, most importantly, the right to make a territorial claim. Later, China became a CCAMLR member in 2007 and defined its Antarctic policy priorities in a 2017 white paper.
Activities in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica have been linked to the BRI, with the pragmatic aim of exploiting resources at the South Pole on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. China operates the largest distant fishing fleet in the world, giving it a particular interest in fish stocks and marine resources. The growing number of Chinese expeditions (including tourism) and surveys in Antarctica also indicates an interest in exploiting natural resources there in the long term – mainly hydrocarbon reserves, rare earths and minerals, and fresh water from ice.
Russia and China have found common ground in opposing the creation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean under the CAMLR Convention. Both countries actively campaigned against the creation of the Ross Sea MPA in 2016 and continue to block the establishment of others. They also share the view that claimant states could use the structures of the ATS – in particular, CCAMLR – to strengthen their claims over territory.
Despite some level of agreement between Russia and China over Antarctic affairs, the Kremlin remains concerned regarding Beijing’s policy of pre-emptive commercial dominance in the Southern Ocean. As Moscow wants to take a defining role in the future of the ATS, it cannot let China act without consulting Russia first.
Indeed, perhaps also reflecting future Russian intentions, the Kremlin equates a Chinese presence at the South Pole with ambitions to make territorial claims and achieve sovereign rights. This is compounded by the fact that China could use its economic leverage over South American claimants like Argentina or Chile to obtain concessions over the management of the ATS.
Like other countries, Russia is also concerned that Chinese activities at the South Pole might encompass military purposes. The PLA is increasingly involved in Antarctic affairs, notably through the icebreaker programme. Furthermore, China installed Beidou satellite stations at the Great Wall and Zhongshan bases in 2010, and at Kunlun/Dome A in 2013. As Beidou stations also serve military purposes, there are risks that satellite installations and remote-sensing capabilities could be used for intelligence-gathering, surveillance and missile-tracking.
Finally, China is seeking to establish an Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA) around the Kunlun station within Dome A, the highest point on the continent. An ASMA within Dome A would essentially create an exclusion zone in which China could use its satellite station for dual-use, ground-based satellite tracking. The proposal has so far been rejected by other ATS members.
