Three implementation areas – political and institutional structures, mechanisms for anticipating climate risk, and operational resilience – are critical for preparing the alliance for climate-related security challenges.
Strengthening political and institutional structures
Maintaining high-level political commitment for climate security
NATO has set clear and ambitious goals for decarbonization and the prioritization of the energy transition through a commitment to reduce its emissions by 45 per cent by 2030, and to become carbon neutral by 2050. Pursuing this bold strategic vision is commendable. Through enduring commitment, high visibility and strong leadership, NATO has the influence and ability to become an important global actor on climate security, both by reducing its own carbon emissions and by helping to address the serious threats posed by climate change to peace and security.
In a political context of competing priorities, NATO must focus on the increasingly complex near- and long-term challenges of climate change, or risk being caught off-guard. NATO can demonstrate leadership and progress through regular public reporting on its own Climate Change and Security Action Plan, establishing benchmarks, timelines and clear measures for success. The secretary-general can provide detail on how the alliance can adapt its planning and capabilities to climate-security risks at NATO’s annual high-level dialogue on climate and security.
This high-level dialogue can further member state consensus-building, strategic preparation and collaborative policymaking, due to its prevention- and resilience-based approach to climate change. Preserving unity across the alliance will be challenging given the varied effects of climate change on different countries. Climate impacts could create tension between NATO’s three core objectives – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. For example, allies have imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine to prioritize collective defence: these sanctions meet NATO’s political and strategic aim of challenging Russian aggression and draining its military and economic capabilities. But from a crisis management and cooperative security angle, sanctions risk increasing energy and food prices and fuelling instability in NATO’s periphery and partner countries.
To counter this, consultation, coordination and collaboration among member states and partner countries will become even more important. The secretary-general’s office can use the annual dialogue to provide a more robust consultation process to maintain political cohesion. The dialogue can also contribute to a better understanding of, and coherence between, member states’ strategies for dealing with climate-security risks. This dialogue can be an important forum for knowledge-sharing, as well as bringing together siloed military, diplomatic, scientific and private sector stakeholders to build adaptive capacities against climate change.
Importantly, NATO must make a concerted effort to speak with a common voice and act in a coordinated manner on climate-related issues. Awareness of how climate change affects national security and military operations varies across the alliance – for example the US is a frontrunner in planning for climate change effects on the armed forces, while Germany acknowledges climate change as a challenge to security but has not integrated measures to tackle the impacts on decision-making and planning in its armed forces, and Türkiye does not yet consider climate change in security discussions at all.
Resolving these varying perspectives and dispelling the scepticism that climate action is a distraction from NATO’s mission will require significant efforts from NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. Through political consultation and practical cooperation, NATO is well-positioned to make the case for the impact of climate change on NATO and member state capabilities, the operational benefits of transitioning to clean energy and the need to invest in climate adaptation. Appointing a special adviser to the secretary-general to champion work on climate change and security can raise the profile of this issue and generate momentum for pursuing climate-informed decision-making. Climate advocates, including the US, the UK, France and Sweden – once its membership bid has been finalized – can use their bilateral relationships to encourage NATO unity and cohesion behind these efforts. NATO can also support cooperative initiatives, such as the Climate Change and the Armed Forces Declaration launched by ministers of defence in 2021, which commits 26 signatory countries to review progress in their collective efforts. Other strategies include incentivizing volunteer pledges or ‘coalitions of the willing’, for example the COP26 First Movers Coalition, which brought together actors with supply chains across carbon-intensive sectors to scale up new solutions.
Investing in cultural change
Building resilience against climate impacts requires NATO to invest in cultural change across the alliance. Effective implementation of the Climate Change and Security Action Plan requires a substantial investment in resources and personnel within NATO HQ. NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division must take the lead in supporting member states to build a forward-looking organization able to deliver on collective security.
In particular, this includes funding for staff structures, such as the Emerging Security Challenges Division, that are responsible for devising NATO’s strategy to address climate-related security threats. Recruiting and educating staff across teams on climate and security can ensure that skills and knowledge are integrated, and can feed into NATO’s understanding of the security needs of the alliance. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example, has hired staff with unusual skills – ‘horizon scanners’, ‘future thinkers’, ‘network specialists’ – in order to infuse new thinking into how it manages climate risk and challenge received wisdom.
NATO must also devote additional resources and funding to cooperation programmes such as the Science for Peace and Security Programme, which is responsible for providing grants to partner countries to explore climate challenges and innovative technologies. The activities funded by this programme have proven valuable in cementing practical cooperation between member states and partner countries, which has led to significant public diplomacy value for NATO. For example, a cross-border project between the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel), the University of Colorado (US) and the Hashemite University (Jordan) on desalinization technology strengthened NATO’s presence in the region and, for a short period of time, cooperation across Middle Eastern states. Investing in these structures will enable NATO to translate its intentions into concrete action.
As part of the Defence Investment Pledge, NATO guidelines on the commitment to spend 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence are set to be reviewed in 2024. Though there are existing political pressures on this commitment, it remains an important opportunity for NATO to encourage funding for adaptation and resilience measures as part of the 2 per cent pledge. These funds are key to maintaining the alliance’s military readiness but could also address vulnerable areas critical to NATO’s security, for example investments in sustainable technologies to strengthen energy security and capacities to measure success by determining whether there has been a reduction in emissions. Setting a climate target focused on prevention and resilience as a proportion of this commitment is a far more effective and economical means to advance NATO’s mission than focusing solely on strengthening capabilities to respond to crises after they occur. NATO HQ could commission the Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), or an academic institution while the CCASCOE is set up, for a rapid research project to understand what this target should be to add value. The added security crisis of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has encouraged many member states to step up their investments in defence, which will likely be sustained at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.
Strategic coordination across NATO
NATO’s political and military structures are complex, but preparing for and responding to climate risks and natural disasters can build cooperation and bolster capabilities across the alliance. Within NATO, the North Atlantic Council and the secretary-general set the direction for action on climate change, but continued communication between NATO HQ, the International Military Staff (IMS) advisory body and the Military Committee can facilitate more effective planning of operations and efficiency in implementation.
NATO HQ, in particular the Climate and Energy Security Section, must establish networks of communication and incentivize efforts by designating clear roles and responsibilities across NATO’s internal machinery.
NATO HQ, in particular the Climate and Energy Security Section, must establish networks of communication and incentivize efforts by designating clear roles and responsibilities across NATO’s internal machinery. This body should provide advice and assistance across NATO divisions to improve climate risk assessment and management, and it should empower staff to understand which risks threaten the success of their work. Ensuring widespread participation is important to identify organizational ‘blind spots’ and maximize the perspectives informing mitigation and adaptation planning. This approach avoids the dangers of ‘groupthink’ and path dependency that can inhibit progress on climate action. To coordinate with partner countries, NATO HQ can draw upon the specialized expertise of the Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), which supports communication between NATO’s internal and external structures.
Centres of excellence exist outside of formal NATO structures but are key mechanisms for building joint capabilities between NATO, member states, partner countries and international organizations. The recently initiated CCASCOE based in Canada can provide NATO with a central forum for knowledge-sharing and capacity strengthening on emerging climate risks. Climate change is a transnational threat and a collective discussion with military officials, strategic planners and policy staff, based on shared information, would help to build trust and create a learning-based cooperation network across the political landscape of NATO. Exchanging best practice on what has been tried and tested across militaries globally, from weapons systems to health, to training and infrastructure, can strengthen the individual security of member states and collective regional security through a reinforced NATO HQ.
The CCASCOE can coordinate with other centres of excellence to prioritize the efficient use of personnel and resources and empower the alliance to prioritize the implementation of its climate mitigation and adaptation objectives. A continuous dialogue to integrate insights from, for example, the Energy Security Centre of Excellence on using microgrids to enhance the resilience of military bases, the Science and Technology Organization and the NATO Space Centre on using space-based observing systems to monitor emissions and optimize military operation routes to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and the Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine on ensuring the health of troops in extreme temperature environments, could provide a central repository to accelerate climate action within member states and support alignment across NATO’s efforts to address climate change and security risks.
Importantly, NATO’s role in responding to climate-induced humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations will be shaped by the preparedness of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), based in NATO HQ, and the effectiveness of the Centre of Excellence for Crisis Management and Disaster Response. The Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CIMIC) can also provide guidance on liaising with civilian actors, developing long-term preparation strategies, and addressing the gendered and disproportionate impact of crises on women and other marginalized groups.
The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) will also be critical – the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the significance of its airlift capabilities in delivering rapid, cost-effective protective medical equipment. The NSPA and the EADRCC, for example, delivered field hospital tents to Luxembourg in less than 24 hours, an operation that usually takes five days. The EADRCC was instrumental in facilitating ‘visa clearances, border crossings, and access to equipment and transportation routes’ during the pandemic, critical skills for both crisis and military mobility. Strengthening coordination and coherence across these structures will be vital to fulfilling NATO’s crisis management responsibilities.
In terms of specific mechanisms, standardization agreements are a valuable instrument for aligning approaches across the alliance. While challenging to develop, existing standardization agreements on climate and security have been useful as strategies to apply peer pressure, ensuring coherence and interoperability across allies, encouraging member states to decrease risk through energy transition, and sending a strong demand signal to relevant sectors. They are a useful tool for including smaller member states, like Croatia and Portugal, that have more limited capabilities, R&D budget and infrastructure in place, and they can help improve interoperability, i.e. the ability for NATO and member states to operate without having to make adaptations so that their systems can function efficiently in adverse circumstances. NATO’s Environmental Protection Working Group (EPWG), which sets standards for environmental protection in NATO military activities and provides expertise to alliance-wide innovation, can lead on efforts to expand and promote the application of standardization agreements in specific policy areas. This addresses a key challenge of a consensus-based organization, which typically experiences a stalemate on prioritizing needs and has led to ‘lowest common denominator’ policymaking.
Strengthening mechanisms for anticipating climate risks
Climate risk assessments
NATO possesses several instruments that collect intelligence and data on climate trends. Alliance navies, for example, hold advanced oceanographic and meteorological tracking sensors that can measure and monitor changes in Arctic polar ice. NATO is also investing in its space-based observation systems to track ocean warming and desertification. Critically, this data should feed into NATO’s annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment, which analyses the climate vulnerabilities of NATO assets, but does not yet provide an overall risk assessment for each NATO installation.
Incorporating highly precise climate monitoring and modelling, societal data and geopolitical trends into the Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment and mission-specific risk assessments will strengthen NATO’s ability to anticipate and prepare for potentially unstable scenarios and disruptions. While this data can be variable, it will help provide a more precise and comprehensive situational picture. The CCASCOE can support NATO with the coordination of an integrated and cross-sectoral approach: military actors can work together with scientific experts, data scientists, policymakers and local stakeholders to translate climate data into assessments of vulnerabilities, their significance and how best to respond. Key lessons can be learned from the US DoD’s Climate Assessment Tool, which analyses historical data to forecast climate impacts on almost 1,400 of its locations globally. It can identify, for example, if seawalls need to be built to protect against sea-level rise and which skills military staff will require to implement climate adaptation measures.
NATO can coordinate a multinational military effort to measure, monitor and assess climate variabilities on infrastructure, operations and overall security, which could contribute to a highly precise modelling and early warning system.
In fact, together with member states and partner countries, NATO can coordinate a multinational military effort to measure, monitor and assess climate variabilities on infrastructure, operations and overall security, which could contribute to a highly precise modelling and early warning system. This assessment can inform future planning and operational needs for NATO’s Defence Planning Process and NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Committee, and longer-term military decision-making through the Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO). It can also have significant tactical and strategic benefits for forecasting conflict hotspots and outcomes. For instance, changing climatic conditions such as rising temperatures and precipitation fluctuations can influence when and where actors engage in conflict. Most recently, an unusually mild winter in Ukraine delayed Russian land-based operations as a lack of ice and frozen ground created difficulties in the manoeuvrability of heavy vehicles and equipment. NATO can provide standard guidelines to promote the sharing of sensitive climate data between member states and strengthen the application of climate risk assessments.
Forecasting cascading risks
It is important to acknowledge that climate change is not a linear process and that ‘tipping points’, such as the accelerated melting of Arctic ice caps, can trigger cascading impacts over a short time frame. Climate risk assessments must consider the full range of threats – particularly those concerning critical gaps or uncertainties related to key systems such as energy, food and water – to inform further research and improve NATO’s understanding of the complex pathways of transnational and systemic risks.
Complex systems modelling has an important role in strategic foresight on climate issues, as operational dependencies on critical resources increase and new theatres of conflict emerge. Mathematical modelling and multidisciplinary analysis – while imperfect – can be used to identify and analyse how cascading climate risks have a multi-domain impact. Such studies could enable NATO to prepare for new forms of hybrid and cross-domain warfare in a warming world, while anticipating potential vulnerabilities. NATO has been at the forefront of bringing together multiple datasets in an integrated way and several member states are already acting on this concern: in its 2022 National Defense Strategy, the US DoD identified the need for ‘integrated deterrence’ aimed at the multi-domain integration of maritime, land, air, space and cyber domains. Similarly, the UK Royal Air Force recognizes that multi-domain integration requires joining up operational and strategic approaches, not only to address climate risk but to also remain operationally effective. To do this, the UK has set a vision of a ‘networked integrated force’ as part of its approach to meet its net zero target by 2040.
NATO and member states’ abilities to strengthen and operationalize systems to measure and monitor the climate will necessitate investing in the development of scientific and data literacy. Risk assessments can only be developed and translated into action if strategic planners and risk officers have the knowledge to conceptualize climate risks and evaluate the emerging data in a manner that provides decision-makers with the ability to make informed judgments. Moreover, understanding these risks from a broader security and political-economy perspective is key to ensuring that purely technical solutions are not advocated when the challenges are inherently political. This will require working with new partners, across academic and NGO communities, and fusing climate expertise with data on wider threats to provide a more accurate picture of the second and third order consequences of climate change. Only then will policy and decision-makers across member states better understand that climate-security risks are not necessarily niche or localized risks but should rather be a mainstream priority.
Importantly, the CCASCOE could play an important role in centralizing training and forecasting efforts while also ensuring accessibility to, and accountability of, the wider climate community. Such efforts would foster knowledge-sharing, build mutual trust and strengthen collaboration across and beyond the alliance.
Reducing emissions
In the near term, NATO must focus on its commitments to reduce and report its carbon emissions. The secretary-general announced a common methodology to measure NATO emissions at the 2022 summit, and an emissions reduction target of 45 per cent by 2030. However, this target only applies to NATO’s military HQ, NATO-run facilities and NATO-owned assets – i.e. a relatively small set of infrastructure – and there was no detail on how this would feed into NATO’s Defence Planning Process. The target also does not incorporate the emissions of member states themselves.
Yet this is an essential element to support NATO’s credibility as an actor in this area. An increasing understanding of climate justice has influenced the public to see NATO as an alliance of wealthy nations that have produced a significant share of historical global emissions that, in turn, have disproportionately harmed those in the Global South. The limited scope and transparency of the emissions methodology has disappointed activists and civil society organizations. It presents an accountability gap, with the public unable to scrutinize NATO’s approach nor understand which member states have adopted the methodology. To tackle this, the secretary-general’s office could propose a method of independent and external verification of its emissions methodology – even if this is not made public due to sensitivity constraints. The secretary-general, through the North Atlantic Council, should also exert pressure on allies to set their own military emission targets and report to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change annually.
Critical to this will be NATO HQ and member states’ abilities to communicate the climate threat to their populations clearly and transparently. Public perception is of political significance. Citizens of NATO countries are already increasingly aware of the existential threat of climate change. According to Pew Research Center’s 2020 Global Attitudes Survey, over 60 per cent of the public in every NATO member said they considered climate change to be a key threat to their country. The increased use of the term ‘eco-anxiety’ further reflects the impacts of environmental crises on public mental health and well-being. In many of these countries, the size of the military’s carbon footprint is already a source of controversy, and this is likely to increase with the frequency and intensity of climate disasters.
Defence policymakers need to be alert to the possibility of a ‘tipping point’ event that could rapidly influence public perception to see climate change as the foremost challenge to society. Such an event would consequently focus attention on NATO’s lack of success in reducing emissions and tackling climate risks, and could lead to the rise of social movements that may themselves be destabilizing. Although it has no legislative power and cannot impose binding targets on the militaries of allies, NATO can take the lead in agenda-setting and building mutual trust among member countries, several of whom are already reporting on their military footprints. NATO can lean into public concerns and bring to life climate risk assessments to show allies that there is a political, economic, moral and military imperative to reduce emissions and strengthen resilience against climate change.
Strengthening operational resilience
Strengthening military operational resilience to the anticipated demands of a climate-affected world will enable NATO to meet its core strategic tasks of deterrence and defence. NATO HQ and member states must prioritize the implementation of resilience and future-proofing strategies to improve military effectiveness, capabilities and readiness, and simultaneously meet climate targets. It is necessary for NATO to remain sensitive to the balance between easier and less time-intensive wins and longer-term structural transformation, both of which are critical but will require differing levels of incentivization across the alliance. NATO can begin to address this challenge by injecting fresh energy, resources and capacity into existing partnership platforms, increasing political dialogue and consultation at the cross-ministerial level, strengthening civil–military cooperation to unify siloed sectors, and advancing public–private partnerships.
Energy
Energy independence and consumption
For NATO and its allies, decoupling from carbon-intensive and single fuel sources is essential to build resilience. Transitioning to energy independence at military bases will benefit military readiness and capabilities. In the case of extreme weather events or malicious activity, which can disrupt critical national infrastructure such as grid services, power can be generated ‘off-the-grid’ using a microgrid with on-site storage. For navy bases and installations, reliance on electricity that is sourced from an interconnected grid can also become a vulnerability. If one part fails, the whole system can fail. As dependencies between power plants, transmission lines and distribution grids increase and become more dependent on cyber and ‘smart’, or interconnected systems, the risk of physical and cyber sabotage, fuel shortages and extreme weather also increase.
Several tried and tested strategies, such as generating on-site renewable energy through smart microgrids, can accelerate energy independence and combat dependencies on local infrastructure. These energy resources are small-scale methods of independent power generation that are connected to a larger distribution grid, but they operate locally and are able to run even if the main grid power is lost. As waste disposal is a critical issue during military operations, waste-to-energy solutions should also be explored. The deployable waste-to-energy convertor project developed in cooperation with the US Army for example, involves drawing on landfills that produce methane to convert waste into organic power. This approach uses less fossil fuel, has a smaller logistical footprint, eliminates common chemical and biological hazards, and is self-powering. Regenerating military-owned land to improve carbon sequestration and biodiversity is another strategy that can help to redress the adverse environmental impacts created by military operations. The removal of vegetation for military activities in Iraq for example, has drastically worsened sand and dust storms. This has contributed to growing desertification and migration from rural areas.
NATO can leverage the progress made by allies’ national strategies in these areas. In the Middle East, the US has approximately 18 bases with installations largely running on power provided by the grids of host nations, making these facilities dependent on local energy supplies, susceptible to outages and a potential strain on grid capacity. In response, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy has pledged to increase US efforts to improve the resilience of its military installations. By 2035, it aims to install a microgrid on every installation and, by 2040, generate enough renewable energy and battery storage capacity to make all army installations self-sustaining. The US Army has started to roll out microgrid demonstrations using solar photovoltaics in Camp Arifjan and Camp Buehring in Kuwait.
Unintended vulnerabilities must be anticipated and mitigated when applying these solutions. For instance, renewable energy infrastructure is often a target of attack. The Ukrainian government estimates that 90 per cent of wind power and 50 per cent of solar energy capacity has been decommissioned as a result of the war. Moreover, cleaner solutions tend to be ‘smarter’ and therefore rely on cyber capabilities, such as smart microgrids that are susceptible to cyberattacks and adversaries. Standardized risk assessments and measures that strengthen operational resilience in case of attack and mitigate cyber-related vulnerabilities must be embedded from the outset. The use of microgrids and other innovations may be privy to individual allies. However, NATO can incentivize these endeavours by facilitating cooperation between allies and making use of its platform to share knowledge.
