Prior to 2020, Belarusian–Western relations alternated between phases when Belarus would ease repressions and the West would lift sanctions, and times when Belarus would tighten restrictions and the West would penalize it again. Today, Western actors, the Lukashenka regime and the Belarusian democratic movement alike speak negatively – and publicly – about these relationship U-turns of the past. But in practice, periods of non-hostility between the Lukashenka regime and the West allowed Belarusian civil society to develop, Lukashenka to manoeuvre away from Russia, and the West to conclude that no mass repressions were occurring inside Belarus. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this era is that such reversals in relations should be perceived only as short-term phenomena that allow certain problems to be addressed at specific points in time. Since 2020 this fluctuating pattern of relations has been broken, meaning that the architecture of the West’s Belarus policy must also change. Western policy will always contain elements of pressure, and rightly so. But the uncomfortable truth is that, in order to achieve certain short-term results such as stopping repression and securing the release of political prisoners, Western policy towards Belarus should offer both incentives and disincentives to parts of the Belarusian regime.
The following six recommendations are aimed at making Western policy more effective and coherent – both in the short term, in order to better take advantage of opportunities that emerge, and in the long term, in order to increase and render more durable the influence of the West in Belarus.
Above all, Western policymakers need to assign a higher priority to Belarus.
The country is an important component of regional security, and its democratization is important for the West as a tool to reduce Russia’s influence and bolster regional security. Without explicitly prioritizing policy towards Belarus, Western governments will be in a weaker position in relation to the Lukashenka regime in spite of the considerable mismatch of geopolitical and economic power, simply because the Belarusian government is able to exploit the current inattention.
Western policymaking needs a robust framework aimed at removing Belarus (along with all other countries in the region) from Russia’s zone of influence and at democratizing the Belarusian political system. Both are medium-term goals and both should be broken down into short phases that involve the development of specific tools conducive to attaining increasingly ambitious policy goals.
Thus, in the first instance, Western governments should focus on policy measures that would ameliorate the domestic situation in Belarus. These might include measures aimed at achieving the release of political prisoners, the cessation of all politically motivated court cases, and an end to repression. Such actions would not only constitute a significant humanitarian victory for the West; they would also improve the chances for the political success of the democratic movement within the country. In terms of foreign policy, Western governments should strive to stop Russia’s absorption of Belarus and to distance the country from Russian aggression against Ukraine. This aligns with the position of the Ukrainian government, which in early 2023 reportedly requested Western governments not to sanction Belarus along with Russia in the context of one of the EU sanctions packages.
Western governments should be ready to increase both pressure and incentives.
The West cannot and should not abandon its policy of pressure, considering the repressions that have taken place in Belarus since 2020 and the government’s perceived status as a ‘collaborator’ in Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, sanctions must be acknowledged for what they are: an inevitable and necessary measure, partly effective but also accompanied by side effects, and not capable in isolation of altering Lukashenka’s conduct. It would make sense to shift the focus of sanctions and prioritize a reduction of Russia’s influence on Belarus, for example by imposing sanctions on Russian companies that own assets in Belarus or that cooperate with Belarusian enterprises, and by ensuring effective control over the execution of such sanctions. In addition, Western policymakers and public opinion can exert influence in other areas of reputational importance for the Lukashenka regime where sanctions have not yet been imposed. For example, international sports federations could take the step of banning pro-regime Belarusian athletes from international competitions. Imposing such bans could enable their eventual revocation to be used as a bargaining tool in negotiations with the regime on the release of political prisoners.
In order for sanctions to be at their most effective, the West must show that it is prepared to maintain escalation, but it must also have other policy options in reserve.
In order for sanctions to be at their most effective and to present a convincing message to the Lukashenka government, the West must show that it is prepared to maintain escalation, but it must also have other policy options in reserve. It should be showing that it is prepared to revoke certain sanctions if the regime makes concessions. In particular, this could apply to those sanctions that push Lukashenka closer to Russia and harm Belarusian citizens (such as the ban on overflights and on access to EU airports for Belarusian carriers mentioned earlier, which blighted travel opportunities for Belarusian individuals). On the other hand, there should be no softening of sanctions in sectors where Belarus depends economically on Russia, such as the processing of Russian crude oil by Belarusian refineries. As one Belarusian expert has suggested, the West should create and deliver to the Lukashenka regime a confidential ‘roadmap’ detailing the concessions that the regime could make and how the West and its partners would react to their implementation. In other words, there is a need for a clear mechanism of deconfliction.
To take full advantage of opportunities as they appear, Western policy must be swift and responsive, and must be coordinated with a wide range of partners. If Western-aligned states fail to coordinate their Belarus policymaking with Western governments, this sends a signal to the regime that the West itself does not take its policy towards Belarus seriously. Western governments should also coordinate their strategy with Belarusian stakeholders. One way of strengthening the Belarusian pro-democracy movement in the eyes of both the regime and society, and to increase its bargaining power, would be to include pro-democracy leaders in discussions on both the imposition and the eventual revocation of Western sanctions against Belarus.
The West’s policymakers should establish a direct channel of communication with Lukashenka.
Many Western actors continue to maintain contacts with the regime at foreign minister level or attempt to reach out to officials whom they believe to have more influence. However, decision-making in the Belarusian government ultimately rests with the country’s authoritarian leader, and it is preferable that Western governments engage directly with him in order to understand what he wants to achieve and what he is willing (and able) to do. Any form of contact with Lukashenka in an effort to bring more clarity to the relationship could prove toxic for Western political leaders and, conversely, might increase his legitimacy in the eyes of the West; this idea would be hard to sell in Western capitals. Yet any decision to stop the repressions or change Belarus’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine will ultimately be taken by Lukashenka, which could mean that holding conversations aiming to address the human rights violations and Russia’s war with more easily accessible representatives of the regime could be futile. Unfortunately, in the near future the only available route to easing repressions in Belarus and to stop Belarus’s incorporation into Russia includes negotiating with the person responsible for both.
Lukashenka is looking for a way to emphasize to the West that he still considers himself the independent ruler of Belarus. For example, he is reported to have written certain ceremonial letters as greetings on independence days to Western leaders, even though these have not been reciprocated (at least not publicly). In April 2022, Vladimir Makei, the late Belarusian minister of foreign affairs, wrote to EU diplomats proposing to ‘avail ourselves of the diplomatic toolbox to re-establish dialogue which is the only means for finding a way forward under any circumstances’. Representatives of the Belarusian government also continue to participate in ‘humanitarian dialogue’ between the government and certain civil society activists. These talks are held quasi-confidentially under the auspices of international mediators.
Maintaining a channel of communication with Lukashenka in the security sphere could also prove important – not least for the security of Ukraine – should Belarus’s authoritarian leader seek to distance himself from Russia in the aftermath of potential military defeats.
Policymakers should send a clear message to the middle and lower echelons of the Belarusian bureaucracy that the West’s position towards them is impartial.
Western governments should study the workings of the Belarusian political system and attempt to fragment the middle levels of the regime’s bureaucracy, either by conducting negotiations with individual bureaucrats and representatives of regime-adjacent large businesses or by providing practical incentives (in the form of protection and monetary rewards) for reporting various crimes, including repressions inside Belarus, specific actions supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine and the circumvention of sanctions. Some participants in the governmental system – unlike others in its upper, ruling echelons – are not complicit in the regime’s crimes and may want to move the country forward. The extent to which such officials are favourably inclined towards the West and the Belarusian pro-democracy movement may have significant implications for democratization within the country when such an opportunity arises. It is in the interests of the regime that the West (or the pro-democracy movement) perceives all civic or security officials as complicit in the repressions, since this strengthens mutual responsibility within the regime. In practice, it is necessary to separate those who are guilty of crimes from those who are not complicit in them, and to use that separation to divide the regime in the future.
Policymakers should send a clear message to the middle and lower echelons of the Belarusian bureaucracy that the West’s position towards them is impartial.
Experts and policymakers have made varying assessments of Western institutions’ previous attempts to work directly with the lower echelons of the Belarusian bureaucracy (for example, by liaising with local governments on regional development programmes). Negative assessments are most common, although in the end this does not make much difference, as it is impossible under the current regime to return to previous modes of cooperation. Nevertheless, the West needs to find new ways of identifying and communicating with government officials at this level, perhaps making use of social media and organizing an information campaign that directly targets them. NGOs and media outlets might also contribute to this work. Making direct contact with such officials could help to debunk myths and disinformation promulgated by the Belarusian regime, for example about the progress of the war in Ukraine.
Box 1, below, gives a snapshot of the political structure of Belarus under Lukashenka’s leadership.
