Just a few years ago, Ethiopia and Sudan looked set for encouraging new chapters in their fraught histories. In Ethiopia, newly selected prime minister Abiy Ahmed began repairing relations with Eritrea in July 2018 and set a course for uniting his ethnically diverse country, following years of growing opposition to the ruling party. In Sudan, months of civilian protests culminated in the military’s ouster of president Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 after 30 years of dictatorship, laying the foundation for democratic rule. Today, both countries are undergoing fraught and bloody transitions which have vast national and regional implications, and in which numerous powerful external actors have a keen and sometimes damaging interest.
Clashes between old and new political forces in both countries have violently disrupted political reform and fuelled economic crises. In Ethiopia, conflict in the northern region of Tigray began in late 2020, pitting the region’s forces against the Ethiopian federal army – with the latter supported by Eritrea and a mix of other Ethiopian regional forces, most notably from the neighbouring Amhara region. It also propelled fighting across northern, central and western regions of Ethiopia. The war has stirred up ethno-nationalist and secessionist sentiments, directly contributing to hundreds of thousands of deaths (and leading to credible accusations of atrocities on both sides), threatening the unity and integrity of the country’s federal system, and exacerbating tensions with neighbours to the point that the conflict has threatened to engulf the entire region. Sudan’s civilian-led transition was derailed by a military coup in October 2021, leading to near-daily street protests and dashing hopes of a permanent shift towards democracy. All of this has been accompanied by attempts on the part of regional and geopolitical stakeholders to influence the political process in often contradictory ways.
Along with these domestic concerns, interconnected issues have pitted the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments against each other, drawing in communities living on either side of the shared 740-km border. Sporadic military clashes over the fertile agricultural land of the Al Fashaga region, and repeated accusations of proxy support for each other’s rebel groups, demonstrate the mistrust and limited working relations between the new leaders in Ethiopia and Sudan over the last two years. These issues should be viewed as part of a larger existential regional power rivalry over the management of the GERD. Increased pressure from domestic crises in both countries has led to both governments hardening their opposing stances, worsening tensions between them over these cross-border disputes.
Along with domestic concerns, interconnected issues have pitted the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments against each other, drawing in communities living on either side of the shared border.
If these cross-border issues are left to fester, tensions could escalate considerably. While open conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan seems unlikely at present – particularly in the wake of the Tigray ceasefire and attempts by Abiy and Burhan to restore relations – the situation is fragile and efforts to restore good relations need to be reinforced. Renewed and sustained hostility between the two countries would have grave implications for regional stability, affecting humanitarian, development and economic outcomes. It could also draw other regional actors into a wider struggle.
International stakeholders working to defuse these tensions need to factor the potentially combustible interaction of domestic and cross-border issues into their policy responses. Substantial multilateral and bilateral diplomatic efforts in Ethiopia and Sudan to date have largely failed to account for the intertwining of such issues. In fact, international stakeholders have often worked at cross purposes – influenced by their own, sometimes incompatible, interests. If they are to address the growing regional impact of cross-border disputes, partners concerned with long-term stability in the Horn of Africa should work to understand the fundamental linkages between the domestic crises in Ethiopia and Sudan, and should formulate policy responses accordingly. They should also better align approaches that seek to boost levels of engagement and trust between the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments.
Methodology
This research paper is based on field research conducted by the authors in Ethiopia and Sudan between 2022 and 2023. That research consists of semi-structured key informant interviews, as well as some online interviews. Desk-based research examined a variety of secondary sources. These included, among others: academic and policy research on both countries and their wider regional dynamics; official documentation, including the Pretoria Agreement and Framework Agreement documents; and news sources from Ethiopian, Sudanese and international outlets.
The sampling for the key informant interviews sought to represent a broad range of actors and interests engaged in domestic and diplomatic interventions in both countries – including governments, political parties, regional and international actors, academics, analysts and civil society representatives. The sample included senior leaders from across the Ethiopian and Sudanese political spectrum, representatives of the AU and IGAD, as well as diplomats from key regional states, Western governments and multilateral organizations.
It is important also to acknowledge the difficulties in conducting this research. Research was not conducted in other parts of the broader region, such as Eritrea or the UAE. However, a short field visit was made to Egypt. A limiting consideration was the safety of the researchers and potential research participants. While the focus on foreign policy considerations reduced the potential risk of conducting interviews, the political and security situation in parts of Ethiopia and Sudan meant that not all actors could be consulted and not all societal positions could be included. Additional secondary sources were consulted to fill gaps where possible.
