Loss and damage is already occurring on a large scale, exacting significant social, ecological and financial costs. Over 40 per cent of the world’s population lives in countries that are ‘highly vulnerable’ to the impacts of climate change (‘climate-vulnerable countries’), with Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) being particularly badly affected. Developed countries are also experiencing increasingly severe climate change impacts – for instance, flooding in western Europe in 2021 killed more than 200 people and caused losses valued at $45.6 billion.
Climate-vulnerable developing countries have contributed little to the emissions causing climate change. Higher-emitting, wealthier industrialized countries are primarily responsible for such emissions. Indeed, despite having only 15 per cent of the global population, wealthy countries are responsible for an estimated 92 per cent of estimated historical greenhouse gas emissions, and 37 per cent of emissions today. Moreover, greenhouse gas emissions by the wealthiest 1 per cent of the global population were more than double the carbon dioxide emitted by the poorest half of the world’s people between 1990 and 2015. By comparison, the entire continent of Africa contributes only 3.8 per cent to global emissions but is experiencing faster temperature rises than the rest of the world. The Maldives contributes only 0.03 per cent of global emissions, but its very existence is threatened by sea-level rise.
Climate-vulnerable developing countries have contributed little to the emissions causing climate change. Higher-emitting, wealthier industrialized countries are primarily responsible for such emissions.
Developing countries generally have lower technical, technological and financial capacities to address loss and damage. These patterns of vulnerability are partly shaped by history, including colonialism and its continued legacies – adding another element to the historical responsibility of wealthy countries which formerly possessed colonies. These inequities raise the important question of how loss and damage-related financing needs of developing countries should be met.
Though the Loss and Damage finance agenda has gained momentum in recent years, the issue remains one of the most contentious, emotive and complex in the UN climate negotiations. Identifying workable pathways forward on this issue is critical for safeguarding lives and livelihoods as well as sociocultural, environmental and economic systems. Notwithstanding politicized disagreements between countries over the relevance of historical responsibility for climate change to the responsibility for providing Loss and Damage finance, it is manifestly the case that improvements in the international response to loss and damage are in the interests of poor and rich nations alike. Climate change is a threat-multiplier with the potential to exacerbate underlying tensions and grievances in countries of strategic interest to the major powers of the world. The provision of funding and other types of support to address loss and damage in such settings may thus have security benefits for all countries: it could, for instance, mitigate the risk of large and unplanned population movements. Improving the response to loss and damage may also help restore trust between developed and developing countries in the climate negotiations, and would enable developing countries to devote more resources to reducing their emissions, adapting to climate change impacts and pursuing sustainable development.
This research paper maps the political landscape on Loss and Damage finance, with the aim of enhancing understanding of different countries’ perspectives and identifying pragmatic, politically realistic, steps that could be taken in the near term to start building a shared vision among governments on a way forward. First, in Chapter 2, the paper traces the history of Loss and Damage in UN climate negotiations. Then, drawing mainly on information gathered through closed-door interviews with country representatives, it explores negotiating signatory Parties’ main concerns, priorities and motivations in relation to Loss and Damage finance (Chapter 3). Next, based on themes and messages identified in Chapter 3, it analyses what a possible pathway forward on Loss and Damage finance might look like in the near term. The concluding chapter contains recommendations for governments and other relevant stakeholders.
Methodology
The paper is informed by 26 semi-structured interviews with climate ambassadors, heads of delegation, Loss and Damage negotiators and climate finance negotiators from 21 Parties. The interviews were conducted online and in person between April and October 2022, and some representatives were interviewed multiple times to understand evolving negotiating positions. To enable frank and honest discussions, the names, affiliations and nationalities of interviewees are not disclosed in the paper. Yet it is worth noting that, given the contentious nature of Loss and Damage negotiations, research participants may have been unwilling or unable to disclose all details of their country or group’s interests and negotiating positions. It should also be highlighted that the information generated through the interviews represents views held at a certain point in time: positions of the negotiating Parties may have changed or evolved over the course of just a few months, especially given the high level of attention surrounding the topic. Such shifts may not be fully reflected in the paper.
The interviewees include representatives from four low-income country Parties, five lower-middle-income country Parties, two upper-middle-income country Parties and 10 high-income country Parties. Eight of the Parties are classified as ‘Annex I’ (essentially developed-country Parties) under the UNFCCC, while 13 are not. Five are found on the UN’s list of LDCs and four on the UN’s list of SIDS. Five of the non-Annex I country Parties are located in Africa, six in the Asia-Pacific and two in Latin America and the Caribbean. The geographical locations of the Annex I Parties are not revealed, as this may compromise the anonymity of interviewees. There is an overrepresentation of interviewees from developed countries in the sample. A focus on better understanding the perspectives, motivations and concerns of such countries was considered strategic, given that they are often regarded as ‘blockers’ on Loss and Damage finance. It should also be noted that the sample includes few representatives from emerging economies, and that its overall size is relatively small.
Acknowledging that the insights obtained through the discussions with country representatives do not represent a complete or perfect overview of country perspectives, the authors complemented the interviews by reviewing and incorporating information found in Party statements and submissions. They also spoke to experts from civil society and international organizations (two of whom serve as advisers to climate-vulnerable developing countries) for further background and analysis and, where relevant, integrated findings from the wider literature. An extensive peer-review process was conducted, and, to gain additional perspectives, the researchers worked with the African Group of Negotiators Experts Support System (AGNES) on the paper’s analysis and recommendations.
The authors also participated in the first Glasgow Dialogue (which took place during the June 2022 Subsidiary Bodies meetings in Bonn) and attended numerous events and workshops on Loss and Damage finance.
The paper’s analysis and recommendations have been informed by the interviews and desk-based research, but have not been negotiated or endorsed by Parties: they represent the views of the authors alone.
