Belarus’s current political environment has been shaped by two events: the 2020 political crisis and the initiation by Russia of a fully fledged war against Ukraine in February 2022.
In 2020, following the fraudulent presidential election in Belarus, large-scale peaceful protests and the subsequent mass repressions, the West refused to recognize Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s claims of victory. To hold his regime accountable for its egregious human rights violations, the EU, the US, the UK, Canada and other countries (whose policymakers are perceived in Belarus as constituting ‘the West’) gradually imposed multiple packages of sanctions. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the presumed winner of the presidential election, was received in many Western capitals and participated in a number of high-level meetings. Furthermore, the West has allocated significant (and sufficient) financial resources to supporting Belarusian civil society, the independent media and other pro-democracy actors. The focus of Western action should now shift to building aid programmes that can be leveraged by the actors most capable of effecting change in Belarus.
Despite this powerful show of Western solidarity with Belarusian pro-democracy actors in the three years since the events of 2020, the Lukashenka regime has managed to cement its position even further over the same period. However, it has simultaneously placed not only Belarus but also its neighbours in a situation of jeopardy. Because of Russian pressure and Lukashenka’s perceived acceptance of ‘vassal state’ status, Belarus has relinquished its sovereignty in the political, economic and military spheres, having become a launching-point in February 2022 for Russian rocket attacks and a land invasion of Ukraine. On 25 March 2023, as this paper was being prepared for publication, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was to station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, without specifying the time frame.
Aside from being forced to permit its territory to be used in this way, the Belarusian government under Lukashenka has also helped the Russian military by providing logistical support, training troops, providing weapons, treating wounded soldiers and repairing equipment. One of the reasons for Russia’s military presence in Belarus is to force Ukraine to devote more resources to the northern border, drawing troops away from the southern and eastern fronts. Rumours about Belarus’s possible direct involvement in the war serve a similar purpose. The West’s imposition of additional sanctions on Belarus is a logical response to the Lukashenka regime’s increasing involvement in the conflict.
The number of tools at the West’s disposal for influencing Belarus has diminished, and the pro-democracy movement is suffering considerable setbacks, with its leaders either in jail or abroad. As of early 2023, the number of political prisoners comprised roughly 1,600 people, and independent Belarusian media outlets were losing their audience; obstruction and repressions have been partially responsible for this. Under current conditions, almost no-one expects real change to begin in Belarus until the current Russian government has been replaced by a more liberal regime. In the meantime, the Lukashenka regime is entering a period of transition of power. During this period the 68-year-old authoritarian leader will seek to nominate a successor through whom he can exercise effective control. He is very likely to do this as the head of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, a newly constituting Belarusian state institution that will become operational in 2024.
No matter how sweeping the repercussions of the war in Ukraine may seem, the fate of Belarus does not necessarily depend on its result.
This briefing paper does not lay all the blame for the events unfolding in Belarus on the West. Rather, responsibility principally lies with Lukashenka and the Russian government, which oscillates between helping Lukashenka and trying to control him. While Belarusian society remains the main catalyst for democratic change in the country, the West still has a chance to influence the government. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate how Western policymakers are utilizing their resources vis-à-vis Belarus and to propose concrete ideas for pursuing a more active, broad and effective Belarus policy that will eventually lead to the weakening of Russia’s expansionist ambitions in the region. To do this, the paper will draw on existing literature, opinion polls, interviews and meetings with policymakers and experts from the West and Belarus.
This paper begins by setting out the problems that have arisen with Western policies towards Belarus in 2020–23. Next, it outlines potential improvements that the West can bring to its policymaking on Belarus. The paper then concludes with some remarks on the role that the West could play in the country’s future.
No matter how sweeping the repercussions of the war in Ukraine may seem, the fate of Belarus does not necessarily depend on its result, especially since there is no knowing how and at what point warfare will stop. Furthermore, this study aims to lead readers away from thinking of Belarus through a single, temporarily relevant, lens: be that Western relations with Lukashenka, support for the democratic movement, or the role played by Belarus in the conflict. Such a narrow approach will inevitably give rise to policy difficulties. To succeed, Western policymaking needs a robust framework within which a whole spectrum of Belarusian actors can be influenced. These include Lukashenka, his officials, Belarusian society and pro-democracy interests.