Cross-border tensions and interlinked crises in Ethiopia and Sudan jeopardize security and development across the Horn of Africa. International partners should coordinate on responses that address the intersection of those crises and causes of instability both within and between the two countries.
Both Ethiopia and Sudan will take many years to recover from their internal political and economic crises. Conditions in each country could worsen before they improve. The fragile ceasefire in the Tigray region and rising unrest in other parts of the country show how far Ethiopia remains from a sustainable reduction of violence. Even if the current peace deal holds, large parts of northern Ethiopia will struggle to recover from the damage caused to the country’s social fabric by interethnic fighting. Across the border in Sudan, meanwhile, the scramble for control of the political transition among a divided military, a splintered civilian cadre and a revived Islamist old guard indicates an uncertain future. In both contexts, interested regional and geopolitical forces further complicate attempts to deliver sustainable, inclusive, civilian-led governance that works for the countries’ large and diverse populations.
These crises, if unaddressed, have the potential to become much more dangerous than they already are. Stabilizing the intertwined transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan will require considerable and sustained international diplomatic, financial and technical assistance.
Domestic considerations and regional outcomes
Cooperation between Ethiopia and Sudan on trade and commerce, energy and regional security means the neighbours stand to benefit from each other’s stability; at the same time, discord between the two will see both suffer from each other’s fragilities. While domestic crises remain priorities for both countries’ governments, these crises will continue to have a ripple effect, influencing cross-border relations. For example, a transitional leadership in Sudan led by the military rather than civilian politicians has significantly different implications for negotiations with Ethiopia over the GERD or Al Fashaga. Likewise, the ascendance of one side of the military over the other will bring a different tone to relations with Addis Ababa. Similarly, a concerted effort to achieve peace between the federal government and the Tigrayan regional administration in Ethiopia would change the strategic calculus for Sudan, compared with renewed conflict in Ethiopia’s north.
Meanwhile, Eritrea’s reinforced role in northern Ethiopia, and its influence with subnational groups such as the Amhara, Afar and Beni Amer, are likely to have additional direct implications for Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan and possibly also with Djibouti. The Pretoria Agreement – as well as the prospect of a new, more robust civilian government in Sudan – offers an opportunity for the national governments of Ethiopia and Sudan to reset their relations. Sudan should apply its close relations with the TPLF and high-level engagement with Asmara to cement Ethiopia’s peace deal. Ethiopia’s federal government should continue to pursue efforts to secure a lasting settlement with the TPLF that is backed by the AU and supported by high-level regional stakeholders. A revitalized role for IGAD should also be explored in the context of fostering greater cross-border trust. Moreover, the possibility of Emirati and Saudi engagement with Eritrea (as co-brokers of the peace between it and Ethiopia) should be advanced as part of broader efforts to prevent Eritrea’s continuation of direct and proxy conflict with Tigrayan regional forces.
The prospective knock-on effects for regional security and integration of an agreement over the GERD are significant. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan should acknowledge the dangerous confluence of regional and domestic insecurity – which has been exacerbated by the Ukraine war and its impact on food security. The three countries must redouble their efforts to establish mutual trust and reach an agreement on outstanding points of contention around the GERD – namely, data-sharing; operation of the dam during periods of extremely high and low water flow; and a workable mechanism for resolving disputes. Although leadership of the AU passed from Senegal to Comoros in February 2023, meaning that the former is no longer in a strong position to lead continental efforts towards a deal on the GERD, Senegal’s prior experience in transboundary water management in West Africa could still be instructive for Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, and could help them to formulate a revised approach and strategy ahead of new negotiations.
Rebuilding bilateral and regional confidence
Amid tensions over disputed agricultural borderlands, recent Sudanese backing for rebels in Ethiopia’s north and an impasse at multiple rounds of negotiations over Ethiopia’s GERD megaproject, relations between Ethiopia and Sudan are at a low ebb, despite the recent detente. Simultaneously, promising transitions in both countries have stalled, bringing fundamental divisions within each society and between old and new elite power structures to the fore. These domestic crises and transnational tensions have prompted the involvement of other regional and geopolitical stakeholders, each of whom brings their own strategic interests to bear.
Proactive international engagement must be channelled more cohesively to enable stability within Ethiopia and Sudan, and to build the platforms and necessary confidence to calm and resolve their damaging cross-border disputes. Such achievements could then provide the foundations for longer-term regional stability and integration. Confidence-building measures might start with constructive international engagement on peace in northern Ethiopia, both bilaterally and via IGAD. Sudan could provide added reassurance to the federal government and Tigrayan interim regional administrationby publicly and practically applying its unique connections and influence to each in support of consolidating the Pretoria Agreement.
Those measures could then expand to form a new cooperative working group of local and national figures as a forum for dialogue and trust-building on cross-border issues such as Al Fashaga. An Ethiopia–Sudan border commission and other related mechanisms already exist. These should be revitalized to explore issues such as demarcation and to establish a formal land-use agreement through which citizens of both countries can peacefully cultivate the land. Cooperative cross-border measures – such as reopening of trade routes and formalizing arrangements for the leasing or sharing of farmland in Al Fashaga – would help to nurture and rebuild confidence between Ethiopia and Sudan. By encouraging the development of secondary and tertiary industries around the border area’s rich agricultural outputs, and by cooperating (rather than competing) on export logistics, both countries would boost the economic value of their produce and expand employment and livelihood opportunities for local communities.
Reinvigorating international engagement and coordination
Since 2022, international attention has been diverted from the Horn of Africa to the conflict in Ukraine. But warnings over food shortages – caused by the Ukraine war, instability in the Horn and climate-induced factors leading to worsening drought – should be a call to action for geopolitical stakeholders to support sustainable solutions in a region with growing strategic importance. The international community must understand in greater detail the connectivity between domestic crises in Ethiopia and Sudan and beyond, back policy approaches that seek to resolve those crises jointly, and better align their efforts to enhance engagement and trust between Ethiopia and Sudan.
The EU, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the UK and the US in particular hold considerable influence in this regard. For example, coordinated support from these international partners for a mechanism that addresses the shared utility of land and resources in Al Fashaga would serve as a useful confidence-building measure and could help to narrow the remaining gaps in negotiations over the GERD – at least between Ethiopia and Sudan.
China, the EU, France, the UK, the US and the UN have all appointed regional envoys. Coordination on approaches and allocation of resources between those envoys and the countries they represent would be particularly useful. Coordination could afford an opportunity to reset relationships and boost cooperation between Ethiopia and Sudan. Moreover, if effectively connected with continental and regional diplomatic mechanisms, it could support the foundations for longer-term stability and integration.
The international community must understand the connectivity between domestic crises in Ethiopia and Sudan, back policy approaches that seek to resolve those crises jointly, and better align their efforts to enhance engagement and trust.
The US should empower its latest Horn envoy to operate regionally while clarifying the role and reach of its ambassadors in Addis Ababa and Khartoum, as well as the modes of cooperation between the three. A reinvigorated US role and greater cooperation with partners including Saudi Arabia and the UAE – which should include the alignment of these efforts with the EU and the UK – could provide useful encouragement to move beyond securitized and transactional approaches, to adopting policies that show greater sensitivity to national and subnational contexts in the Horn. Collaborative Saudi, UK and US efforts to bring Sudan’s military and FFC-CC together for talks, and to reinvigorate the ‘quad’ diplomatic group, show how such approaches can succeed. The US should also use its influence to press the Saudis and Emiratis to use their considerable economic and cultural clout, with greater reference to popular civilian demands in Ethiopia and Sudan. This channel remains crucial to boosting the Ethiopian and Sudanese transitions and easing transboundary tensions.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are well placed financially to incentivize agreements on Al Fashaga and the GERD, via investments that both allow significant untapped agricultural and other commercial capacity to be realized and respond to food security worries in the Horn and the Gulf. Scope also exists for improved AU/IGAD–Gulf cooperation, building on existing efforts to engage on common regional priorities and Red Sea security issues.
In tackling these cross-border issues, the US and like-minded states must pay equal attention to the parallel transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan, and align their policymaking on both countries through the development of joint strategies which can be implemented by regional envoys. A more active re-engagement by the US in Sudan could help to offset the growing influence of both regional actors such as Egypt and Eritrea and external actors such as Israel and Russia. These actors have used US reticence over Sudan as an opportunity to project their own interests more assertively, with potentially harmful outcomes for regional stability.
If these opportunities to de-escalate tensions and build stability are not taken, the Horn of Africa region risks becoming increasingly volatile amid a renewed era of direct or proxy inter-state conflicts. The hopes for peace, democracy and prosperity of another generation of that region’s youth would then be lost.
