A critical juncture in the scenario under consideration would be the transition of power to a post-Putin leadership. Although a well-ordered succession is one of the author’s baseline assumptions, examining how this might come about helps to anchor the discussion of plausible outcomes.
This assumption, as set out above, can be divided into two halves. In the first half, ‘Vladimir Putin is forced to step down as president’ following military defeats in Ukraine. In this scenario, humiliation on the battlefield signals the failure of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, landing a devastating blow on the domestic legitimacy of the Putin regime. In turn, this triggers a phenomenon that is usually a proximate cause of leadership replacement in an authoritarian system like Russia’s: ‘the sudden mass abdication of officials and other regime loyalists’. Key parts of the domestic security establishment would have to be directly involved in a move against Putin, given their pivotal position in his regime. They would be joined by leading government technocrats, whose expertise in economic management would be vital for a prospective new regime. To legitimize their actions, this alliance of elite interests would probably announce that, in accordance with Article 92.2 of the Russian Federation’s constitution, Putin had resigned and that an election for a new president would be held within three months of the resignation. In line with Article 92.3, the prime minister, currently Mikhail Mishustin, would be temporarily vested with presidential powers.
The second half of the author’s assumption states that ‘Russia’s elites engineer an orderly transition of power to his [Putin’s] successor’. This would require elites to come together and identify a common candidate for the presidency. In theory, there are compelling reasons why they would do so. In an authoritarian system, the transition to a new leader is a moment of stress and uncertainty for elites, with fears that disunity could set off instability. Concern for the preservation of order might be reinforced by worries about rising rates of violent crime, perhaps related to an influx of army veterans returning from Ukraine. Lastly, an emerging leadership would wish to establish rapid control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy – which would be essential for political stability.
Having agreed on a successor, elite groups would probably want to arrange a managed presidential election as quickly as possible. It is likely that voters would endorse the anointed candidate, thus buttressing the authority of the new regime. At this early stage, a new president would represent an elite-level coalition, would have been chosen to defend and promote their interests, and would have to take account of whatever intra-elite pact had been struck. It is possible that the initial phase of a post-Putin presidency would resemble a collective leadership, of which there have been several examples during the last 100 years. A crucial difference would be the absence of an institutionalized forum – such as existed prior to 1991 in the shape of the Politburo or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – by means of which the oligarchy might oversee the start of the new era. Existing bodies, such as the Security Council or the State Council, could be adapted (or a new body created) to serve this purpose. In any case, important decisions would still be taken along the informal, personalized channels that make up Russia’s ‘network state’.
With a potentially tumultuous succession navigated, how might Russia’s state system plausibly develop to the end of 2027? The next three sections address that question.
