The TTC complements other US–EU forums, such as the regular US–EU Summits, high-level meetings of the US–EU Dialogue on China, and the newly established US–EU High-Level Dialogue on Russia.
This section explores how the TTC fits into the growing landscape of minilateral forums and international organizations. It also assesses the opportunities to create synergies with those existing structures while avoiding the risks of duplication.
WTO
TTC Working Group 10 deals with global trade challenges, but the TTC’s scope does not specifically include WTO reform. Nonetheless, in previous TTC statements, the US and EU have reiterated their commitment to progressing reform, including of the WTO’s negotiating, monitoring and dispute settlement function. As part of the TTC, the US and EU seek to strengthen bilateral information exchange to pre-empt trade barriers, but ‘without duplicating discussions under existing channels, such as in the WTO’.
On trade and climate/environmental matters, the TTC aims to support work in international forums, including on the implementation of the WTO statement on the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions. Efforts under TTC Working Group 2 on climate and green tech could also inform discussions at the WTO on the Government Procurement Agreement.
At the intersection of trade and labour – for example, the eradication of forced labour in global supply chains – the TTC has indicated readiness to identify opportunities for coordination with key forums and organizations including the WTO, but also the International Labour Organization, OECD, G7 and G20.
A key pillar for Working Group 10 is strengthening cooperation to address trade-distortive non-market policies and practices of third countries. In this regard, working with like-minded partners is critical: the US–EU–Japan trilateral initiative on non-market practices was launched in 2017; ministers from the three economies renewed their partnership in 2021. This trilateral mechanism feeds into efforts, for example, to strengthen existing WTO rules on industrial subsidies.
G7
The TTC, and the relationships established between US and EU officials as a result, have provided a foundation for common approaches among G7 members in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (around export controls, for example).
The launch of a TTC taskforce on public financing to promote secure and resilient connectivity and ICTS supply chains in third countries can support collective efforts of the G7’s global development initiative. Collaborations with Jamaica and Kenya announced at the December 2022 TTC meeting specifically refer to commitments made under the transatlantic partners’ flagship global development initiatives – the EU’s Global Gateway and the US-led G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).
Another area where TTC efforts are closely linked to those of the G7 is cooperation to address Russian disinformation in third countries regarding food security. The US and EU have emphasized that dialogue under the TTC ‘should be complementary to existing frameworks and initiatives, including the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism’.
OECD
The AI Roadmap announced at the December 2022 TTC meeting will not only inform approaches to AI risk management and trustworthy AI on both sides of the Atlantic, but also support collaborative approaches at the international level. In particular, this work will be informed by and leverage ongoing efforts within the OECD.
US–EU cooperation under the TTC concerning the eradication of forced labour in global supply chains can also go hand in hand with efforts at the OECD to advance responsible business conduct.
UN
TTC Working Group 6, dealing with threats to security and human rights arising from the misuse of technology, stresses that the US and EU will ‘engage multilaterally, including with and within the United Nations, in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’.
Minilateral groups
If carefully managed, the TTC can be a strong component of the ‘latticework of alliances and partnerships globally that are fit for purpose for the 21st century’ mentioned in the October 2022 US National Security Strategy.
The TTC partners are committed to advance the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, which both the US and EU signed in April 2022 alongside approximately 60 other partners, including Canada and the UK. The declaration focuses on principles concerning universal access, human rights, openness and fair competition – these principles now need to be put into practice. If the TTC succeeds in strengthening US–EU cooperation, the partners can support broader alignment on data governance and platforms at the global level.
The TTC’s work on secure supply chains is connected to other minilateral initiatives with like-minded partners. For instance, the May 2022 TTC statement references the Conference on Critical Materials and Minerals between the EU, US, Japan, Australia and Canada, launched in 2011. In June 2022, the same partners formed a new alliance with additional allies to bolster critical mineral supply chains – the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). It is currently unclear how TTC efforts, the Conference or the MSP relate to each other. But these potentially overlapping initiatives can be leveraged to enhance collaboration and coordination on supply-chain policy.
During the Indonesian presidency in 2022, the G20 has survived questions over Russia’s membership and friction caused by members’ varied positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But maintaining a fully functional G20 will be an ongoing challenge. On specific global policy issues such as trade and technology, the G20 is likely to become less conducive to deeper cooperation with India taking on the presidency in 2023. India’s restrictions on the internet and its occasionally unconstructive role in the WTO, for example, are potential obstacles in those areas. The US and EU have therefore focused their efforts on the G7 and will continue to do so.
In contrast to the US–EU TTC, where trade and technology issues are closely balanced, tech is expected to be a larger component of the EU–India TTC than trade.
Despite bearing the same name as the US–EU version, the EU–India TTC, launched in April 2022, is likely to take a different form. Both sides are currently defining ‘the objectives, scope and format for the EU-India Trade and Technology Council’. In contrast to the US–EU TTC, where trade and technology issues are closely balanced, tech is expected to be a larger component of the EU–India TTC than trade. It should be noted, though, that the EU and India formally relaunched negotiations on a free trade agreement in June 2022, in parallel to their TTC. No similar negotiations are currently taking place in the US–EU context.
