The war is hindering climate action, while underlining why it is so critical to move away from fossil fuels.
Slowing the energy transition in Ukraine
Renewable energy installations have been heavily affected by the war, which has also cast doubt on the wisdom of civilian nuclear power
as a low-carbon energy source.
Ukraine – the world’s fifth most energy-intensive country – had been moving towards greater energy efficiency and decarbonization before the war. In 2016, Ukraine issued a nationally determined contribution (NDC) strategy that committed the country to reductions in its greenhouse gas emissions of 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030, a target that the government increased to 65 per cent in 2021. Just a few months before the invasion, at the November 2021 COP26 climate conference, Ukraine announced a planned end to coal-fired power generation by 2035.
The government had also set a goal of sourcing 25 per cent of Ukraine’s total energy supply from renewables by 2035 – an ambitious target requiring significant investment in wind and solar technology. According to a report by the Energy Charter Secretariat, Ukraine has the potential to produce more energy from renewable energy than anywhere else in southeast Europe. The EU was also hoping that Ukraine could become a major exporter of the ‘green’ hydrogen that is supposed to be the main element of Europe’s integrated power system by 2030 under the Green New Deal.
But the war has seriously damaged Ukraine’s renewable energy infrastructure and undermined future investments in the sector. According to the Ukrainian government, about 90 per cent of wind power capacity and 50 per cent of solar energy capacity have been taken offline as a result of the war, and more than 500 water infrastructure facilities, including hydroelectric dams, have been destroyed.
According to the Ukrainian government, about 90 per cent of wind power capacity and 50 per cent of solar energy capacity have been taken offline as a result of the war.
In June 2023, the Nova Khakhovka dam near Kherson was destroyed, causing huge areas of downstream lands to be inundated with water, and – at the time of writing – raising concerns about the viability of the cooling systems at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the attack an ‘environmental bomb of mass destruction’, and the Ukrainian government accused Russia of ‘ecocide’.
Replacing Ukraine’s renewable energy infrastructure is complicated, particularly while fighting is ongoing. Unsurprisingly, future investment in renewables is uncertain. For example, the largest operator of renewable generation in Ukraine, DTEK Renewables, has indefinitely delayed plans to construct 700 MW of additional wind power capacity for its network.
Even so, some projects have continued: the 19-turbine Tyligulska wind power plant opened in 2023, despite being situated less than 100 kilometres from the frontline in the region of Mykolaiv. And the level of climate ambition in Ukraine policy circles has, somewhat remarkably, persisted. In June 2023, the Ukrainian government adopted new legislation to encourage investment in renewable energies and the modernization of the country’s energy system. And in July 2023, the government reaffirmed its commitment to phase out state-owned coal power plants by 2035.
Nevertheless, the viability of nuclear power as a low-carbon source of energy – both in Ukraine and elsewhere – has been thrown into doubt, as the war has demonstrated how vulnerable civilian nuclear power stations can be to attack. Despite its tragic history with Chornobyl, Ukraine still depended heavily on nuclear power before the war, with 15 reactors across four stations providing about one-half of the country’s electricity. All 15 are pressurized-water reactors of Soviet-era design, with their average age already past the original design threshold of 30 years. The oldest of these reactors has been in operation since 1980. However, in 2012, Energoatom – a state enterprise operating all four of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants – announced it intended to operate the oldest reactors at those plants for at least 20 more years.
The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – the largest nuclear power plant in Europe – has been repeatedly attacked and has been under Russian control since March 2022. The loss of independent cooling systems could potentially lead to the meltdown of used fuel in reactors or cooling ponds. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is ‘gravely concerned about the situation’ at Zaporizhzhia. The plant’s reactors have been disconnected from the Ukrainian electricity grid, leading to a significant loss of supply. President Zelenskyy’s appeals to create demilitarized zones around nuclear power stations remain unanswered. Since Russia’s occupation of the plant, there have been repeated power blackouts, forcing the plant to temporarily rely on emergency diesel generators for reactor-cooling, and for other nuclear safety and security functions. IAEA director-general Rafael Grossi has said, ‘I don’t know for how long we are going to be lucky in avoiding a nuclear accident.’ The agency further noted in its February 2023 assessment that, ‘[e]very single one of the IAEA’s crucial seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict has been compromised’. These attacks have also underlined the strategic risks of nuclear power plants – in particular, their exposure to being targeted as a form of immense ‘dirty bomb’ by deeply irresponsible actors.
Threatening multilateral co-operation on climate change
Climate action risks being drawn into a stand-off between Russia
and the West.
Some experts argue that the world is entering a period of ‘deglobalization’ that could hinder collective action on global challenges. The final question is what this means for the prospects of ambitious action on climate change.
Climate change is widely viewed as the one of the biggest single challenges facing the planet. But the issue of climate change risks being pulled into a geopolitical stand-off between Russia (and potentially China) and the West. Growing concerns about the current consequences of the war, the risks of escalation and the spectre of all-out nuclear conflict have pushed the climate crisis down the media and political agendas, with UN secretary-general António Guterres warning in October 2022 that the war was putting climate action on the ‘backburner’. Meanwhile, the focus on energy security at a national level could reduce the space for countries to advance bold climate action at the yearly UN climate conferences.
Even climate negotiations are getting tangled in these wider political currents. During a video address at COP27, Zelenskyy argued that global collective action on climate change will not be possible until the war ends. In the run-up to that conference, Russia endeavoured to include emissions from the occupied Crimean peninsula in its national-level greenhouse gas inventory, a claim that was vigorously disputed by Ukraine as being part of an effort by Russia to normalize the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and support Russian claims over the territory. Russia’s climate envoy, Ruslan Edelgeriev, argued at the conference that Russia remained committed to its climate targets despite sanctions. He also linked climate action to the wider political situation, adding that Russia could achieve carbon neutrality earlier than its current target of 2060 if sanctions were lifted. This statement appears to underline the apparent approach by Russia of using climate action as a point of leverage over the West, and points to the risk that the continuing war may impede negotiations over climate change and other global challenges.
