The contestation over Al Fashaga and apparent Sudanese backing for Ethiopian opposition forces from Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz is intertwined with the larger regional matter of the GERD dispute – an existential issue for both states, as well as Egypt. Tigrayan and Gumuz forces, along with Oromo militia, have fought against the Ethiopian military and regional security forces, particularly the Amhara Special Forces (ASF) and Fano regional militia – with Gumuz forces reported to have attacked deliveries of construction materials for the GERD, demonstrably slowing the dam’s completion.
Beyond strategic calculations around the GERD, Sudanese government interests in the Tigray conflict are, in large part, the result of historical links between the Sudanese military and the TPLF. But they are in part linked to the dispute over Al Fashaga. Since sweeping into Al Fashaga in the weeks after the start of the conflict in Tigray, Sudanese regular forces now occupy this border area almost entirely, giving Sudan control over 600,000 acres of valuable agricultural land. Al Fashaga’s location along 250 sq km of the border also makes it crucial to Tigrayan interests keen to secure an access route into Sudan for trade and humanitarian supplies, as well as any military assistance necessary in the event of a resurgence of conflict. With Eritrea to the north, and Afar and Amhara federal states to the east and south, Sudan remains Tigray’s only prospective friendly boundary – although the crucial strip of land along the border was occupied early in the conflict by Ethiopian federal, Amhara and Eritrean forces, who recognized the strategic importance of the area as a potential supply route.
The GERD
Disagreement over management and operation of the GERD lies at the heart of tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan. Built on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, just 30 km from the border with Sudan, the GERD is nearing completion, with the Ethiopian government announcing in March 2023 that 90 per cent of the dam was finalized.Holleis, J. (2023), ‘Ethiopia’s GERD dam: A potential boon for all, experts say’, Deutsche Welle, 8 April 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-all-exper…. The dam, Africa’s largest, began generating electricity in February 2022, after 11 years of construction work. The Nile River states directly affected by choices made by Ethiopia in relation to water flows – Egypt and Sudan – have engaged in years of sporadic talks with Ethiopia over the dam’s operation. To date, the three countries have failed to finalize an agreement, although most technical issues reportedly have been resolved.
Those talks have foundered over an array of issues: Egyptian insistence on applying prior treaties on the use and distribution of Nile water that disadvantage Ethiopia; Ethiopian insistence on a non-binding agreement over water-sharing and operation of the dam; disagreement over the structure and legality of a dispute resolution mechanism; and differing views over drought mitigation and how much water to release from behind the dam during periods of high and low water flow. Coordination on water releases from the GERD’s 74 billion-cubic metre reservoir is imperative to regulate downstream flows and avoid disruption of Sudan’s Roseires dam, which lies 100 km downriver from the GERD and holds just one-tenth of its volume. In 2020, a water release from the GERD without prior notice disrupted the Roseires water pumps, and in 2021 the filling of the GERD dam basin caused the Roseires dam to clog with excess silt, halting its turbines. In a sign of progress, the parties agreed in mid-2022 to share data on GERD operations to support operational and irrigation planning by downstream states.
Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government sought to tread a narrow path of even-handedness in regional relations, which included efforts to mediate on outstanding technical and legal issues around the GERD.
After initially favouring the GERD megaproject, Sudan has grown more sceptical of the project over time. Former President Bashir initially backed the dam’s construction, correctly anticipating benefits including improved control of damaging Nile flooding, improved irrigation for farming and the purchase of excess electricity to supplement Sudan’s weak and unreliable power grid. But Bashir’s ouster prompted a change in Sudan’s stance. Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government sought to tread a narrow path of even-handedness in regional relations, which included efforts to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia on outstanding technical and legal issues around the GERD. Following the October 2021 coup, however, the Sudanese military’s long-standing relationship with Egypt’s armed forces came to the fore, with the two armies conducting large-scale military exercises that heightened Ethiopian unease. Policy towards the GERD likewise hardened under military leadership. The conflict in Tigray, which fuelled violence along the Ethiopia–Sudan border and heightened bilateral tensions, also raised questions among Sudanese officials regarding Ethiopian intentions and prospects for ensuring smooth dam operations amid ongoing instability. However, the recent detente between the leaders of Ethiopia and Sudan offers some hope for a return to closer alignment on the GERD between both countries.
Egypt, meanwhile, has always opposed the dam. It views unfettered access to Nile waters as an existential issue: 98 per cent of the country’s nearly 100 million people live close to the Nile, which provides around 90 per cent of Egypt’s water needs. Egypt’s reliance on the river fuels its concerns about the potential for Ethiopia to assert unilateral control over its flow – a concern shared by Sudan. Egypt likewise fears that Sudan could divert a larger share of the Nile over time to support expanded agriculture, motivating efforts to maintain close relations. To reinforce its stance against the GERD, Egypt has sought to influence both US and EU positions on the issue. It has also sought alliances among other Nile Basin countries such as South Sudan and Uganda. Before the Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement of 2018, Egypt had cultivated relations with Eritrea, partly to rile the Ethiopian government.
Al Fashaga
The resurgence of a century-old dispute over ownership and use of the border region of Al Fashaga – lying in Sudan’s Gedaref state and flanking both Tigray and Amhara in Ethiopia – is an especially sensitive flashpoint, given the direct involvement of both militaries. Since 1996, the highly prized and fertile region has been predominantly cultivated by thousands of Ethiopian Amhara and Tigrayan farmers, with the tacit acquiescence of Sudan’s government. Following the ouster of al-Bashir, however, Sudanese interest in regaining Al Fashaga intensified. Shortly after the start of the conflict in Tigray, the SAF pushed into Al Fashaga, capitalizing on the shifting focus of Ethiopian federal and Amhara forces. Sudan quickly reclaimed nearly the entire area of Al Fashaga with little fighting, evicting thousands of Ethiopian farmers.
Sudanese officials now insist that a return to prior farming and soft border arrangements in Al Fashaga will only be possible if Ethiopia accepts Sudanese sovereignty over the territory. Sudan’s claim dates back to the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 and a subsequent effort to demarcate the border between Sudan and Ethiopia in 1903. The unofficial border line drawn as part of this effort – the Gwynn Line (named after the British officer who had led the attempt to demarcate) – places Al Fashaga inside Sudan, although the 1972 exchange of notes between the two countries provides for negotiated demarcation.
Sudan has worked to consolidate its hold over Al Fashaga by expanding Sudanese farming in the area, while also building military fortifications, bridges and roads. Sudanese communities with land claims in the region hailed the SAF’s takeover, boosting the army’s standing in parts of eastern Sudan that traditionally have not viewed the military favourably. Such heightened political favour has great value for the SAF as it works to build popular support for its role in the country’s transition.
The Al Fashaga issue has subnational implications, as important Ethiopian and Sudanese constituencies – including business figures linked to Emirati interests in agricultural production – demand that Prime Minister Abiy and General Burhan respectively secure the fertile territory for farming.
After Sudan’s reclamation of Al Fashaga, Abiy has been under pressure to defend what many Ethiopians, particularly the Amhara, view as historically and rightfully Ethiopian territory. Amhara elites have pressed the Ethiopian federal government to respond both diplomatically and militarily to Sudan. However, apart from an early burst of violence, the Ethiopian and Sudanese militaries have mainly avoided direct confrontation. Instead, sporadic cross-border clashes have taken place involving Amhara militias, which Sudan alleges are backed by the Ethiopian and Eritrean militaries. Those clashes have allegedly killed dozens of Sudanese soldiers. Violence has also erupted due to disputes between Ethiopian and Sudanese farmers over the control of agricultural lands in Al Fashaga and other parts of Gedaref state. In mid-2022, the Sudanese army accused the Ethiopian military of executing seven captured Sudanese soldiers and a civilian following such clashes. Ethiopia’s ministry of defence ascribed the violence to militia forces and denounced the Sudanese claims as provocations. The episode highlights the risk of escalation due to competing claims and narratives.
In July 2022, Abiy and Burhan met on the side-lines of an IGAD summit and agreed to form a joint committee to resolve the border dispute and re-open the strategic Metema–Gallabat border crossing – an important trade conduit between the two countries. However, renewed fighting in Tigray in September 2022 prompted Sudan to reinforce its positions along the border, heightening the potential for unintended escalation. Reciprocal visits by the two leaders – first by Burhan to Ethiopia in October 2022, then by Abiy to Sudan in January 2023 – have signalled an easing of tensions, but this has yet to be followed by noticeable changes on the ground.
Even as the immediate prospects of an open conflagration have receded – with the Pretoria ceasefire largely holding in Ethiopia and communication between Ethiopia and Sudan on the one hand and Sudan and Eritrea on the other – the three militaries (Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) have remained deployed in large numbers close to one another, illustrating the overall dearth of trust. The regional implications of any escalation would be vast, including further civilian displacement and economic and food security consequences.
Sudanese support for the TPLF and other Ethiopian opposition groups
Reports of Sudanese support for Tigrayan forces and other armed groups within Ethiopia have fed cross-border tensions. Diplomatic, Sudanese and Tigrayan military sources indicate that Sudan enabled the flow of supplies and materiel to both Tigrayan forces and rebels from the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, and allowed these forces to operate from eastern Sudan. The Sudanese authorities have denied providing materiel or training to Tigrayan forces.
In addition, some 60,000–70,000 mainly Tigrayan refugees have fled to eastern Sudan since the start of the conflict. Some reportedly left refugee camps along the border to join TDF units operating from inside Sudan, seemingly with a focus on regaining all-important ground in western Tigray from Amhara security forces. Control of western Tigray – a key transit corridor and supply route from Sudan to Tigray – remains a strategic priority for the Tigrayans, and future arrangements for this territory’s administration are among the fundamental points of contention to be resolved in any durable solution to the Ethiopian conflict.
As of September 2022, tens of thousands of Tigrayan fighters were estimated to be present in eastern Sudan’s Gedaref state. This included a contingent of Tigrayan peacekeeping forces, formerly serving within the Ethiopian military as part of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), who had received political asylum in Sudan. Sudan also has sheltered Tigrayan political figures in Khartoum since early in the war, a reflection of the long-standing relationship between the Sudanese military and the TPLF.
Separately, Sudanese support to Gumuz rebels amid the Tigray conflict was said to include shelter of armed groups in Sudan’s Blue Nile state, bordering Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region where the GERD is located. Gumuz rebels are reported to have used this area as a staging ground for attacks inside the Beninshangul-Gumuz region, in particular against convoys delivering construction materials to the GERD. As with Al Fashaga and its support to Tigrayan rebels, Sudan’s apparent tolerance of armed opposition activity within its borders is likely partly intended to place additional pressure on the Ethiopian federal government to reach agreement on the GERD.
Domestic posturing and the cross-border implications
With both Ethiopia and Sudan simultaneously undergoing transitions following the departure of long-standing authoritarian governments, the potential for domestic rivalries to drive or influence regional policy also raises the stakes in the relationship. As part of their political and strategic positioning, Sudan’s leading military figures, Burhan and Hemedti, have allied with opposing sides of the Ethiopian conflict. On the heels of reasserting Sudanese military control over Al Fashaga, Burhan and the SAF reinforced the long-standing Sudanese government relationship with the TPLF. Hemedti, by contrast, sought to cultivate a relationship with Abiy and federal government figures in Addis Ababa. However, recent efforts by Abiy and Burhan to restore relations will have undermined those efforts. Hemedti’s networking has included drawing closer to Ethiopia’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, as well as other Amhara leaders over shared business interests, including in agriculture and tourism. Hemedti has sought to balance engagement with Abiy and Amhara elites – the latter of which are focused on retaining control over western Tigray – with efforts to deepen his political appeal and influence on the opposite side of the border in eastern Sudan.
While the ceasefire in northern Ethiopia has offered some promise of a lasting response to conflict, the primarily Ethiopian war has become a regionalized one. Sudanese, Egyptian and Eritrean actions can therefore ease or exacerbate the conflict – as has been most vividly demonstrated by Eritrea’s damaging involvement on the side of the federal government.
At present, there is impetus towards consolidating peace with Tigray. But these calculations could change, particularly if significant disagreements over implementation of the Pretoria Agreement should emerge.
The Ethiopian federal government’s ability and will to negotiate with the TPLF over core issues that led to war is conditioned by Abiy’s own domestic political calculations that rely on balancing Amhara, Afar, Oromo and other ethnonationalist interests, tensions within his ruling PP and the need to restart international assistance to help save a foundering economy. At present, there is impetus towards consolidating peace with Tigray. But these calculations could change, particularly if significant disagreements over implementation of the Pretoria Agreement should emerge. While Abiy consolidated his authority with an election win in 2021 and party reshuffles at the PP congress in March 2022, the positions of senior Amhara in the government remain important to the form and progress of mediations. Even if a sustained political settlement with Tigray is achievable, it could lead to further fracturing among Amhara or Afar constituencies and greater divisions between Ethiopia and its allies in Eritrea, if not carefully managed. Moreover, the varied international stakeholders involved – not least Egypt, Eritrea, the UAE and the US – have often worked at cross purposes, as they seek to resolve these crises in service of their own, sometimes incompatible interests.
Eritrean interests and interference
Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki’s deep animosity towards the Tigrayans stretches back decades, even before the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia war, to the 1970s, when the Eritrean and Tigrayan leaderships alternated between cooperation over shared enemies and discord over divergent strategic visions. However, Afwerki’s unambiguous antipathy towards the TPLF in its current form means that Sudanese support to the Tigrayans pitted Sudan against the governments of two neighbouring countries. During the peaks of the Ethiopian conflict, this heightened the prospect of proxy or even direct interstate conflict between Sudan and Eritrea, feeding into a complex range of tribal dynamics playing out across their shared border.
Eritrean forces have been supporting the Ethiopian federal government in Tigray since the first month of the war. However, Eritrea has been at pains to avoid direct confrontation with Sudan’s military. This is despite the fact that, until recently, Eritrean forces were gathered extremely close to Sudanese territory, in western Tigray – including at Humera, a strategic border point between Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. As of January 2023, some Eritrean units were reported to have moved out of major Tigrayan towns and back to the border area. However, reports of Eritrean forces’ presence in the region have continued. Afwerki was dismissive of calls for those troops to leave when asked by journalists following a visit to meet Kenyan president William Ruto in February 2023.
Eritrean officials made several high-level visits to Khartoum in the last year, some of which included offers to mediate in the political crisis in Sudan. Eritrea maintains an influence in eastern Sudan, where tribes spanning the border area between the two countries are often in dispute. Historically, the Eritrean government has encouraged the settlement of the Beni Amer tribe in eastern Sudan, and sought to use its connections within that tribe to project its interests in Sudan. Eritrea offered to facilitate an August 2022 dialogue between eastern Sudanese tribes, an offer which was rejected by the Sudanese government.
Prime Minister Abiy’s shifting stance on negotiations with Tigray, and the reported tensions this has caused with Afwerki, may have led to a change in approach by the latter. Afwerki is now deeply involved in Ethiopian politics; it is difficult to see how this will change. As part of the CoHA, the federal government has committed to ensuring sovereignty over its own territory and the removal of external forces from the region. Eritrean withdrawal will depend on whether Afwerki is reassured that the TPLF has been sufficiently weakened; in his eyes, this will likely require near full disarmament and demobilization of Tigrayan forces. However, that process is intended to take place simultaneously with the departure of Eritrean and Amhara forces from Tigray. If Eritrea does not fully withdraw, this could lead to a scenario where Ethiopian–Eritrean relations deteriorate once more and Ethiopian federal forces are pitted against their erstwhile allies.
With it being able to instrumentalize relationships with subnational groups such as the Amhara and the Afar, Eritrea’s commitment to removing the TPLF will continue to be a major obstacle and destabilizing factor in any attempts to reach a sustainable peace in northern Ethiopia.
Regional implications of Amhara discontent
The kinetic and political battle for control over western Tigray, a key fault line in the Tigray conflict and a focus of Sudanese interest across the border, is closely bound up in Amhara identity politics, as well as business interests which extend across the border into Al Fashaga. During the conflict in northern Ethiopia, Amhara, federal government and Eritrean interests converged over their shared antipathy towards the TPLF and TDF. The surge in Amhara nationalist sentiment was a significant motivational dynamic for the federal government’s prosecution of the conflict, and will continue to inform Abiy’s political stance as he seeks to resolve underlying tensions in the north.
Popular perceptions that the PP-led regional administration in Amhara serves the interests of the federal authorities over those of the Amhara people pitted Amhara nationalists against Abiy. This consternation was heightened by the federal government’s crackdown on the rapidly expanding Amhara Fano militia groups, which were at the centre of the fight against the TDF. The federal and regional forces arrested over 4,000 Amhara Fano, journalists and activists in May 2022. Moreover, in April 2023, the government’s decision to restructure the regional special forces under the command of the federal army and police sparked protests and armed skirmishes across the Amhara region. Amhara nationalists interpreted the decision as being targeted primarily towards curbing the Amhara region’s capacity for self-defence, and lessening its ability to maintain control of western Tigray and other contested areas.Addis Standard (2023), ‘News Update: Heavy artillery fired in Kobo as protests engulf Amhara region following decision to dissolve regional special forces’, 10 April 2023, https://addisstandard.com/news-update-heavy-artillery-fired-in-kobo-as-….
Despite the Amhara regional leadership overtly supporting the federal government’s decision, this dynamic contributes to heightened tensions between the two since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. Such schisms and federal–regional strains are not new and, in part, reflect long-standing grievances from the TPLF-dominated era.
Amhara nationalism is also strongly connected to farming and agricultural interests along the fertile borderlands. Ethiopian farmers have grown sesame and other crops on both sides of the border for many years, with most of the cash crops produced in Al Fashaga exported via Ethiopia until the onset of conflict in Tigray and Sudan’s capture of Al Fashaga in late 2020. The Amhara capture of fertile land in western Tigray from Tigrayan control, meanwhile, has concentrated the dominance of the agricultural sector in the hands of influential Amhara political, business and security elites, some of whom are connected to the PP. Along with local investors, they are unhappy at the Sudanese takeover in Al Fashaga and the prospect of a shift in the agricultural export market away from Ethiopia.
Amhara territorial claims over Al Fashaga have to some extent been softened by the capture of western Tigray. However, this has not prevented the use of hostile rhetoric by senior national politicians seeking to demonstrate their regional credentials and protect their business interests. Mekonnen, the most senior Amhara in the federal government, has been vocal on this issue, claiming that Sudan invaded Ethiopian territory and that the land would be returned to Ethiopian control either peacefully or by force. This illustrates that subnational factors will continue to have important bearing on Ethiopia- Sudan relations.
De facto Amhara control over western Tigray and the prominence of their political and economic elites mean that Amhara sentiments and positions on Al Fashaga and the border will continue to influence and shape the federal government’s actions. Amhara discontent is intensifying as divides open between Amhara interests and federal actions, which are perceived in the Amhara regional capital, Bahir Dar, to be directed by Oromo elites. There are concerns that Abiy may see concessions over western Tigray as a way to consolidate a tenuous peace with the Tigrayans, including by exploring an interim administration for the territory ahead of a possible future referendum on the territory’s governance.
