This introductory chapter identifies and evaluates the factors that led Israel and the UAE to sign the Abraham Accords in 2020, examines the complex role of the US in the process of normalization and considers the accords’ wider implications for regional dynamics.
In September 2020, normalization agreements known as the Abraham Accords were signed at the White House, formalizing ties between Israel and Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At a time of deep regional insecurity stemming from tensions between the US and Iran, the accords brought together US regional partners with shared threat perceptions concerning both the destabilizing influence of radical Islamist groups and Iran’s regional activities. The agreements formalized relations after more than a decade of quiet Israeli–Emirati engagement amid shared concerns about declining US regional security commitments, mutual ambitions to directly manage and assert influence in multiplying regional conflicts, and a desire to forge stronger, regional economic ties.
At the outset, the Abraham Accords were not overtly directed towards security interests. For Israel, normalization was largely seen as a way of ending its regional isolation and finally open pathways to regional integration. The UAE meanwhile sought to capitalize on economic linkages and to expand scientific and technological collaboration. Both countries had long cooperated behind the scenes, but they saw value in publicly declaring their relationship to solidify those interests and remain relevant to the US, other global influencers and the region. Two years on from the signing of the accords, this public partnership has created major changes in regional dynamics and economic and security alignments. If well-managed and maintained, the Abraham Accords will have important implications for regional security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Although still a work in progress, the changes resulting from the accords have been motivated by a shifting and competitive regional climate, tied to concerns over the declining US security role in the Middle East and the ongoing challenge of containing Iran’s regional influence. Russia’s war on Ukraine and broader geopolitical tensions between the US and its allies and Russia and China have enhanced the accords’ value, causing Middle East regional powers to adopt flexible hedging strategies to protect against geopolitical competition and US withdrawal. This thought process has prompted the emergence of new groupings intended to bolster multilateral regional engagement. The Biden administration, despite initially viewing the Abraham Accords as an unwanted legacy of his predecessor, Donald Trump, has acknowledged that the accords do in fact serve US interests by enhancing regional cooperation in the Middle East.
Despite significant criticism from the outset, principally over the abandonment of Palestinian peace initiatives as a precondition to normalization with Israel, normalization has enabled more open and integrative bilateral and multilateral discussions, aimed at fostering increased regional cooperation. A range of post-accords engagements have demonstrated this: not only the stronger bilateral economic ties between Israel and the UAE, but other minilateral and multilateral initiatives such as the August 2021 and December 2022 Baghdad summits, the March 2022 Negev summit, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, the Israel–Lebanon maritime agreement and the Red Sea Council. The accords have also paved the way for the emerging regional security construct (RSC), backed and led by the US Central Command (CENTCOM). Should it come to fruition, the RSC will allow for gradual but greater regional security coordination and integration. Ultimately, the unprecedented level of engagement since the accords were signed could lead to a broader security initiative that would serve regional interests alongside those of the international community, and specifically those of the US.
Much consistent diplomatic work remains to be done to achieve such an outcome. Steady Western and regional engagement to balance divergent regional strategies among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will be necessary to manage growing challenges, ranging from Iran’s ongoing nuclear programme and regional activities, to the optical and political effects of the new Israeli ultra-right coalition government on normalized ties, and the lack of a Palestinian negotiation process. Above all, managing these challenges requires consistent diplomacy and trust-building among regional states that have previously struggled to maintain alliances. Direct and continued bipartisan US engagement to support bilateral and multilateral relationships can also help regional powers to achieve greater security integration.
Not since Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel had Arab states made steps of this magnitude, delinking normalization with Israel from progress on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. This has been a noteworthy shift, bringing to light the prioritization of national and security interests, alongside a growing sense of detachment – particularly in some Gulf Arab states – towards the Palestinian leadership. As such, the Abraham Accords saw Israel solely commit to terminating its annexation plan of the West Bank without making further advances towards conflict resolution. Thus far, the accords have withstood pressure arising from two confrontations between Israel and Gaza and violence in the West Bank, which required mediation from regional states. This reflects the durability of the deal, and makes clear that both the UAE and Israel prioritize pragmatic national interests and benefits of normalization over the Palestinian conflict. However, without greater regional engagement on Palestinian security issues, states seeking to join the Abraham Accords could face a domestic popular backlash following further Israeli interventions in Gaza and the West Bank in early 2023.
The Israeli and Emirati governments have placed greater emphasis on bilateral economic, technological and commercial opportunities in industries ranging from energy to tourism, and healthcare to ports, with the intent to build stronger trading links – both between themselves and within the region. Seeking to boost bilateral trade to $4 billion within a five-year period, Israel and the UAE aim to enhance their domestic industries in the short term and achieve long-term economic sustainability through economic cooperation linking their economies to supply chains within and beyond the Middle East. Moreover, they intend to create stronger contact between their respective populations, which could further heal regional divides.
Beyond the important economic opportunities, the real value of the Abraham Accords lies in the tactical agreements and the larger strategic objectives of the partnership. Here, US support for normalization and continued regional security investments remain key to the ongoing success of the process.
Uncertainty over the US’s regional security commitments – a sentiment shared by policymakers in both Israel and the UAE – was a significant motivator behind the accords. All parties are committed to ‘join with the United States to develop and launch a ‘Strategic Agenda for the Middle East’ in order to expand regional diplomatic, trade, stability, and other cooperation’. Having relied on the US as the principal regional security guarantor for so long, regional states have been perturbed as the US seeks to shift its attention from the Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific. Three successive US administrations – those of Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden – have sought to prioritize geopolitical competition with China and Russia, and to redirect US resources to this larger challenge after two decades of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The impact of this shifting US posture, amid geopolitical challenges stemming from the war in Ukraine, is helping shape a new Middle East.
About this paper
This paper seeks to evaluate how and why the Israeli–Emirati relationship – its strategic objectives, Israeli and UAE hard and soft power, and the economic aspect – has motivated greater regional cooperation and security integration. Our research provides a comprehensive examination of the economic, political and regional developments since the Abraham Accords were signed. Both Israel and the UAE seek a bigger regional role, economic interdependence and stronger, more stable ties with the US. Regional security integration is another long-term strategic objective for both countries. The US role in these investments and developments is important for the broader security dimensions.
For Israel, normalization agreements with Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan have been significant outcomes in themselves. However, our research has identified the Israel–UAE relationship as an important catalyst for regional security change. That relationship is based on a shared security posture, economic and soft power benefits, as well as broader regional objectives. While Israeli–Emirati ties are still developing, our data indicate that economic and security ties, alongside regional multilateral engagement, are creating a foundation for regional cooperation among other US-aligned states.
The paper assesses the history, motivations and dynamics of Israeli–Emirati normalization and its implications for regional security. The research highlights how the Abraham Accords and formalized ties between Israel and the UAE have created opportunities for the wider MENA region. Moreover, the US role in facilitating and supporting the relationship amid concerns of declining US regional influence and broader geopolitical competition is highly significant. The paper’s findings suggest that, despite continued frustration with the US among MENA countries, US engagement remains a key variable in the success of the accords and subsequent processes.
Yet for a more secure outcome to be achieved, a series of emerging regional and geopolitical challenges will also require sustained attention. Specific focus will be given to developments in Iran, the Palestinian Territories, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and intra-GCC dynamics.
The findings are based on desk research, key informant interviews and workshop discussions conducted under the Chatham House Rule with analysts and policymakers in Israel and the UAE, as well as in Europe, Iran, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UK and the US. The interviewees’ identities have been anonymized for security purposes.
The paper begins with a brief review of the geopolitical and regional history, including the US’s involvement, that led to normalization. Chapter 3 assesses both states’ security landscapes, threat perceptions and regional priorities. Chapter 4 showcases the bilateral hard and soft power exchanges between Israel and the UAE since the Abraham Accords. Chapter 5 includes a detailed account of Israeli–Emirati economic relations. Chapter 6 discusses the changing regional security landscape and emergent multilateral groupings, while ongoing challenges and recommendations for leveraging the Abraham Accords are set out in Chapter 7.
