The sections below review the strengths and limitations of the most promising, largely governmental, current regional initiatives.
The ‘Baghdad summit’ process
The Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership, a French-supported initiative, gathered regional representatives in Baghdad in August 2021 and again in Amman in December 2022 to discuss how to strengthen economic and political stability in Iraq. The two conferences were notable for assembling high-level representatives from a broad array of competing regional actors – with Iran among the participants. This indicated a significant level of political buy-in from across the region. Where states could not agree on broader topics for discussions, both meetings reinforced a regional consensus on the need to preserve Iraqi economic and political stability. The conferences also provided an important opportunity for engagement and reconciliation after years of strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, Türkiye and the UAE, and Türkiye and Saudi Arabia.
At the first summit in Baghdad, the delegates consisted of heads of state and foreign ministers from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE. At the second summit, participation expanded to include representatives from Bahrain and Oman. The fact that Iran participated in both summits, despite its opposition to the principle of external actors managing regional security, marked a deviation from its formal position on this issue.
Because of the sensitive political dynamics, participants agreed to focus their public discussions on Iraqi stability. As such, the final communiqué from the first Baghdad summit mainly showcased a commitment to supporting the Iraqi federal government. However, it also portrayed a desire for wider cooperation, as participants ‘acknowledged that the region faces common challenges that require the countries of the region to deal with them on the basis of joint cooperation and mutual interests in accordance with the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, and respect of national sovereignty’.
Political challenges associated with the formation of a new government in Iraq following the October 2022 elections meant that the second forum needed to convene in Amman. While no political breakthroughs were achieved, this summit was widely seen as a confidence-building measure signalling that regional states were keen to continue convening. The communiqué from Amman reiterated the message of solidarity for Iraq’s stability. It called for measures ‘supporting Iraq’s central role in expanding regional economic cooperation and building bridges of dialogue to end tensions and establish regional relations of mutual benefits’.
The French continue to play an important supporting role in this initiative, and are working to hold a third conference in Baghdad in late 2023. The intention, should consensus be achieved, is to introduce thematic discussions to the dialogue. Such a focus could enable shared climate- or trade-related concerns to be explored, building much-needed confidence and trust, and moving the dialogue beyond what many view as a largely performative function to date.
Notwithstanding this continued momentum, the Baghdad process has several limitations. The absence of Israel and Palestine means that the format cannot be considered to provide an inclusive cooperative security structure. The French convening role has also raised concerns and questions about the objectives of the effort – which is arguably vulnerable to the perception that the French government is using the platform to promote its own interests in the region. Finally, the focus on Iraqi stability renders the format vulnerable – in terms of both participation and agenda – to political fluctuations in Iraq.
GCC-focused initiatives
The United Nations and non-governmental institutions have looked to build on cooperation among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – and expand into a format with wider participation. The International Crisis Group, among others, has advocated the creation of a Helsinki-inspired dialogue focused on the Gulf subregion to help reduce tensions with Iran, arguing that while such dialogues should eventually include all regional stakeholders, the ‘chances of success likely would be higher if an initiative were to start small and test ideas ahead of launching a broader process’. A Crisis Group report recommends starting regional de-escalation efforts with the GCC states, Iran and Iraq, supported by a core group of external states. The UN, where the Crisis Group initially presented its report at a special session dedicated to regional security, has similarly focused on this ‘GCC+2’ formulation as a starting point for regional dialogue.
Another example of Gulf-centred initiatives can be found in the activities of the Gulf Research Center (GRC), a Saudi-based think-tank. The GRC hosts workshops and conferences that foster GCC cooperation with Iran, Iraq and Yemen on a variety of regional political, social and economic issues. Working alongside other organizations, it has expanded dialogues to include civil society participants and a younger generation of experts, creating a Gulf-based community that has vested interests in cooperation and an understanding of its value – though such concepts have gained less traction with official decision-makers.
These GCC-focused projects are undoubtedly more practical than some wider-ranging regional cooperation efforts, as it is easier to start with a small group of like-minded states and avoid the complications of a larger forum where agreement may be more difficult. And with the centre of political gravity in the Middle East having moved towards the Gulf over the past decade, concentrating on this subregion is in tune with regional trends. The GCC platform has also been able to include states outside the subregion that have similar interests on some matters – such as Egypt and Jordan – and has proven a useful mechanism for re-anchoring Iraq’s foreign policy to the common interests of its Arab neighbours. Moreover, Iranian participation as part of a GCC+2 format is compatible with Iran’s long-standing preference for regionally based dialogues that exclude external powers such as the US and – within the MENA region – Israel.
However, subregional mechanisms are no panacea. Transnational issues such as climate change, food security and migration extend beyond the Gulf’s geographical boundaries. Moreover, a Gulf format that includes Iran but excludes Israel cannot be used to translate existing areas of productive functional cooperation between some GCC states and Israel into wider improvements in political relations.
Subregional mechanisms are no panacea. Transnational issues such as climate change, food security and migration extend beyond the Gulf’s geographical boundaries.
Perhaps most critically, the argument that subregional Gulf solutions are somehow ‘easier’ overlooks the deep-seated mistrust and competition between the GCC states themselves. It also downplays their continued preference for bilateral and minilateral arrangements and external security guarantees. Such factors make agreement even among a smaller grouping challenging. The lingering impact of the 2017–21 blockade of Qatar has, despite resumed diplomatic ties, continued to slow GCC coordination. Economic and diplomatic competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is also on the rise as Riyadh pushes forward on its ambitious domestic ‘Vision 2030’, an economic diversification and privatization plan that could, over time, draw investment and resources away from Dubai.
It is thus not surprising that a recent UN effort to support a Gulf dialogue through the GCC+2 format managed only a ‘lunch not a launch’ among the participating countries’ permanent representatives in New York. That said, UN officials are exploring further meetings with this grouping to advance dialogue within the Gulf region.
Abraham Accords/Negev Forum initiatives
The Abraham Accords – a set of normalization agreements between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain announced in August 2020 – have signalled a shift in regional politics that culminated in the first formal recognition of Israel by any Arab state since Jordan’s 1994 agreement. (Morocco followed the UAE and Bahrain in recognizing Israel in December 2020; Sudan has also committed in principle to doing so but the process has been delayed due to the civil war.) The Abraham Accords not only established diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE, and between Israel and Bahrain, but also normalized economic ties between Israel and both partners. This has encouraged cooperation in fields that include tourism, education, healthcare and technology.
Gulf Arab economic cooperation with Israel has focused on joint water and energy projects, the expansion of defence relationships, and technological and surveillance exchanges. Despite significant criticism, principally over the abandonment of Palestinian peace initiatives as a precondition for the normalization of relations with Israel, the Abraham Accords have enabled more inclusive bilateral and multilateral discussions to take place as a result of Israeli participation.
A prime example is the Negev Forum, the inaugural meeting of which took place in Israel in March 2022. The forum brought together Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the UAE and the US to build and support the normalization agreements through economic and security cooperation. However, because of the lack of progress on Palestinian peace negotiations, Jordan was notably absent from this gathering.
Borrowing both from the format of the 1991 Madrid peace process and that used by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the participants agreed to make the meeting a rotating forum with a steering committee. The idea is that, with time, the Negev Forum will enable greater cooperation on hard and soft security issues and form the basis for a broader, more formalized institutional framework. Six working groups were also established – on education, energy, food and water security, health, security and tourism – with the goal of building cross-regional cooperation in these areas. The working groups also aspire to coordinate steps to improve living conditions in the Palestinian Territories.
Members of the Negev Forum convened again in Bahrain in June 2022 to establish the structure for future dialogue and cooperation. It was agreed that the working groups will meet three times a year. In January 2023, the groups convened in Abu Dhabi to begin preparations for a planned March 2023 meeting in Morocco, subsequently postponed twice due to political tensions over Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank. The meetings have received track 2 support from the Atlantic Council and other institutions.
The Negev Forum remains hampered by a number of regional challenges. Among these are perceptions, particularly in some Gulf states, that the participants are motivated by a common agenda of curbing Iran’s expansionist ambitions. The fear is that this could prompt Iranian retaliation against targets in Gulf Arab countries. Also problematic is a perception that the grouping is too exclusive, and that it exists largely to enhance Israel’s integration with other countries in the region, running counter to a substantial segment of popular opinion across the Middle East which sees such integration as coming at the expense of Palestinian peace. Yet without progress on a Palestinian peace process, sustained regional cooperation as well as the Israeli goal of further normalization – including with Saudi Arabia – appears harder to achieve. Because of these political challenges, the Negev Forum risks being obstructed by broader regional dynamics and tensions, and could be reduced to episodic meetings. Finally, the fact that the US is a signatory to the forum brands it as an American effort, limiting the initiative’s regional legitimacy and wider international appeal.
Minilateral initiatives
‘Minilateralism’ has taken off in the Middle East as a number of smaller country groupings have emerged organically to tackle specific challenges. This type of diplomatic approach has the advantage of being more targeted and more flexible, and allows a focus on specific goals while also filling strategic voids unaddressed by other formats. Compared to more ambitious multilateralism, which has been difficult to coordinate in the region and remains vulnerable to polarizing political divides, minilateral groups are nimbler and can build focused relationships.
Smaller groups of countries often achieve progress on issues related to economic development or other topical issues. Such groups have included the Amman Summit, which in 2021 brought together Jordan, Egypt and Iraq to discuss regional security cooperation and economic ties. Similarly, the Cyprus Government Initiative for Coordinating Climate Change Action in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East provides a thematic, focused forum for technical specialists from around the region, including from Iran, Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. The East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) gathers representatives from Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories – as well as from France, Italy and Greece – in a regional dialogue on gas market security and decarbonization. There is also a Red Sea Council, which promotes maritime security mainly among the littoral states of the Red Sea (although Israel is conspicuously not a member), and a Russia-backed ‘Astana process’ that has tried to promote alignment between Iran, Syria and Türkiye.
In some cases, minilateralism has brought in extra-regional actors. Along with the EMGF mentioned above, another example is the I2U2 initiative involving Israel, India, the UAE and the US. Building on this trend, Middle Eastern states have also gained membership or observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Despite the array of emergent groupings, minilateral initiatives should not be seen as a replacement for multilateral diplomacy. Minilateral gatherings reflect a need for expedient transactional cooperation that is narrowly focused, and their agendas and effectiveness often depend excessively on the positions of individual leaders and national agendas at any given time. As such, minilateralism has yet to provide a channel for more sustained and inclusive cooperation.
