To fully attain the ambition of SDG 7 requires systemic integration of displaced people into policy and planning for governments, and systemic integration of sustainable energy provision into programming for humanitarian agencies.
Through case studies, this paper has explored what difference, if any, host government and humanitarian organizational structures (governance) have made to energy access projects in displacement-affected areas. The analysis identifies constraints and enablers regarding the large-scale uptake of energy access projects in situations of displacement.
Beyond the basic conditions of adequate security, ability to work and ability to move, our research highlights four key enabling factors, linked to host-country policy and governance for clean energy access:
1. A coordinated crisis-response approach: thinking long term from the beginning
Of the countries examined in this paper, Jordan has gone furthest in government-led, multi-stakeholder engagement as regards moving from short-term humanitarian relief towards fostering long-term resilience. The three-year rolling JRP, whereby the Jordanian government works with humanitarian agencies to integrate refugee welfare with national development needs, is a key example. Here, for example, energy, water and housing needs have been specified and have attracted funding. The JRP has overseen some of the most ambitious humanitarian energy projects in the world, as well as innovations in the municipal space. In Irbid, where more than 137,600 Syrian refugees are hosted, NRC integrated a project under the JRP that expanded energy efficiency and solar water heating systems to reduce bills and rents for refugee tenants, while adding value for Jordanian homeowners who rent property to refugees. This fits with both the government of Jordan’s specification that projects outside camps must demonstrate at least 30 per cent benefit to host communities and the country’s energy efficiency targets.
Uganda is not far behind, and its creation of the SERP is also reflective of this movement towards governments taking active ownership of the energy agenda in displacement settings.
Nationally developed governance structures that create operational bridges between the humanitarian and energy policy and planning realms within host countries can facilitate durable sustainable energy investments. Host government commitments at the international level, as with the CRRF and response plans to the Syria crisis, provide political mandates for such structures to emerge. Multi-stakeholder processes involving government, donors and development and humanitarian actors also require multi-year funding. In these cases, interaction is taking place between high-level global humanitarian policy and country response plans, including the relatively recent focus on sustainable energy access.
However, experience to date indicates that ad hoc individual and bottom-up initiatives make up the vast majority of humanitarian energy interventions. Such approaches can miss opportunities to receive government support, and to coordinate and build on existing national plans, in ways that would reduce costs and contribute to scale-up. In most countries with large internally displaced
and/or refugee populations, there is an opportunity to better integrate them into national energy and climate change policy and targets, including a country’s rural energy access plans and its NDCs in line with the Paris Agreement. This offers the potential to meet the large funding gaps currently evident between the stated support required for response plans and what is actually obtained. It also provides for continuity when aid dwindles or if funding for the response plan process is cut. Addressing the funding gap will require dedicated support for host governments from relevant humanitarian and development agencies and partners to address barriers to scaling up. In this way, humanitarian energy projects can inform and lay the foundations for a pipeline of national projects, with an eye to unlocking the promised billions in climate financing and other forms of green finance to accelerate the transition to clean and sustainable energy systems in lower-income countries.
In the past, short-term relief-focused thinking, combined with a lack of interagency collaboration and coordination, has tended to obstruct the installation of anything that could be perceived as permanent. So, are crisis-response plans helping to incentivize better energy solutions? In several countries, these policy documents have provided a space for energy and environmental interventions that has previously been lacking. In theory, a coordinated government–UN–NGO response to a humanitarian crisis, which attempts to make sure that host-country populations also benefit from humanitarian efforts, should provide some of the stability of tenure for refugees that is needed to pursue development-oriented projects. Such processes should also make sure that energy access projects are actually wanted by the host government, which will need to approve infrastructure deemed to be permanent, and by the local community (nationals and refugees) in which they will take place. Governments will be interested in the legacy value of energy-related projects where they bring benefits for both host and displaced communities and foster wider national objectives, such as growing the clean cooking or renewable energy markets.
However, the effectiveness of these response plans has differed considerably. The example from Tanzania shows that a response plan alone cannot suffice: funding, ambition and a supportive enabling environment are all crucial components of an effective crisis-response plan. Moving towards longer-term planning (i.e. beyond the current one- and two-year plans in Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia) will also allow such response plans to be more realistic: in the case of Ethiopia, for instance, providing more time to attract sufficient funding; for Rwanda, having more time to achieve ambitious targets. The two most effective response plans considered (Jordan and Uganda) have both received external funding (in Jordan’s case from UNDP, in Uganda’s from GIZ and others) in order to provide humanitarian agencies and governments with the time and space to define the agenda they wish to pursue. This model can be considered by other donors looking to incentivize progress within specific countries in the future. But it is crucial that local ownership is embedded in the decision-making process. Failure to make sure this happens means that national strategies can be either resisted or rejected, and/or deemed to be a foreign imposition.
2. Building the right partnerships
To increase and enable sustainable energy access in any displacement situation requires a clear in-country coordination mechanism that can organize, mobilize and advocate for improvements to sustainable energy that overlap with the humanitarian space. As the case studies in this paper show, having sustainable energy detailed as a priority area in national response plans is an important first step, but to implement them with optimum value for both development and humanitarian aims requires greater coordination. Building structures and processes for coordination can take time, given the differing incentives of the necessary actors.
In Jordan, Rwanda and Uganda, it is relatively clear who governs and controls policy areas needed to advance humanitarian energy projects. Structures and governance models differ from country to country. In Uganda, for example, the technical working group on energy and environment is run by UNHCR and the Office of the Prime Minister; whereas in Rwanda all projects working in-camp need to secure buy-in from MINEMA (the government agency responsible for refugees), MININFRA (responsible for energy) and UNHCR, which together decide what projects will be implemented. In Ethiopia, however, it is often unclear who the primary decision-makers are, and – as some of the examples from Dollo Ado show – weak relationships with local administrations and leadership groups have hampered the effectiveness of projects. In the past, the strong leadership of humanitarian organizations has meant that humanitarian energy projects developed within the displacement setting have moved relatively quickly, but when projects extend beyond camp boundaries the lack of certainty around decision-making has held up decisions, sign-off and implementation. In Jordan, the bureaucracy is more thorough and the capacity for regulation is high. MoPIC is supposed to be a single point of contact for project approvals; but in reality it will then field proposals to a number of other ministries for approval, which can take months, especially when these are overstretched. For solar projects, it is important to understand the protocol for engineering studies, grid capacity studies and connection. An issue such as a customer’s unpaid bills can hinder connection to the grid, for example.
UNHCR and other lead UN agencies operating in this space (IOM, WFP, FAO) are used to dealing with government departments responsible for displaced people, but not those responsible for energy, the environment or development. The same is also true in reverse, with the development-oriented government ministries often regarding refugee settlements as outside their remit or somehow ‘owned’ by humanitarian agencies. All cases point to the need for additional advocacy at government level to explain the value of the project to each body responsible for approvals.
The humanitarian sector is not best placed to design and implement energy access projects. In general, it is technically poorly equipped and unprepared to handle long-term financing agreements. The sector has an organizational DNA based in emergency response, not long-term sustainability. Yet lead humanitarian agencies have the legal mandate to protect and manage forcibly displaced people, and energy is a key concern for protection and welfare. Displaced people themselves – and other people working on ground operations – will also be able to contribute the best knowledge of displaced people’s circumstances, needs and capacities to inform energy project design. Attempts to address energy needs should avoid duplication by first learning from and potentially building on existing successful work with local partners. It makes sense to build partnerships with private companies or social enterprises to deliver solutions. However, there is minimal documented experience of such partnerships and how they can work for both parties over time, with a pervasive scepticism among humanitarian officials about engaging with the private sector.
While the global-level policy direction and ambition are clear, there is a disconnect between that and the level of field operations – the ‘doers’ working on the ground – who are responsible for designing bottom-up solutions. Overcoming technical knowledge gaps requires building the right partnerships, between qualified and legitimate agencies operating within a political mandate from refugee-hosting governments and the lead humanitarian agencies. Co-designed processes, potentially including committees of relevant bodies, can help to iron out critical issues at the outset concerning the ownership of assets, responsibility for maintenance, and legal and regulatory conditions for retail and procedures in the event of camp closure, for example.
3. Strong, clear energy and environment plans and legislation for long-term, economically sustainable solutions
Humanitarian agencies work within the boundaries set by host governments. Where legislation is clear, humanitarian agencies can develop innovative and enterprising solutions. For example, Jordan’s ‘wheeling’ regulation allows UNHCR operations to offset electricity costs by generating power to feed the national grid from the PV plants at two camps. These provide legacy assets for Jordan – which has a target of 31 per cent of electricity generation from renewable sources by 2030 – and makes the humanitarian operations more financially sustainable. In Rwanda, the government issued a directive to stop the distribution of firewood in camps, on the basis of concerns about deforestation. This sent a clear message to the humanitarian sector, sharpening the focus on finding solutions to access cleaner cooking technologies and pushing the sector to think more about a developmental rather than an emergency response.
Both examples provide evidence of how humanitarian agencies overseeing energy projects have responded to government policy signals. But responses to policy are not always sustainable. The experience in Rwanda is instructive: the solution that UNHCR adopted in Kigeme suppressed the nascent market in clean cooking fuels. Learning related to the interaction between policy and programming, and the unintended consequences of policy choices, is a key factor here, not least as project champions move on before project completion. It often takes years to build successful projects; and working on short-term contracts (for a year or two, for example) means that projects are often shifted ‘back to square one’ when new staff arrive.
4. Moving towards rational price-setting for local energy sources, reflecting their true social and environmental cost
It is important that humanitarian agencies and host governments alike should recognize the costs and negative externalities associated with current practices. Whether the costs and disadvantages relate to health (negative impacts of breathing polluting smoke from traditional fuels), time (i.e. time spent collecting firewood from ever greater distances), shortened work, education or social time (from lack of lighting), reduced potential for additional income (through inadequate access to power) or other factors, the traditional models of energy delivery in humanitarian settings are unacceptable and expensive. The benefits of access to energy outweigh the costs entailed. For every dollar spent on energy annually, around $1.4 to $1.7 in benefits can be achieved.
Lack of market incentives nationally can mean that clean cooking opportunities are missed due to the burden of subsidy involved, as can be noted from the experience in Tanzania. There, a successful LPG market creation plan for Nyarugusu was deemed to require short-term donor funding to help overcome the capital barriers to LPG market access, plus a long-term policy commitment to support areas where refugees and host communities could trade together.
Where diesel is subsidized or untaxed, it is difficult for a competitive market for efficiency measures and cleaner electricity generation technologies, including low-cost solar PV, to emerge. In Jordan, reforms to electricity and water tariffs provide clear incentives for efficiency and solar power applications, and a market in these services has emerged. This context has motivated government, humanitarian and development interest in solar for schools for example, where the Ministry of Education faced increased bills due to double shifts as Syrians entered the state education system. As UNHCR was also charged the commercial rate for electricity use in the camps, this provided a strong incentive to enter into partnerships for renewable energy systems that it did not have the capital to deploy itself.
Next steps
In plotting a course towards the 2030 SDG targets in countries with large internally displaced and refugee populations, the accumulated experience from humanitarian operations and partnerships should inform and enhance policy and governance frameworks. The case studies presented in this paper show that an enabling environment – in terms of policy, coordination and government capacity – is critical to humanitarian delivery and long-term sustainability gains for a host country. With an increasing focus on bridging the humanitarian–development gap in order to accommodate large vulnerable populations who cannot safely return to their homes for many years, interest in projects that help foster such an enabling environment will grow.
For countries – such as Uganda – that have put considerable effort into positively transforming their policy environment, it is crucial that donors and the wider institutional community recognize and support these efforts by backing programming that has been carefully planned and costed. But to fully deliver SDG 7 – access to affordable, reliable, sustainanable and modern energy for all – requires systemic integration of displaced people into policy and planning for governments, and systemic integration of energy into programming for humanitarian agencies.
Refugee-hosting governments stand to benefit most from humanitarian support for sustainable energy when they integrate energy in their plans and targets, and engage with transitional plans for ownership, financing and maintenance. Humanitarian and development agencies cannot work alone; they must engage with and complement others with longer-term influence over a project, taking into account how they align with local needs and stated ambitions. ‘Anchoring’ projects within local decision-making processes adds to the costs but increases the chances of longer-term durability. In a context of stretched budgets and pandemic-related restrictions, undertaking these changes will not be easy, but the benefits would be transformative.
