Since the UK left the EU, much of the attention around UK foreign policy has been on the potential for greater ties with the Asia-Pacific region. The phrase ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, as used in the 2021 Integrated Review, covers a multitude of initiatives and ideas across different policy areas, ranging from the UK’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to the AUKUS security pact with Australia and the US.
But it is debatable how much of the ‘tilt’ is slogan and how much is tangible policy. Aside from the CPTPP and AUKUS, few other examples have emerged of what it will mean in practice. In a different geopolitical era, tilting to the Indo-Pacific region might have meant deepening the UK’s trade and investment relationship with China. In current circumstances, though, it is more likely to mean challenging China both economically, through partnerships with liberal democracies in the region, and militarily, through an increased Royal Navy presence in the South China Sea.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine challenges the idea that the UK can prioritize the Indo-Pacific in its security policy. Indeed, while proposing the ‘tilt’, the Integrated Review also identified Russia as the most direct threat to UK interests. Events in Ukraine have only bolstered that view.
Therefore, it remains to be seen to what extent the UK can realistically be a military and economic power in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Maintaining a presence in any region for the world requires substantial resources, but the UK government has recently cut the size of its military and the development aid budget, and reduced both its diplomatic staff and the activities of the British Council. It has also abolished dedicated ministerial posts focused on regions like the Middle East and North Africa.
The UK’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific also depends on US foreign policy priorities. Under the current US president, Joe Biden, there is momentum behind efforts to establish an alliance of democracies focusing attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific. However, things could look very different under a more isolationist president, as when Biden’s predecessor as president, Donald Trump, withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The UK is not large enough to go it alone in Asia without partnering with the US, and to a lesser extent, with Australia and Japan.
The war could reduce opportunities for geopolitical and defence cooperation with India, which would otherwise be a key ally in countering China’s ambitions.
One rationale behind the Indo-Pacific tilt is the potential for economic opportunities, including the possibility of a trade agreement between the UK and India, which is currently being negotiated. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could slow progress on this deal, as India has not supported Western-led sanctions against Russia and relies heavily on Russia for weapons and other imports. The war could also reduce opportunities for geopolitical and defence cooperation with India, which would otherwise be a key ally in countering China’s ambitions.
Any tilt back towards Europe could have a trade dimension. Europe will always retain a certain pull on UK foreign policy, not least as eight of the UK’s top 10 export partners are European countries. For certain types of trade, such as fresh produce or parts for just-in-time manufacturing, geographically distant supply chains are unfeasible. In addition, the UK is a significant exporter of military equipment and provider of cyber intelligence technology, for which increased concern over security presents an opportunity. Many countries on Europe’s eastern front are wary of potential Russian aggression, regardless of how the war develops. Finland and Sweden are likely to join NATO within the next year, while Germany is boosting its military spending to an extent not seen since the end of World War Two.
The situation in Ukraine of course cannot be reduced to a mere trading opportunity. At the same time, the UK does have a comparative advantage in the sectors mentioned above, and geopolitical reasons mean that there is likely to be a surge in demand for UK expertise in conventional arms and advanced weapons technology from many of the UK’s liberal allies, potentially from Europe’s eastern front more than from the Asia-Pacific region.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is therefore likely to limit the UK’s shift in focus towards the Indo-Pacific, with implications for trade and investment. A renewed military and security focus on Europe is a helpful reminder of the UK’s continued dependence on, and connection with, its European neighbours, despite Brexit. If the UK wishes to tilt towards Asia, it will need to find more money and resources to fund activities on both continents.
