Tension and miscalculation in polar affairs must be managed by shaping Western policy around Russia’s increasingly militarized posture in the polar regions. Preserving the spirit of ‘low tension’ in the Arctic and stability within the ATS will require adjustments on the part of Western policymakers.
The polar regions are no longer insulated from the wider geopolitical challenges caused by deteriorating Western relations with Russia. There is now an increased risk that the current era of ‘low tension’ at both the North and South Poles will come to an end.
This geopoliticization of polar issues presents a common thread: great power competition is slowly starting to shape the way non-security issues – including climate change – are framed and discussed, both in the Arctic and within the ATS. The situation is now compounded by the growing role of China in polar affairs: through its Polar Silk Road concept, Beijing is seeking to disrupt polar governance norms.
Heightened insecurity in polar affairs, along with the potential for direct military competition, impacts the security interests of the US, NATO and other Western nations. For Russia, issues at both poles could become increasingly linked and could push the Kremlin towards a more aggressive and militarized approach to defend Russia’s perceived national interests.
While anticipating the impact of climate change and future polar competition, Moscow is thinking in terms of contingency planning. This means pre-empting the consequences of rising tensions in the Arctic and positioning itself in Antarctica to prepare for the future.
Tension and miscalculation in polar affairs must be managed by taking stock of Russia’s increasingly militarized posture in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. To that end, this paper offers the following general and targeted policy recommendations for Western policymakers:
Develop Arctic and Antarctic policies in conjunction
- Western analysis should systematically take into account the interdependence between Arctic and Antarctic policies. While Russia might not have (yet) established an overarching polar strategy, other potential disruptors like China have done so. Thinking in those terms will help Western governments to establish a more comprehensive picture of the polar security environment.
- Similarly, patterns of cooperation in both poles should be more thoroughly discussed by Arctic and Antarctic stakeholders to understand and replicate lessons learned and best practices (for example, incidents at sea (INCSEA) agreements in the Arctic or marine bio-conservation measures in Antarctica).
Prevent insecurity from driving polar politics
- Geopolitical tension is not inevitable in the polar regions, nor should it become a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the level of official state rhetoric, policymakers engaged in polar politics must avoid bombastic statements. These are harmful and erode the spirit of cooperation in both regions.
Change the analytical approach to Russia’s posture in the Arctic
- The ‘double dual’ nature (see Chapter 1) of Russian military infrastructure and capabilities in the Arctic is blurring the line between offensive and defensive purposes. The remilitarization of the Russian Arctic therefore becomes both defensive in nature and offensive in intent, as Moscow plans for all contingencies including escalation. This situation is compounded by risks linked to horizontal escalation to and from the Arctic theatre.
- Too often, Western discussions around the Russian Arctic focus solely on the European High North. The US and its allies in the region must instead analyse Russia’s Arctic as a strategic and interconnected continuum stretching from the North Atlantic to the North Pacific. This approach will help to provide a comprehensive operating picture and allow them to reassess Russia’s posture.
Manage tension with Russia in the Arctic
- Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has shattered all hopes of continued cooperation with the Kremlin in the context of Russia’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum until May 2023. Indeed, in early March 2022, the so-called ‘Arctic 7’ (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the US) condemned Russia’s aggression and unanimously paused their participation in all Arctic Council meetings.
- The risk for Arctic nations is that Russia might pivot to a wider variety of more ‘friendly’ states interested in Arctic affairs, such as India or the United Arab Emirates, to leverage its interests and break out of its current isolation in international affairs.
- Any opportunity that existed to constructively engage Moscow in parallel discussions over military security in the Arctic has now gone. Russia cannot be allowed to rejoin the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable or the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff meetings – at least for as long as the current leadership remains in the Kremlin.
- Creating a new framework to engage with Russia on military security issues in the Arctic would also be ill-advised. It is doubtful that Russia can be trusted to implement existing regional agreements, including bilateral INCSEA agreements.
Create a military security architecture for the Arctic
- With Russia’s renewed war in Ukraine in mind, the Arctic 7 will now have to deal increasingly with the risk of miscalculation and tactical errors, even in day-to-day ‘soft security’ activities such as patrols and constabulary missions or SAR. This is especially relevant in the context of the Finnish and Swedish applications to join NATO and the likely expansion of the alliance.
- It is vital now that the Arctic 7 define the ‘rules of the road’ for military activity in the region, exploring the continuum between military and ‘soft security’ affairs, creating Arctic-specific military-to-military channels of communication and properly defining the role of NATO in the European Arctic.
Avoid a ‘FONOP vicious circle’ in the Arctic
- Demonstrations of uncontested access at sea and in the air in the Arctic are slowly becoming a ‘new normal’. This tit-for-tat, action/reaction military dynamic reinforces the existing security dilemma between Russia and NATO and other coastal nations.
- The greatest risk of tactical errors and miscalculation in the Arctic is undoubtedly posed by incidents at sea during day-to-day activities, from patrols to demonstrations of freedom of navigation. A ‘FONOP vicious circle’ – which would consist of successive demonstrations of access and presence from NATO and Russian forces through naval and aerial operations – cannot be allowed to develop. Risks can be mitigated by refraining from unnecessary escalation.
- However, the Kremlin cannot be allowed to believe that Russia ‘owns’ the approaches of the Barents Sea or the Bering Sea, nor that the Russian armed forces could contest the operating environment, deny US and NATO regional presence or achieve military superiority in contested spaces. This can be achieved by increasing the regional presence of MDA capabilities, as well as by pushing back systematically against Russia’s narrative.
Invest in Arctic-specific technologies
- Arctic partners must invest in cold weather-enabling and polar-specific capabilities that contest Russia’s sense of military superiority in the region – this should include MDA, ASW and mine counter-measure capabilities and maritime patrol aviation, as well as hardening military infrastructure and systems against Russian electronic warfare. With specific reference to the Pacific Arctic, this could be achieved in the US by restarting an extended form of continuous bomber presence.
Address Russia’s lack of transparency in Antarctica
- Parties to the ATS must regularly renew their pledge to use the Antarctic continent and the Southern Ocean for ‘peaceful purposes only’ – namely, keeping the South Pole demilitarized, denuclearized and free from military activities. Suspicions over military activities carried out on Russian bases and during scientific expeditions must be addressed more thoroughly.
- Under the ATS, more frequent inspections of Russian stations are needed. This policy must apply additionally to Chinese bases, where military activity is also suspected. It is paramount that the US, NATO and allies take action to reaffirm ATS commitments on the demilitarization of the continent.