Following the signing of the Abraham Accords, recent, interconnected trends and events have catalysed a shift from bilateralism to multilateralism in the MENA region.
Both Israel and the UAE intend to leverage the opportunities arising from their fast-developing relationship beyond the bilateral to influence regional security dynamics. Alongside political, diplomatic and economic normalization, a broader security reorganization of the Middle East regional order is under way. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, a plethora of other economic and political groupings have emerged that have paved the way for greater regional collaboration.
Additionally, four interconnected trends and events have helped facilitate this shift in regional state behaviour. They include: (i) continued uncertainty and insecurity regarding the US’s security role in the region; (ii) a region-wide trend of de-escalation, partly motivated by conflict fatigue; (iii)the emergence of several multilateral forums for regional cooperation; and (iv) the formal incorporation of Israel into CENTCOM. The shifts represented by the above have led to the emergence of multiple forums allowing regional states to find common ground and pragmatically engage in multilateral discussions.
The US security role in the Middle East
Most interviewees consistently pointed out that the uncertain role of the US remains a primary motivator behind the regional reorganization under way. The prevailing concern for most regional states, as has been reiterated throughout this paper, has been continued anxiety over the long-term US security commitment to the Middle East. Even though the US has not materially drawn down, or ‘pivoted’ away from, its regional positions, perceptions of declining US interest continue to drive discord and disquiet among regional governments. US officials have indicated that they are aware of such frustrations but are often dismissive. Many in Washington see their actions as ‘never enough’.
These concerns have been further exacerbated by the sense that the Biden administration intended to deprioritize the region. Middle East states felt that the administration’s first year in office had focused on resurrecting negotiations over the JCPOA and ending the war in Yemen, rather than on a broader regional strategy from the outset. Among Biden’s first appointments were those of Tim Lenderking as Yemen envoy and Rob Malley on Iran negotiations. Those objectives clearly required a more balanced approach from that pursued under the Trump administration. From the beginning of its term, the Biden administration’s review of offensive weapons sales to the Gulf Arab states and continued talk of human rights, directed at Saudi Arabia and MbS in particular, further deepened these fissures and mobilized regional states to review, diversify and invest in upgrading their security positions.
Middle East states felt that the Biden administration’s first year in office had focused on resurrecting negotiations over the JCPOA and ending the war in Yemen, rather than on a broader regional strategy from the outset.
The outbreak of the war in Ukraine has also intensified these concerns. Watching as the US and its European partners quickly mobilized military and economic support for Ukraine from early 2022, the US’s Middle East partners concluded that regional security threats coming from Iran were being compartmentalized due to negotiations over the JCPOA. Gulf-based policymakers also privately expressed frustration that the West was overlooking the – in their view – legitimate threat from Iran. Regional reactions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine further exacerbated existing tensions. These reactions included Gulf Arab states’ neutral positioning and OPEC+ arrangements that required Saudi Arabia and the UAE to coordinate and stabilize oil prices with Russia, rather than support Western calls to increase supply. Within the region, meanwhile, some states argued that economic and security concerns, particularly due to Russia’s presence in Syria and ties with Iran, necessitated continued diplomatic relations with Russia.
However, Biden’s July 2022 visit to the Middle East marked a shift in the US posture and a recognition that the regional security atmosphere since the accords was changing. ‘The administration saw regional dialogues in a positive light that could be leveraged,’ said one official. Through increased public contact, an alignment in threat perception was emerging between Israel and normalized Arab states experiencing air, land and sea challenges. ‘Opportunities for regional security cooperation have been enhanced by working with Israel which can provide important access to cutting-edge technology,’ stated another official.
This thinking has been further captured in the 2022 NSS that made clear that there is no single sustainable US approach to managing the range of regional threats. Instead, the strategy makes clear that US interests will be best served by supporting the multiple bilateral and multilateral processes that are under way. This acknowledgment has created room for US- and CENTCOM-led backing for a process that would begin with information- and intelligence-sharing and would slowly lead to an enhanced early-warning system and perhaps more.
De-escalation dynamics
One immediate outcome of the accords has been a region-wide trend of de-escalation, partly motivated by conflict fatigue among Middle East leaders. As stated by one interviewee: ‘Everyone in the region has been collectively weakened and this period could be a mutually hurting stalemate of regional tensions.’ The COVID-19 pandemic has also lent greater urgency to de-escalation: another interviewee commented that ‘the pandemic exposed not just the economic vulnerability throughout the region but also its geographic connectivity’.
This has led to an unprecedented wave of diplomatic contact that has resulted in outreach across the region. The UAE started this process with the resumption of high-level UAE–Iran relations, beginning in 2019. Four rounds of bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, organized by Iraq, have also sought to stabilize tensions. These discussions remain stalled due to the stalemate over the JCPOA and ongoing protests in Iran. Other, more productive examples include the end of the Qatar crisis. The 2021 Al-Ula agreement negotiations, led by Saudi Arabia, to a significant extent reset GCC ties after the 2017 blockade of Qatar. Strengthening of ties between Egypt and Qatar has also been under way. Elsewhere, the UAE has taken the lead in restoring Arab state ties with the Assad regime in Syria, with other states including Egypt and Oman showing willingness to restore Syria to the Arab League. The March 2022 reconciliation between Turkey and the UAE, followed by a similar rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, has meanwhile formally ended a decade-long rivalry between Turkey and these GCC states. This has also been followed by a restoration of Israeli–Turkish relations. Another critical example of this trend came on 10 March 2023, when it was announced that Chinese-brokered talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia had resulted in an agreement to restore diplomatic ties, which had been severed since 2016, and reopen embassies within two months. It is expected that Bahrain will also resume diplomatic engagement with Iran, formally ending the Gulf countries’ strategy of support for ‘maximum pressure’ and containment.
The direct effect of this de-escalation has been a reduction in overt tensions and suggests that a new approach to regional conflict management is under way. One observer commented that ‘Gulf states in particular have recognized that in the absence of US support, direct regional competition has not only increased their vulnerabilities but also provided Iran with greater strategic opportunities’. What remains unclear is if these bilateral ties are reflective of a tactical recalibration or part of a broader regional reset in managing tensions. This pattern of dialogue is seen by others as tied to inconsistent US security support. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the September 2019 attacks on its oil infrastructure caused a change in thinking. Outreach to Iran was an opportunity to hedge against further attacks and directly manage, rather than outsource, its security.
Emerging multilateral regional cooperation
Reflecting the regional security vacuum and reduced dependency on US diplomacy, a secondary outcome of fluctuating regional dynamics can be seen in the emergence of multiple multilateral regional summits. These summits also showcase a new pattern of cooperation that aims to exert greater regional agency over conflicts. Dubai-based analyst Mohamed Baharoon has described this as part of a ‘networked world order … [where] … states can engage in multiple relationships based on national and regional interests rather than affinity to one ideology or another’. Many of these initiatives are in their nascent stage and it is too early to assess their durability. But together they point to a new trend of ‘strategic flexibility’. One interviewee characterized the new regional atmosphere by saying: ‘These dynamics showcase that this is not an and/or, with us or against us world anymore. Multilateral and trilateral coordination allows for diversification and greater security interdependence.’
The Baghdad summit
The August 2021 Baghdad summit was organized by former Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and supported by the French government. It represented the first occasion for competing regional actors to convene. Heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers from Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE attended. With such a broad array of actors at the table, and as the only initiative that currently includes Iranian participation, perhaps unsurprisingly there was no alignment on issues for discussion at the summit. As such, the participants agreed to focus their deliberations solely on Iraq’s political stability.
In the final communiqué that mainly showcased a commitment to support the Iraqi federal government, the participants ‘acknowledged that the region faces common challenges that require the countries of the region to deal with them on the basis of joint cooperation and mutual interests in accordance with the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, and respect of national sovereignty’. No advances were achieved, but the diverse participation that brought together many states with strained relations was seen to be positive in itself.
While Iran’s regional activities are unlikely ever to be the sole focus of discussions, greater direct diplomacy with Iran is important to stabilize tensions and entrench de-escalatory patterns.
Domestic challenges relating to government formation in Iraq and the replacement of Kadhimi as Iraqi prime minister by Mohammad Shiaa al-Sudani in October 2022 led to delays in convening regional actors for further meetings. Limited progress in Iranian–Saudi dialogue – in which Kadhimi played a crucial convening role – obstructed efforts to reconvene the two parties as well.
French coordination efforts continued, meanwhile, with the objective of gathering the same actors together in Amman with a more focused, confidence-building agenda. The second conference was held in December 2022, bringing together the same group with the addition of Bahraini and Omani officials. While again no advances were achieved and Iran–Saudi dialogue was not revived during this meeting (rather being achieved through Chinese mediation in March 2023), the forum released another communiqué reinforcing solidarity for Iraq’s stability and ‘supporting Iraq’s central role in expanding regional economic cooperation and building bridges of dialogue to end tensions and establish regional relations of mutual benefits’. There is an intention to hold a third conference in the second half of 2023, with the aim of introducing a thematic focus to the conversation.
As this is the only forum that has included Iranian participation alongside significant Arab regional states, greater diplomatic efforts are needed to provide momentum to this process. One interviewee argued that ‘[t]he regular repetition of this gathering can serve as an important point of departure for gradual dialogue’. While Iran’s regional activities are unlikely ever to be the sole focus of these discussions, greater direct diplomacy with Iran is important to stabilize regional tensions and entrench de-escalatory patterns. Additionally, thematic discussions on climate or trade could build much-needed additional confidence and trust among participants.
The Negev summit
Alongside the Baghdad initiative, the twin March 2021 summits in Sharm el-Sheikh and Negev brought Israel together with a growing coalition of Arab states. Sharm el-Sheikh was a trilateral Emirati, Egyptian and Israeli event, while the Negev summit convened Israel along with Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco and the UAE, with the US also present, to build and support the normalization agreements through economic and security cooperation.
The Negev summit was a first of its kind and regarded as a significant achievement, due to it being regionally managed and implemented without the US playing its usual coordination role, as, for example, in the 1991 Madrid peace talks. Symbolically, the meeting showcased Israel’s regional integration, while Egypt’s participation not only vindicated its own 1979 peace with Israel but also enabled stronger economic and political cooperation. Jordan was invited but did not attend, as a demonstration of its frustration over the Palestinian issue. The prospect of the US returning to the JCPOA and the implications of that re-entry for regional states featured high on the summit’s agenda. Moreover, as in 2015, a range of Middle East states – including Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – opposed US efforts to reach a deal with Iran for fear that it would: i) legitimize Iran’s quest to develop a fully functioning nuclear programme and achieve threshold status; and ii) incentivize Iran to further destabilize the region through its proxy groups.
Whereas in the past, the US would have taken the lead in convening regional states, it was much more of an observer at the Negev summit and Secretary of State Blinken played a secondary role. Moreover, the regional states present – though largely misaligned in their expected outcomes from the summit – conveyed their common concern that the US is no longer as committed to the region. Formerly, the US played an indispensable role in bringing Israel and Arab states together; it was instrumental in pushing for the Israeli–Egyptian and Israeli–Jordanian peace treaties. Although Norway facilitated the secret talks between Israelis and Palestinians resulting in the Oslo Process, it was the US (and the administration of Bill Clinton) in particular that brought Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat together on the White House lawn in September 1993 to sign the Oslo Accords. The US then shepherded the peace process until the intifada of 2002. It was striking, therefore, both that Israel and the normalization states convened their own summit in Negev without US leadership and that they were so tightly knit when criticizing US regional policy.
Amid both the war in Ukraine and concerns over the US role in the Middle East, the Negev meeting provided an opportunity for states which see Iran as a regional threat to discuss their concerns directly. The principal outcomes of the meeting, beyond the mere publicity value, were a commitment to make the meeting a rotating forum and the establishment of six working groups to coordinate on education, energy, food and water security, health, security and tourism. These working groups are also aimed at coordinating steps to improve living conditions in the Palestinian Territories. Since the initial meeting, members convened in Bahrain in June 2022 to set up the structure of the forum. The working groups are set to meet three times a year. In January 2023, the Negev working groups convened in Abu Dhabi to begin preparations for the planned March 2023 meeting in Morocco. It is hoped that, with time, they could build greater institutional cooperation on hard and soft security issues and form the basis for a broader institutional framework, but such a process will require dedicated diplomatic activity that is directed towards specific goals.
While one US observer saw these developments as significant for ‘bottom-up’ processes and trust among regional partners, the long-term nature of this project will not lead to ‘quick wins’ or swift regional transformations. Indeed, in the first meeting, Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid took the opportunity to foreshadow Israel’s broader objective of creating ‘a new regional architecture to deter common enemies’. Egypt, however, made clear its view that the summit did not signal participation in a broader regional security structure. With heightened tensions over the new Israeli government’s posture towards the Palestinians, reports suggested that the March 2023 meeting in Morocco is likely to be postponed. It should be noted that Jordan also continues to refuse participation. Should a postponement happen, this demonstrates that normalization alone will not lead to a full embrace of Israel without progress on Palestinian issues. Moreover, it foreshadows that this process cannot on its own serve as an arena for dialogue and conflict resolution. The path to regional security alongside thematically based cooperation requires continued planning and persistence alongside inclusion of the issue of Palestine to overcome the endemic challenges.
Israeli participation in CENTCOM
In January 2021, the US Department of Defense announced the expansion of CENTCOM’s geographical remit to include Israel. This decision – signed off under the Trump administration – was made after the realization that US and Israeli shared and perceived threats in the region were ineffectively handled by the existing organizational division of responsibilities. Israel had previously fallen under the aegis of the US European Command (EUCOM). However, threats to both countries were emanating from geographies under CENTCOM’s purview – in particular, from Iran, Lebanon and Yemen.
Much like the political relationship between Israel and the UAE, Israeli engagement with Middle East-based CENTCOM predated formal partnership. High-level meetings between US and Israeli defence personnel had been quietly conducted for years, and by 2016, a three-way dialogue between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), CENTCOM and EUCOM had been established. The overlap between the three parties’ interests, and the threats emerging across the region at the time, made closer CENTCOM–IDF operational cooperation an inevitable next step.
The gradual rapprochement between Israel and some of its Arab neighbours in recent years – leading to the signing of the Abraham Accords – and the rising, shared threat of Iran allowed for Israel’s formal involvement in the CENTCOM structure.
Israel’s inclusion in CENTCOM at this point was also a reflection of the changing realities on the ground. At CENTCOM’s establishment in 1983, most Middle Eastern states did not recognize Israel. But the gradual rapprochement between Israel and some of its Arab neighbours in recent years – leading to the signing of the Abraham Accords – and the rising, shared threat of Iran allowed for Israel’s formal involvement in the CENTCOM structure.
The shift, however, is not unprecedented – the US has routinely made alterations to the United Command Plan to reflect, and respond to, changing realities on the ground. For example, Lebanon and Syria were moved under CENTCOM in 2004, the Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2007 and PACOM was renamed Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in 2018 – all in response to geopolitical developments and policy priorities.
Several potential problems arise from Israel’s inclusion. First, on a practical level, the financial and operational requirements from CENTCOM increase. However, US officials have stated that such increases will be inconsequential and will have little effect on the daily operation of the command. Second, there is a risk that the US’s relationships with other CENTCOM partners may suffer owing to opposition to Israel over the Palestinian issue, although disagreements between the members of multilateral military groupings are not uncommon – for example, Turkey within NATO. Finally, the US’s ability to distance itself from Israeli military activities could be compromised by the IDF’s participation, although in reality, the close ties between the two are already widely acknowledged and strategic coordination between the US and Israel already assumed.
Despite these challenges, the benefits of Israeli integration appear to outweigh the risks. First, cooperation can serve as a first step towards the US’s goal of establishing a regional security framework for the Middle East, partly to burden-share with Middle Eastern partners but also to allow the US to focus more on China. Second, CENTCOM can also provide a mechanism for Israel to communicate and cooperate with those Arab states not yet party to the Abraham Accords, furthering the US’s ambition of broadening the number of signatories. Finally, Israeli participation enables the expansion of joint military and naval exercises – several of which have already been conducted with, and alongside, Arab states. In November 2021, the US coordinated the first publicly acknowledged joint naval drill between its navy and those of Bahrain, Israel and the UAE. February 2022 saw Israel participate for the first time in the US-led International Maritime Exercise (IME), alongside Oman and Saudi Arabia – despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Israel and those states. Comprising over 60 countries, the IME covers the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and north Indian Ocean. In August 2022, the US and Israel held a bilateral training event in the Red Sea, designed to improve interoperability between their respective maritime interdiction teams.
Joint exercises and drills of this kind serve several purposes. On a routine level, they are designed to strengthen, and display, capability to protect freedom of navigation and the free flow of trade, which is vital to ensuring regional security and stability. They also act as a deterrent to any potentially disruptive forces. From Israel’s perspective, these recent exercises help to counter Iran’s power projection in the region. The exercises have also facilitated discussions and coordination around a long-term collective security process. However, such overt demonstrations of power – as a foreign policy tool, as well as a military one – could serve to further provoke Iran and its proxies into a circular cycle of threat, deterrent and response.
The RSC
The creation of a regional security construct (RSC) aims to bring together regional states with Israel and CENTCOM to support greater military integration and coordination across the MENA region. While being the most ambitious of the projects mentioned so far, the RSC has the greatest potential to build security collaboration among regional states. It will also require the most work among all those initiatives to meet its objectives. A military integration initiative of this magnitude, while having received support from past US administrations, has not been pursued since 1983. The role and bipartisan commitment of the US is a key variable in its success.
As part of CENTCOM’s transition from active military engagement to a focus on promoting regional security, the RSC aims to create a framework that, over time, integrates regional air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing, maritime security operations, crisis response and counterterrorism operations among US regional partners. To enable this transition, CENTCOM has been required to transform its level of regional engagement to what is described as ‘partnership over posture’. The RSC intends to implement a phased integration of Israeli and Arab systems and personnel via regular convening.
This investment in collective regional security is not new. The US government has, since the 1991 Gulf War, made similar efforts to support a regional security architecture for the Middle East. Most recently, the Trump administration tried – and failed – to rally regional support for its Middle East Security Architecture (MESA) project. MESA and previous such projects all ended in failure largely because partner states were primarily interested in forging stronger bilateral ties with the US. Competing regional dynamics also meant that those partners could not align their objectives. The RSC, however, is the first time that such a detailed strategy has been proposed. The RSC differs from MESA in that there is greater bipartisan support for this initiative in Washington, with awareness that ‘drawing down in the region requires investment in a regional security construct’. However, achieving the vision will prove difficult, not least because ‘resources are more stretched and American partners are even more anxious’. In the US, the bureaucratic process is also seen as a hindrance in the Middle East.
CENTCOM has itself acknowledged that Israel’s broader regional engagement, a move that was also made possible by Trump’s decision to place Israel under the purview of CENTCOM, has helped to facilitate this transition. R. Clarke Cooper, the US State Department’s top official for foreign military transfers under the Trump administration, confirmed the broader objective related to that move as an attempt to ‘enable Middle Eastern militaries to become interoperable with the United States as well as with each other’.
It is important to stress that CENTCOM is not offering regional states a US alliance, nor are regional states willing yet to join a formal defence pact against the common threat of Iran. Also, it must be acknowledged that the RSC development process requires procedural, technical and integration phases that need ‘long-term work and cooperation through training, exercises, equipment, authorities, and doctrine…and truly is a heavy lift’. One interviewee cautioned that this process will be at least a decade in the making and by no means can be achieved in lightning speed. Above all, trust is needed to bring competing partners together. Considering these challenges, it appears difficult to see how such an initiative can get off the ground. Cooperation at that level, however, is of critical importance to US geopolitical and regional interests.
The first phase of the process requires broad alignment among participants on the nature of regional threats. A coordinated threat assessment is particularly challenging and has never been achieved among regional partners. But it is an essential step to building consensus on the regional environment. While the RSC could easily appear to be an anti-Iran alliance, regional states have yet to align their thinking – and will probably not – on how to manage Iran’s destabilizing regional influence. Many regional states would moreover refuse to join if the anti-Iran posture was explicit, to maintain their independent approach. In fact, Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, stated in July 2022 that ‘Abu Dhabi doesn’t support a regional alliance to confront Iran’. For this reason, regional states are cautious in the public domain to avoid association with an overtly anti-Iranian pact.
The second, more technical phase will concentrate on linking capacity including radars and satellites to prepare for the final, and most challenging, phase of interoperability. This second phase will require states to prepare for system link-ups. This stage will likely also prove challenging because states have been procuring defence systems from a range of partners, including China, Europe and the US, that therefore cannot be immediately synchronized. Regional states also have diverse capabilities and competing systems that cannot be easily reconciled. For interoperability to be achieved, new technology must be developed to bring states together. Regional states that have already invested in defence systems will be reluctant to upgrade before the lifespan of such investments ends. The key to this process is to build a theatre for secure communications, joint training and operations.
For the RSC initiative to develop fully, time and regular engagement are imperative. One interviewee argued: ‘Because a structural surgery is needed to transform and upgrade security cooperation, it could take up to five years to bring the most aligned and agile states together.’ Bilateral meetings are to be complemented by two intra-regional conferences bringing together the GCC states, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan at the head-of-defence level. As noted, among the hardest tasks for participants will be to coordinate and align on the timing of this plan: as the same interviewee pointed out, ‘[i]t took NATO, the most powerful alliance on the planet, decades before it achieved it’.
Normalization of ties with Israel has allowed for the formal military-to-military engagement with Arab states to begin. Biden’s visit to Israel in July 2022 came with the signing of the Jerusalem Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, a document that demonstrates the US’s prioritization of Israel and support for its regional integration. The ‘US sees Israel with its advanced systems as an asset in supporting the RSC,’ stated one interviewee. The US convened a meeting with former head of CENTCOM General Frank MacKenzie in March 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh that brought together Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Previous lower-level meetings have been held at which participants discussed scenarios on how to detect and defend against air threats.
Since this initial phase, current CENTCOM commander General Michael Kurilla has shepherded the process forward with subsequent visits and investments. Through this ongoing engagement, RSC participants have been able to align on providing rapid notification regarding aerial threats, which can be done using computer or phone communication and maritime security to be led by the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).
The NAVCENT process is the most advanced to date, with the expectation that security cooperation in this domain will commence in the summer of 2023. Training and capacity-building to set up a new security initiative to patrol the Persian Gulf are well under way. However, the regional trust deficit has caused the air and missile defence process to stagnate, despite urgency and a shared threat from Iran. Sustained engagement, both between Arab states and with Israel, is needed to build confidence.
With many states including Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia having yet to normalize ties with Israel, major obstacles to the RSC still exist. While CENTCOM intends to play an intermediary role enabling formal defence cooperation, even the appearance of formal partnership with Israel is too high an obstacle for some Arab countries. Above all, many regional states worry that the RSC will be seen solely as an anti-Iran alliance. But without the capacity to deter air and missile threats, regional states remain acutely vulnerable.
Another, but equally important, issue that complicates efforts to build the RSC is the trust deficit among GCC states. This deficit has so far continued to prevent GCC states from cooperating on intelligence-sharing, but the US network provided via CENTCOM would aim to bridge the gap. The US–GCC defence working group meetings held in February 2023 are one of the efforts aimed at correcting these dynamics with a step-by-step approach to regionalizing security. Despite the shift towards multilateral engagement, interviewees confirmed that GCC states still prefer to prioritize their bilateral relationships with Washington. The UAE continues to push for integration with Bahrain and Israel as a first step. One policymaker suggested that, since relations between all three are normalized and are ready to go, the US should support that collaboration and be ready for other countries to join at a later stage.
Some countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, see their engagement in the RSC as an opportunity to upgrade bilateral defence cooperation to secure stronger defence relationships. Yet competition among GCC players, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, is inhibiting progress. Participant states are also moving ahead at differing speeds. One interviewee indicated that ‘Kuwait and Bahrain were all in [to the RSC], while Qatar was proving difficult to read and Oman categorically not interested’. These divergences could prove to be significant obstacles. Consistent US diplomatic engagement and leadership-level support are required to nurture and nudge these relationships along.
US–Emirati security matters
The UAE is seeking an upgraded bilateral strategic framework with the US that would highlight the former’s weight and influence in the MENA region. The broad goal would be to ‘develop a strategic framework that aligns not only on defence cooperation but also on climate, energy, China strategy and other challenges’. Such an agreement would also help insulate the bilateral relationship from the increasingly partisan nature of US politics. The demand for an upgraded strategic agreement points to the UAE’s continued security reliance on the US. Negotiations towards this agreement have already begun, with the UAE seeking the highest-level guarantees on security, alongside meaningful cooperation in the fields of climate change, science and technology.
Progress in the climate space was made in November 2022 with the signing of the Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy (PACE), which aims to increase cooperation between the US and UAE towards ‘a goal of deploying 100 gigawatts of clean energy by 2035.’ This partnership shows a diversification beyond defence and an important commitment in advance of the UAE’s presidency of COP28 in November 2023.
US–Emirati relations on security matters have been close for more than 20 years, and successive administrations, with authorization from Congress, have sold the Emiratis sophisticated US weaponry, such as F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. The US and UAE established a ‘Defence Cooperation Framework’ to develop joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote interoperability. These processes built on the 1994 bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement, the text of which is classified.
The UAE’s sustained cooperation with the US in the field of defence over the past two decades has enabled it to project power across the region.
The UAE’s sustained cooperation with the US in the field of defence over the past two decades has enabled it to project power across the region. Cooperation has included purchases of US arms, capacity-building, strategic planning, and joint drills and activities. The UAE’s armed forces are small – numbering approximately 50,000 – but have gained experience and built capability since 2001 through participating in US-led military ground operations, including Somalia (1992), the Balkans (late 1990s), and Afghanistan (2003–14), as well as air operations in Libya (2011) and against ISIS in Syria (2014–15). The UAE joined the US-led International Maritime Security Construct security mission in the Gulf in 2019 in an effort to deter Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping.
A deal signed with the US in January 2021 for the UAE to procure up to 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper drones has been reviewed by the Biden administration; and the process of finalizing the sale has been delayed over US concerns that the UAE could purchase the F-35 and its technology from rival powers – notably China, with which the UAE enjoys growing relations. As the negotiation process for an expanded strategic framework continues, it remains to be seen if the UAE can obtain the security guarantees it is seeking. ‘While they are seeking a South Korean-like defence pact with Washington or a Taiwanese commitment, it is hard to see the US making such a commitment and obtaining Congressional approval,’ said one interviewee. As such, the UAE is seeking greater defence and capacity-building to confront drone and missile threats, including access to US-made Predator missiles and other assets that will provide early warning. Against this backdrop, the Abraham Accords have created space for increased regional security and defence collaboration discussions to take place.
The Red Sea
Given the importance of the Red Sea to global trade and individual countries’ import and export activities, major powers including the US, the EU, China and Russia, as well as regional states, share an interest in securing the sea’s maritime security.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), global maritime trade volumes are expected to treble by 2050 owing to a rapidly expanding e-commerce industry and population growth. As such, securing access to, and protecting, critical waterways will remain a high priority for trading nations and a central feature of national security strategies. This has led many states to project power into the Red Sea arena through a variety of means, including establishing naval and military bases, lending diplomatic and political support, and providing budget assistance, infrastructure investment, training and development aid.
Maritime security is not restricted to protecting waterways, as it also encompasses protecting against a wider range of threats, such as inter-state conflict, piracy, illegal immigration, human trafficking, weapons and narcotics smuggling, terrorism and illegal fishing, and offsetting the effects of environmental catastrophes.
Given increasing threats to and global interest in the Red Sea, the US has begun to change its thinking about the strategic significance of the sub-region, taking steps to ensure it has oversight of the region. As a result, it established a new multinational taskforce in April 2022: Combined Task Force (CTF) 153 complements existing taskforces by dividing the geographic area under the CTF’s purview to allow a dedicated taskforce to cover the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.
While the primary threat to be addressed by the CTF is Iranian weapons-smuggling, particularly to the Houthi movement in Yemen, Russia’s intentions in the Red Sea arena will undoubtedly be on US minds as well. In fact, the US provided military facilities to Kenya and Somalia in the 1970s to counter the then-Soviet ambition in Africa. Russian expansionary ambitions have once again become a pressing priority, not least because Russia has already begun embedding itself in the Mediterranean with a presence in both Libya and Syria.
Increasing multilateralism
The proliferation of multilateral security forums as described above highlights the vacuum of power in the Middle East, alongside the profound security concerns of regional states. Geopolitical tensions between China and Russia and the US, and the war in Ukraine, have aggravated problematic security dynamics in the region. With the US increasingly distracted by threats from elsewhere, these multilateral initiatives provide an opportunity for MENA states to directly manage regional challenges. The various summits and gatherings showcase a pattern of strategic flexibility where states are asserting their priorities and stepping up cooperation in areas of mutually aligned interest. One analyst described the dynamics as ‘using multiple alliances to minimize the scope of dangers coming from outside’. For the US, increased multilateralism in the Middle East is seen as positive. ‘There is an awareness in Washington that there is no one sustainable approach to address the array of threats ranging from human security, climate, Iran to others’, said one interviewee. The hope is that, over time, multilateral cooperation will ‘create a deliberate but incremental pathway for leaders and their societies to cooperate’.
It is important to note that, unlike previous alignments seen after the Arab Spring uprisings, these groupings are not ideologically motivated but rather emerging via flexible avenues of cooperation that have been reinvigorated after the Abraham Accords. Despite displaying strategic or tactical differences in managing threats, regional states are also coming together to discuss a range of security challenges, which include climate change, food security, cybersecurity and political instability, among others. Many of these multilateral groupings are at an early stage and will require sustained investment if they are to provide cooperative security benefits. The Biden administration’s belated but necessary support for these initiatives is an important investment in regional security and could be a ‘game changer’ that can help the US take full advantage of the relations that have been built.
For a more formal structure to emerge from these efforts, the multiple convening initiatives would have to be combined with deliberate intention. Regional states have yet to coalesce around this goal. One interviewee stressed that ‘integration can only be achieved with leadership buy-in’. It is also unclear if these new dynamics will become a permanent feature of Middle East regional politics. After a decade of tension and competition, regional states could make use of a common platform to upgrade their security cooperation to prepare for future cycles of tension with Iran. If successfully managed, the new dynamics could lead to a period of recalibration that breeds new alignments and security coordination across the region.
