Security actors in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan since 2011

How local factors shape Libya’s security sector, and what this means for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Research paper Updated 30 January 2024 ISBN: 978 1 78413 594 2 DOI: 10.55317/9781784135942

seven men each wearing a different military uniform stand beside a white vehicle parked on a street in Zawiya, Libya

Tim Eaton

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

In the absence of durable political and security institutions at national level, there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) across Libya. But as the country’s sprawling security sector continues to grow, with fresh recruits signing up to join both state-affiliated and non-state-affiliated armed groups, it is clear that planning for DDR cannot wait for a ‘post-conflict’ situation.

Drawing on a set of interviews with key figures with close knowledge of Libya’s security landscape, along with in-depth interviews with residents of Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan, this research paper explores how the security apparatus of each of these three cities has evolved since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The case studies highlight that significant variation exists in each city’s security dynamics, reflecting its social composition; its experience of conflict; the structure of the local economy and economic opportunity; and relations with neighbouring locations as well as with the state’s formal institutions.

Such highly localized factors underscore the scale of the challenges to be overcome in efforts to reform Libya’s security sector. Even so, the fact that the country’s armed groups mainly operate in the areas where they originated ensures a degree of social accountability that should not be underestimated. This accountability has the potential to check the behaviour of the armed groups within their own communities, and to provide a foundation, where conditions allow, for DDR planning in line with specific local contexts.

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03 The development of the post-2011 security apparatuses in the three cities

Armed factions in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan are formed from social networks drawn from the local context. It is these features, rather than policy from the central state, that has shaped them.

The evolving relationship of Libya’s armed groups to state authority must be studied in the context of the developing political, economic and security landscape in the country. Misratan, Zawiyan and Zintani armed groups have obtained state affiliation through the defence and interior ministries, as well as via direct relationships with the Presidency Council and the Libyan Intelligence Service. Elements of Zintan’s security sector have also aligned themselves with Haftar’s LAAF. Such institutional affiliations have in most cases proved weak and subject to change.

Armed groups from each of the three cities remain based on social networks. Seen through this lens, the changes in names of the groups, their shifting affiliations and reorganizations, and their influxes of funding shed light on the prevailing distribution of power in the country. Tracking these developments has become increasingly complex. However, focusing on the positioning of key social constituencies and commanders reveals a clearer narrative, with the formal structures of the security sector reflecting local conditions. These dynamics show that durable institution-building in the security sector at national level remains elusive.

The Misratan security apparatus: social mobilization, restructuring and expansion

In Misrata, support for the goals of the revolution rather than formal state authority remains at the centre of the social contract between the community and its armed groups. Over the past decade, Misratan armed groups have led and engaged in conflicts across Libya, with hundreds of individuals fighting on various front lines for what they believed to be national causes. The majority of these Misratan fighters do not belong to the military, and do not necessarily have a sense of military hierarchy and command. Consequently, to mobilize their units effectively and maintain control military operations, Misratan commanders need societal support for their cause. For day-to-day operations in times of relative peace, the core state-affiliated elements of the Misratan security apparatuses respond to orders coming down the Tripoli-based official chain of command.

A number of initiatives have sought to formalize Misratan armed groups under the aegis of the Libyan state, albeit in a period where Misrata exerted significant influence over the state itself. This has led the security apparatus in Misrata to become more coherent since 2015, as the prevalence and the impact of activities by members of non-state-affiliated armed groups – including illegal arrests, checkpoints and the exercise of authority over citizens and government institutions – have diminished considerably. This transformation has been associated with attempts to professionalize armed individuals under military forces and Ministry of Interior agencies. Early efforts, via the establishment of the Libya Shield apparatus and the Third Force, ended in failure.16

Misrata’s security apparatus has been subject to efforts at restructuring whereby commanders from the city have sought to install a military hierarchy and train personnel, although connections to the revolutionary groups remain firmly in place (see Table 1). The clearest examples of these attempts are the creation of Brigades 166 and 301, the Joint Operations Force (JOF) and the Counter Terrorism Force (CTF).

Table 1. Misratan-dominated state-affiliated forces and their origins

Year of formation	State-affiliated force	Location of HQ	Affiliation	Revolutionary group
2013	Joint Operations Force	Misrata	Presidency Council	Drawn from a mix of groups
2014	Al-Sumood Brigade	Zwara	No current affiliation	Al-Marsa Brigade
2015	Brigade 166	Misrata	Ministry of Defence	Nimr Brigade
2015	Brigade 301	Tripoli	Ministry of Defence	Halbous Brigade
2015	Special Support Force	Misrata	Ministry of Interior	First Security Group (2015)
2016	Al-Sumood Operations Room	Misrata	Presidency Council	Misrata Military Council-affiliated groups
2017	Counter Terrorism Force	Khums	Presidency Council	Drawn from a mix of revolutionary groups
2019	Al-Burkhan al-Ghadab Operations Room	Tripoli	Ministry of Defence	–
2019	Operations Room for the Protection of Sirte and Jufra	Abugrein	Presidency Council	Misrata Military Council

Source: Chatham House research.

Brigade 301 was formed from fighters affiliated with the Halbous Brigade in Tripoli in 2015.17 The Halbous Brigade is a revolutionary armed group that defended the eastern areas of Misrata in 2011 and subsequently became one of the largest, best equipped and most organized brigades in the city. It played a significant role in the Libya Dawn operation in 2014, deploying to Tripoli to oust Zintani forces. Halbous was led by a cadre of five leading officers. One of them, Mohamed al-Haddad, was appointed to the command of the Central Military Zone in 2017, and a number of leading Misratan armed groups were brought under his command. Haddad was appointed chief of the general staff of the GNA in 2020. His influence stems not only from his official position but also from his connections to Halbous. It is said in the city that Misrata cannot go to war without Halbous.

Brigade 166 was formed in 2015 to protect state institutions. At that time, most of its recruits were fighters from the Nimr Brigade, which had been a prominent revolutionary faction fighting on Misrata’s eastern front lines in 2011. Like Brigade 301, the group has partly relied on its connections to revolutionary factions to maintain its influence.18

The JOF, which is responsible for counterterrorism operations, was founded in 2013 under the Ministry of Defence, before coming under the direct purview of the Presidency Council in 2016. Members first joined the group after an announcement was broadcast on Misrata FM radio about accepting new members to a state group. Headquartered in central Misrata, the JOF also contains members from other cities such as Khums and Zliten. The group is formed of fighters with a reputation for being ‘well behaved’, and who can be trusted to be part of a force intended to support and secure state institutions. When the GNA Presidency Council was formed, it placed the JOF under the direct command of then prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The JOF has since come to be regarded as one of the most effective and respected forces in Misrata.

Founded in 2017, the CTF emulated the JOF approach. It recruited fighters who had participated in the al-Bunyan al-Marsous operation against ISIS in Sirte in 2016. under the command of Mohamed al-Zain (who previously commanded an artillery battalion affiliated with the Central Military Zone). The CTF has since collaborated with international partners on counterterrorism operations, and is directly affiliated to the Presidency Council.19

A concerted effort has also been made to develop regular armed forces with Misratan recruits under the formal aegis of the Central Military Zone of the Ministry of Defence.

All four of these forces continue to draw, to differing degrees, on Misratan revolutionary armed formations. Crucially, they each maintain a military hierarchy within their units, and each force is being expanded via formal training programmes that are separate from the revolutionary factions. Members have received military training, and through their state affiliations Brigade 301, Brigade 166 and the CTF are entitled to receive military serial numbers.

A concerted effort has also been made to develop regular armed forces with Misratan recruits under the formal aegis of the Central Military Zone of the Ministry of Defence. These formal elements containing Misratans recruited since 2011 are not, however, believed to be influential outside the administrative circles of the Central Military Zone, which is responsible for Libya’s central region (including Misrata). In 2019, in response to Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, armed forces that would previously have been expected to be integrated under the Central Military Zone were instead affiliated to the Presidency Council, seen as facilitating more direct funding relationships.

The Central Military Zone has been unable to obtain significant funding from the state. It has played no significant role in security developments over recent years. Key informant interviews indicated that these formal groups would continue to be overshadowed by hybrid forces such as the JOF and others that have formal elements but retain connections to the revolutionary groups, as well as by the revolutionary groups, as there is a continuing perceived need to remain on a state of alert to counter threats by LAAF-affiliated armed groups.

Ministry of Interior-affiliated forces have been able to consolidate their authority within Misrata since 2015. They are now confident enough to provide law and order on the streets and to enforce judicial orders without the need to be supported by armed groups, as was the case previously. Defence groups are not present on the streets of the city, and neither military institutions nor non-state-affiliated armed groups interfere in regular civil affairs. Consequently, unlike in many other cities including Tripoli, revolutionary armed groups play no role in the day-to-day provision of policing in Misrata, nor are there checkpoints controlled by armed factions. The Misrata Security Directorate, affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, provides policing within the city, running police stations from al-Dafnia gate in the west of the city to Abugrein in the east.

The Security Directorate does, however, seek support from both the JOF, which continues to provide a counterterrorism function, and the Special Support Force (SSF).20 This form of interagency cooperation is encouraging. The SSF is considered to be one of the most effective Ministry of Interior state forces in Misrata and central Libya. It was founded in 2015 by the city’s municipal council, and was then known as the First Security Division. The group’s main duty initially was to secure the Misrata Medical Centre and to stop armed individuals from entering it and abusing medical staff. Its perceived legitimacy enabled it to address and reduce such violations. The SSF was commanded by a prominent young Salafi figure, Anwar Swaisi. During Haftar’s military assault on Tripoli in 2019–20, the force was reconstituted by the Ministry of Interior, and it became the SSF under the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate of Central Support. The SSF is now completely commanded by the Ministry of Interior.21

With strong social connections to the local community, the JOF and the SSF are considered to be among the most powerful and reliable state security agencies in Misrata. The Ministry of Interior, as well as judicial authorities, have been cooperating with both in critical missions related to counterterrorism, countering drug-trafficking and restoring public property. However, there have been reports of some members of the JOF having allegedly committed human rights violations on occasion against journalists and activists.22

The enduring importance of revolutionary factions

Prominent revolutionary factions within Misrata have continued to eschew a formal affiliation to the state. These include the al-Mahjoub Brigade and the al-Marsa Brigade, among others. The al-Mahjoub Brigade was established in 2011 by rebels from one of Misrata’s largest neighbourhoods, Zawiat al-Mahjoub, in the west of the city, after they gained control of the neighbourhood from Gaddafi-supporting troops. The group then focused on the front lines west of Misrata, starting from the area of Addafnia, moving to Zliten and then on to Tripoli and Sirte. Al-Mahjoub subsequently took part in all major armed conflicts in the central area of Libya and in Tripoli, including Libya Dawn (2014), al-Bunyan al-Marsous (2016–17) and al-Burkhan al-Ghadab (2019–21). Compared with Halbous, the al-Mahjoub Brigade is less organized and more impulsive about joining armed conflicts that do not directly affect the local security of Misrata. Like Halbous, al-Mahjoub is more influential in times of war: it does not play an official role in the city. But unlike Halbous, it does not have a state-affiliated sister force. It is, however, capable of significant deployments, and its influence should not be disregarded. For example, the Sirte Security and Protection Force, established following the al-Bunyan al-Marsous operation, was mainly formed by groups belonging to al-Mahjoub (most prominently the Shnina Brigade).

The al-Marsa Brigade is effectively split into three main factions: al-Marsa al-Kubra, commanded by Salim al-Zoufri; al-Marsa 06, under the leadership of Salah Badi; and Death Company, commanded by Khaled Abu Aoud. Al-Marsa was formed in 2011 by rebels mainly from the al-Ramla and Garara neighbourhoods of Misrata. While Gaddafi’s troops did not manage to reach areas close to the central coast, such as al-Ramla and Garara, rebels from those areas also participated in the battles on Misrata’s eastern front lines.

Elements of al-Marsa received a state affiliation under the NSG in 2014–15, but they seem to have lost this following the appointment of the GNA. In May 2015, the al-Marsa 03 was positioned in Sirte power plant and was the last group to withdraw from the city after members of the NSG and the GNC refused to support Misrata armed groups in their conflict with ISIS.

Zawiya’s security apparatus: family ties, local competition and profit

The forces active in Zawiya consist of two main – and rivalrous – axes of power, based principally on familial ties and neighbourhoods, which have also effectively controlled the means through which the Zawiyan security sector has obtained affiliation with the Libyan state. The first is the central Zawiya axis of Mahmoud Bin Rajab and Mohamed Bahrun, which brings together factions from the Awlad Saqr tribe and family-based groupings located in the centre of the city. The second axis is built on the Abu Hamyra tribe, under the leadership of armed groups headed by the Abu Zariba and Khushlaf families, that control southern Zawiya and the city’s crucial oil refinery. These axes continue to vie with one another for dominance in the city. Their disputes have at times spilled over into violence, yet they have sought to avoid large-scale confrontation in order to preserve a degree of social stability. In December 2023, at the time of writing, these conflicts remain ongoing following a GNU-led bombing campaign in May–June 2023, and are continuing to reshape Zawiya’s security apparatus. The situation is set to remain volatile, and further reconfigurations should be expected. However, it should be noted that any ‘victory’ for one axis over the other is not likely to be absolute, as the rival groups’ social constituencies remain resident in their respective areas of the city.

The forces active in Zawiya consist of two main – and rivalrous – axes of power, based principally on familial ties and neighbourhoods, which have also effectively controlled the means through which the Zawiyan security sector has obtained affiliation with the Libyan state.

Unlike in Misrata, the development of armed groups in Zawiya has been forged in competition over economic interests. It is the actors themselves who have dictated the terms on which they have become affiliated with the state, as politicians have sought to reward Zawiya’s armed groups for their loyalty with resources and legitimacy by integrating them into the state structure. However, efforts to professionalize local forces or to break their existing chains of command as part of this integration have foundered.

The Zawiyan security forces are dominated by key figures who command the major forces in the city, which remain permanently mobilized. Compared with the situation in Misrata and Zintan, local community members and leaders in Zawiya are less able to check the behaviour of the city’s armed groups.

The central Zawiya axis

The central Zawiya axis includes several figures who are viewed as having close connections to Islamist-leaning factions associated with the former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) commander Shaaban Hadiya.23 Hadiya led the LROR, formed in 2013 from Islamist armed groups from across the country. All major Zawiyan revolutionary brigades joined the LROR, with their commanders having close relationships with Hadiya. Among these were Mahmoud Bin Rajab’s Faruq Brigade, which also had Mohamed Bahrun as one of its members, and Othman al-Lahab’s Silaa Brigade. The Nasr Brigade, which would later form a key part of the rival Abu Hamyra network, also joined with the LROR.

Changes emerged in the balance of power between the armed groups in Zawiya as a result of political changes at the national level and of power struggles at the local level. A key part of the Libya Dawn coalition, the LROR enjoyed significant influence while the Government of National Salvation operated in Tripoli. The formation of the GNA at Skheirat in December 2015 led to a decline in the influence of the Zawiyan armed groups.

Three developments in 2017 significantly changed the Zawiyan security sector. The first was the ouster of the LIFG’s leadership from Tripoli, which illustrated its reduced influence. Hadiya subsequently relocated to Istanbul. Second, fighting among rival armed groups in the centre of Zawiya escalated. In June 2017, Ibrahim Hneesh, the 20-year-old leader of a group of local militants, was killed during a gunfight with the militia of the Khadrawi family.24 His death triggered further fighting among competing armed groups. The third development, also in June of that year, was the arrest in Saudi Arabia of Mahmoud Bin Rajab, who was later transferred back to Libya and placed under LAAF detention.25

The violence in the city, along with Bin Rajab’s absence, created the space for Mohamed Bahrun (also known as ‘Al-Far’, or ‘the Mouse’) to emerge as a new leader. As a result, Bahrun’s First Security Division attracted members of rival factions and expanded significantly.26 Bahrun and the Awlad Saqr armed groups, such as the Silaa Brigade, continued to compete with the armed groups of the Abu Hamyra tribe for primacy in the city, and for a leading role in lucrative markets for goods.

In 2019, the return of Bin Rajab and the events surrounding the LAAF’s offensive on Tripoli transformed the situation once again. Following his release by the LAAF, Bin Rajab returned to Zawiya after reportedly indicating to Khalifa Haftar’s forces that he would likely support the LAAF in its attempts to capture Tripoli.27 However, Bin Rajab instead remobilized Zawiyan armed groups that had been active in the 2014 conflict from the Awlad Saqr, along with factions in the central Zawiya area that had been competing against the Abu Hamyra armed groups. The Zawiya Security Directorate-affiliated First Security Division, led by Bahrun, and Force III Support Force, led by Mohamed Ali Khalifa Sulaiman, joined Bin Rajab’s forces.

The forces aligned with Bin Rajab were formalized within the Ministry of Defence as a result of their support for the GNA against the LAAF’s offensive. The GNA’s then defence minister, Salah al-Din Namroush, a high-ranking Zawiyan military officer, emerged as a key figure in this period. Namroush is the formal ‘face’ of Bin Rajab’s faction, and is widely known to have aligned himself with Bin Rajab’s directives.28 While Namroush fronted engagement with Turkey, whose forces’ entry into Libya had swung the tide of the war, Bin Rajab is reported by some with a close knowledge of the security sector to have been an important interlocutor with Turkish forces. Namroush left office with the GNA in March 2021.29 Bin Rajab’s forces were formalized as the 52nd Infantry Brigade in July 2020 via a resolution issued by Namroush in his capacity as defence minister. The al-Naqliya Martyrs’ Brigade, formed of elements from central and northern Zawiya that fought in the campaign against the LAAF, was also formalized under the Western Military Zone.

Table 2. Zawiyan forces affiliated to the Government of National Unity

Year of formation	State-affiliated force	Location of HQ	Affiliation	Tribal affiliation	Origins
~2014	Criminal Investigations Unit	Zawiya	Zawiya Security Directorate (Ministry of Interior)	Mixed	Rebranded from the First Security Division in 2020, which also drew former fighters from the Khadrawi and Hneesh units
2019	Force III	Zawiya	Zawiya Security Directorate (Ministry of Interior)	Awlad Saqr	Faruq Brigade, recruitment of local fighters in vicinity of the Zawiya refinery
2020	District Support Force	Zawiya	Zawiya Security Directorate (Ministry of Interior)	Mixed	First Security Division, recruitment from Sabriya area, Surman
2020	52nd Infantry Brigade	Zawiya	West Coast Military Zone (Ministry of Defence)	Mixed	Formed from revolutionary-era battalions, such as the al-Faruq Brigade and the Mohamed Kilani Brigade, and demobilized fighters
2019	Al-Naqliya Martyrs Brigade	Tripoli	West Coast Military Zone (Ministry of Defence)	Mixed	Volunteers from central and northern Zawiya who fought against the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in 2019–20
2021	Force II for Support and Stability	Tripoli	West Coast Military Zone (Ministry of Defence)	Mixed	Drawn from Bin Rajab forces, formalized in 2021
2022	Office for Counterterrorism and Combating Destructive Acts	Tripoli	Libyan Intelligence Service	Mixed	Drawn from Bahrun’s forces who transferred from the Criminal Investigations Unit

Following its involvement in the campaign against Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Tripoli, the forces under the control of Mohamed Bahrun were formalized as a Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU) under the aegis of the Zawiya Security Directorate, as part of the Ministry of Interior. In 2020, the head of the Zawiya Security Directorate, Ali al-Lafi, recognized the status of the Bahrun’s forces, which had been operating as an informal ‘support’ force for some time.30

However, these institutional relationships did not define the scope and nature of Bahrun’s actions. Bahrun would subsequently use his forces to support the head of the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS), Hussein Ayeb, in the latter’s struggle for control of the LIS amid challenges from Tripoli-based armed groups. This support for Ayeb led to Bahrun’s appointment to the new position of head of the Office for Counterterrorism and Combating Destructive Acts.31

Since the period of data collection for this paper, the already tense situation in Zawiya has escalated significantly. In April 2023, clashes broke out between the forces of Bahrun and Hassan Abu Zariba after the reported killing of a member of each force.32 Subsequently, in May and June, a series of GNU drone strikes targeted facilities in Zawiya (as well as Zuwara and Warshefana) that included buildings linked to the Abu Hamyra axis.33 In the aftermath of this campaign, the GNU has sought to place the West Coast Military Zone – dominated by the central Zawiya axis commanders – in charge of previously Abu Hamyra-controlled areas, such as the critical Zawiya refinery.34 Illustrating the importance of the central Zawiya axis to the GNU, Namroush was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Libyan armed forces in November 2023.35

The Abu Hamyra axis

Zawiya’s second axis of power is generally seen as being built on the Abu Hamyra tribe. Key players in the city are drawn from this tribe, notably the Abu Zariba and the Khushlaf families. In both of these families, three brothers have divided power, influence and positions among themselves. The two sets of brothers are cousins. Yet these groups should not be considered purely tribal because recruitment into them has not been limited to family or tribal connections.

Zawiya’s second axis of power is generally seen as being built on the Abu Hamyra tribe. Key players in the city are drawn from this tribe, notably the Abu Zariba and the Khushlaf families.

Ali, Essam and Hassan Abu Zariba have steadily accumulated power and influence in Zawiya since the overthrow of the regime. They formed the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade in 2012, and the group has been seen as controlling southern Zawiya.36 Its strategic partnership with the Nasr Brigade (which is also from the Abu Hamyra and controls the Zawiya refinery) allowed the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade to dominate some local trading markets. The Abu Hamyra’s competition with rival Awlad Saqr armed groups is seen as having become more violent, particularly since the campaign against the LAAF drew to a close and fresh disputes over central government emerged.

The Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) was established by a resolution of the Presidency Council of the GNA in January 2021, at the request of a coalition of the Abu Hamyra and the Tripoli-based Abu Slim Security Unit. These groups pressured the GNA to form a joint force that would bring together armed groups from Tripoli and Zawiya. The GNA’s resolution included appointing Hassan Abu Zariba, the commander of the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade, as the deputy head of the SSA. Hassan Abu Zariba was responsible for establishing and overseeing a branch of the SSA in the cities west of Tripoli, from Zawiya to al-Ajaylat. He also incorporated other armed groups within the SSA, under the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade: among these were the al-Ajaylat Martyrs’ Brigade and the 55th Infantry Brigade, which controlled the municipalities of al-Zahra, Ma’amoura and al-Mayi in neighbouring Warshefana, southwest of Tripoli. As a result, the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade became the main force from which the SSA was established. From the end of 2021, Hassan Abu Zariba expanded his network of alliances in Zawiya and began to build an alliance between the SSA and the Nasr Brigade, with which the Abu Zariba family has been aligned for years.

However, a rift subsequently emerged between the Abu Zaribas and the commander of the SSA’s Tripoli elements, Abdel Ghani Belkacem al-Kikli (known as Gneiwa).37 Their conflicting stances became clear in May 2022, when the Abu Zaribas and their coalition split off to support the GNS, which had been appointed by the House of Representatives. Essam Abu Zariba was appointed minister of the interior in the GNS, and Ali Abu Zariba, a member of the House of Representatives, became close to Fathi Bashagha, the GNS prime minister. Gneiwa sided with the GNU, led by Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba. The SSA is said to have received more than LYD130 million from the GNU.38

Later that month, when Bashagha sought to enter Tripoli, elements of the SSA fought on opposite sides. Gneiwa supported the GNU, and the Abu Zaribas sent armoured vehicles to support the GNS. The Abu Zaribas’ support for Bashagha has limited their opportunities to gain a different legal standing that would enable them to give up the SSA name.

While the above-mentioned GNU bombing campaign in Zawiya claimed that the strikes targeted criminals in these areas, their initial focus within Libya was seen as political. The targeting was interpreted as messaging to the Abu Hamyra axis on the risks it was running in its continued opposition to the GNU.39 Subsequent to the strikes, in addition to the GNU placing the West Coast Military Zone in formal charge, the attorney-general announced that the commander of the Support Unit (the official name for the Nasr Brigade under its formal affiliation with the Petroleum Facilities Guard) had been detained pending investigation for ‘facilitating fuel smuggling’.40 At the time of writing, however, there is no evidence to suggest that Mohamed Khushlaf, the Nasr Brigade commander, was detained or remains in detention.41 These developments indicate that Zawiya’s security space will continue to be contested, with no clear resolution in sight.

Zintan’s security apparatus: expansion and protection of local interests, and varying interpretations of the revolutionary cause

From a unified position in favour of the revolution in 2011, Zintan’s security landscape has since fractured, with parallel processes of integration with eastern- and western-based authorities. Such affiliations have been largely determined by the political positioning of key Zintani commanders and their networks as part of a process of deal-making. This has led to a fragmented and confused security apparatus. Based on their current affiliations, Zintan’s armed groups can be broadly divided into four factions: pro-GNU, pro-LAAF, groups loyal to the former Gaddafi regime, and neutrals. However, there is overlap among them. Some groups have taken pro-LAAF and pro-Gaddafi positions simultaneously, while others remain technically part of GNU-affiliated forces even though they do not recognize the GNU. The degree to which these affiliations have fluctuated illustrates the weakness of the groups’ ties to governing authorities.

The fragmentation of Zintan’s security sector after 2014 reflects the distinctive political positioning of the city.

The fragmentation of Zintan’s security sector after 2014 reflects the distinctive political positioning of the city. Zintan was a bulwark of the 2011 revolution, but it has also been willing to engage with former regime elements and take a softer line on the return of state officials, in contrast with the hardline constituencies of Misrata and Zawiya. Consequently, seeking to dissect the Zintani security services along ideological lines is imperfect. Zintani armed groups might be described as pro- or counter-revolution, and Islamist or non-Islamist. Yet the pro-revolutionary groups have entered a coalition of sorts with the LAAF, which is dominated by counter-revolutionaries. The Madkhali-Salafists,42 meanwhile, have consistently opposed the Muslim Brotherhood’s political project.

The ZMC and the revolution

Despite splits since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, the enduring importance of the Zintan Revolutionaries’ Military Council (ZMC) as a military operations room and critical social forum for the city’s armed groups illustrates Zintan’s continuing allegiance to the 2011 revolution. The ZMC was established early in the uprising to command all the military forces and revolutionaries from Zintan and the surrounding area who volunteered to fight. Its influence soon expanded to controlling a large number of other military councils, and its model was reproduced in other locations. The ZMC was aligned with the non-Islamist current in Libyan politics, and only accepted recruits who could demonstrate that they had no affiliation to the former regime.43 Strongly hierarchical, it initially consisted of 23 Nafusa mountain (the mountainous area within which Zintan is located) militia groups, and it was viewed as one of the most powerful and well-organized groups in Libya.44

A series of defections and the realignment of some groups with Haftar following the 2014 war diminished the ZMC’s influence. As a result, there have been major attempts to dismantle and reconfigure the ZMC. It still exists, however, and its leaders still have good connections with different social, political and military actors in the Nafusa mountain region. The ZMC retains the support of a number of armed groups, most of which are formally affiliated to other authorities. It has participated in all the wars in which the Zintan tribes have engaged, providing weapons, ammunition and fighters.

A series of defections and the realignment of some groups with Haftar following the 2014 war diminished the ZMC’s influence.

The ZMC has also had a prominent role in determining who from Zintan could run for political positions. At the same time, state authorities are viewed as having offered positions to figures from Zintan to ensure the ongoing support of the ZMC. The appointment of Osama al-Juweili as defence minister in 2012 was viewed as particularly notable in this regard. Perceptions of the broader political influence of the ZMC have been reinforced by the fact that the House of Representatives has five members from Zintan, even though only two seats are nominally allocated to the city.45 In addition, two members of the State Council also have significant support from the ZMC.46

Table 3. Key armed groups affiliated with the Zintan Military Council

Years active	Armed group	Location of activity	Commander	Relationship with ZMC
2011–14	Al-Qaaqaa Brigade	Tripoli	Othman Mlegta	Defunct
2011–14	Sawa’iq Brigade	Tripoli	Emad al-Trabelsi	Defunct
2011–14	Al-Madani Brigade	Tripoli	Ibrahim al- Madani	Defunct
2011 to date	Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Brigade	Southern Libya	Al-Ajmi al-Atiri	Defected to LAAF in 2014; split from LAAF in 2017
2011 to date	Al-Samah Group	Northwestern coast	Ismail al-Samah	Defected to LAAF in 2014
2011 to date	Nasser al-Hallak Brigade	Northwestern coast	Riyad al-Hubail and Mohamed Kamour	Member of ZMC
2011 to date	Al-Gurj Battalion/Rayayna Petroleum Facilities Guard	Northwestern coast	Mohamed al- Gurj	Defected to LAAF in 2014
2014–20	Committee of 200	Zintan	Marwan Saqr	Defunded by ZMC after support for LAAF in 2019 war

Source: Chatham House research.

The role of key commanders: Osama al-Juweili and Emad al-Trabelsi

As in Zawiya, the positioning of key security figures is critical. Realignments of Zintani security structures affiliated with Tripoli-based authorities have been negotiated through Osama al-Juweili and Emad al-Trabelsi, with both acting as focal points for the pursuit of Zintani interests through state authorities in the capital.

Osama al-Juweili has been at the forefront of Zintan’s security sector since 2011, and was seen as a main driver of Zintani influence in government until 2022. As GNC minister of defence in 2012–13, he signed off on the formation of several new units to absorb Zintan’s fighters, and he appointed dozens of military attachés, the vast majority of whom were from Zintan, to Libya’s official diplomatic missions abroad.47

Juweili led Zintani forces in the 2014 fighting. These forces were divided into three main branches: a formal military one led by Idris Madi; a quasi-civilian one led by Abdelsalam Abu Sitta and the ZMC; and a religious one, responsible for teaching and ideology, led by Tariq al-Durman (also known as Abu al-Khatab). All these actors came together in a Joint Operations Room, sometimes called the Information Room, which constituted the main leadership at that time and was run by Juweili. Following the conflict, Madi’s military branch, along with Durman and his adherents, affiliated themselves with the LAAF.

Following the ouster of Zintani forces from Tripoli in 2014, Juweili retained his connections with the revolutionary camp. In June 2017, his appointment as commander of the Western Military Region of the GNA-aligned Armed Forces signalled the rapprochement of Zintani revolutionary factions with the Tripoli-based authorities. Although he was technically under the authority of the Presidency Council of the GNA, in reality Juweili was able to operate autonomously.

Juweili was a critical figure for the GNA in its attempts to marshal support to counter the LAAF’s offensive on Tripoli in 2019–20. He was instrumental in ensuring that Zawiyan groups opposed Haftar’s initial advance on Tripoli. Juweili headed the Western Military Region’s Joint Operations Room – formed in May 2019 – a key command centre in the war for Tripoli. The Joint Operations Room was a critical structure for the GNA-affiliated forces and for integrating fighters and militias under the command of the General Staff. Following the defeat of Haftar’s forces, Juweili’s Joint Operations Room incorporated former military leaders holding a military rank. It took control over the al-Aziziya road and of the April 7 Military Camp in Tripoli, and also secured the Batin al-Jabal road between al-Jabal al-Gharbi and Tripoli. The Joint Operations Room trained batches of recruits and created a site in the Surman Reserve area as a primary military location and administrative building. Its military force expanded after fighters joined from the Amazigh regions, especially from al-Qalaa, Nalut, Jadu and Gharyan. An armed brigade from al-Asaba also joined, as did soldiers from the Riqdalin, al-Jumayl, Zaltan, al-Ajaylat, Sabratah and Surman areas.

Following the collapse of the 2021 elections process, Juweili backed Fathi Bashagha’s GNS, formed by the House of Representatives in February 2022.48 In response, the GNU fired him from his post as commander of the Western Military Zone. Juweili rejected his removal, joining a campaign to replace the GNU in the summer of 2022.49

Amid these events, Emad al-Trabelsi, a fellow commander from Zintan, supplanted Juweili by becoming the primary conduit for support for the city through the Tripoli authorities. He rose to prominence following the 2011 overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, establishing himself in Tripoli.50 Following the expulsion of Zintani forces from the capital, Trabelsi returned to the western mountains before reaching an accommodation with the House of Representatives and Haftar in 2015. In 2016, the eastern-based Interim Government of Abdullah al-Thani appointed Trabelsi as head of a new Special Operations Force. The following year, he was appointed head of a joint security room affiliated with the House of Representatives.

The GNA wrested Trabelsi’s allegiance back to the Tripoli-based authorities, bolstering its support in Zintan. In July 2018, prime minister Fayez al-Serraj appointed Trabelsi to head the newly created General Security Service, which allowed him to incorporate his fighters from the Joint Operations Force under the GNA. The General Security Service was supported by the GNA as a means of checking the power of Tripoli’s own armed groups. Trabelsi’s General Security Service played no significant role in the 2019–20 war for Tripoli, however, focusing instead on retaining its physical position in the capital. Despite his limited role in the fighting, Trabelsi was appointed deputy head of the Libyan Intelligence Service in September 2020, but the Presidency Council under Mohamed al-Menfi dismissed him from this position when it entered office in 2021.

Trabelsi was rewarded for his support of the GNU when he was appointed acting minister of interior in the government of Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba in November 2022. Dabaiba worked hard to retain Trabelsi’s allegiance throughout the summer of 2022. One source in the Ministry of Finance indicated that the General Security Service was able to obtain LYD50 million of funding in June 2022.51,52 The GNU also created a new border guard unit under the leadership of Mohamed al-Shaibani al-Amyani, who was Trabelsi’s former office director and deputy minister of interior for immigration affairs in the GNA. For the GNU, retaining Trabelsi’s support prevented a reunification of the Zintani security sector by Juweili.

The promotion of Trabelsi to the position of acting minister of interior was a significant prize for Zintani forces, in that it allowed them to remain in the capital to preserve their interests. The impact of Juweili’s defeat on Zintani interests was mitigated by the fact that the General Security Service took over the camps previously held by his forces. A source close to Juweili noted that Zintani armed groups were only concerned with keeping the city under their military control and preserving their political gains in Tripoli, and that the withdrawal of Juweili’s forces from the April 7 Military Camp in August 2022 was just a formality as the Zintan forces can still access Tripoli via the General Security Service.53 The same source noted Zintani armed groups have no problem being under either the Trabelsi or the Juweili umbrella.54 Their overwhelming priority is to maintain their access in Tripoli, and to avert any threats that might reduce or end their presence in the capital.

Zintan and the LAAF

Zintan’s relations with Haftar and the LAAF must be seen in the context of developments in Tripoli and the outbreak of the 2014 war. Existing relationships with former regime elements, support for the ‘liberal’ political current and the Libya Dawn offensive led a significant number of Zintani armed groups to ally with Haftar’s growing Dignity coalition and to break ties with the ZMC after the 2014 conflict. From a Zintani perspective, support for the House of Representatives in the east and the reformulated Interim Government of Abdullah al-Thani represented continuity. Haftar was appointed general commander of the Armed Forces aligned with these eastern-based authorities in March 2015.55 The groups that declared support for Haftar were mainly active in the battle to control key infrastructure such as the al-Watiya airbase and the Melitah oil and gas complex, key towns such as al-Rujban, and the desert regions to the south of the Nafusa mountains. One such group is the Rayayna Petroleum Facilities Guard, known locally as the al-Gurj Battalion. Formed in 2011, this relatively long-established group is drawn from a single tribe, the al-Gurj. It is affiliated to the Petroleum Facilities Guard as well as to the LAAF.56

Other groups developed in significance through the recruitment of fighters in the context of the 2014 war. The al-Samah group, led by Ismail al-Samah, was first formed in 2011. After declaring its support for Haftar, it received military equipment and funds from the UAE. Fighters from the southern regions and the east also joined the al-Samah group, especially during the 2019–20 war for Tripoli, as did fighters from the areas of al-Rujban, al-Asbaa city, Tarhuna, Gharyan and al-Sayan. Many members of the group are supporters of the former Gaddafi regime.

The 2017 accommodation of Juweili and the remaining elements of the ZMC with the GNA led to an open split in Zintan between GNA-aligned and LAAF-aligned forces. Idris Madi, who headed the Western Military Region for the LAAF-aligned forces from 2014 until 2020, had worked with Juweili in the Ministry of Defence before breaking with him and the ZMC.

Haftar’s forces developed links with religious and tribal leaders in Zintan, drawing on shared affiliation to the Interim Government to build relationships with Zintani political and security figures. Tariq al-Durman has been a key ally for the LAAF in Zintan.57 He appears to have been particularly critical to the maintenance of support from Madkhali-dominated armed groups drawn from Zintan and the northwestern coastal cities of Sabratha and Surman in 2014–20. Among these groups were the al-Adiyat Brigade – reported to take Durman’s orders – which positions itself as an elite strike force and which was active on the front lines in the 2019–20 Tripoli offensive. Durman also maintained a strong relationship with the Committee of the 200, a group akin to a popular police force whose membership is drawn from across the social groups of Zintan. These armed groups crumbled after Haftar’s defeat in Tripoli. As a result of its support for Haftar, the Committee of the 200 lost funding from the ZMC, and many of its fighters and people went into hiding and withdrew from the scene in Zintan. The al-Adiyat Brigade has relocated to the east, and it is also reported to be operating alongside the LAAF’s Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade in the south.

There has been a nominal reunification of the Zintani security sector since Juweili’s ouster by the GNU.

The divide placed significant stress on social peace in Zintan, as was evident amid the 2019–20 LAAF offensive on Tripoli, when Zintani groups fought on opposing sides. However, they conspicuously avoided direct confrontation on the battlefield.58 Following the LAAF’s loss, Zintani forces affiliated with it were ostracized, with key figures such as Durman moving to the east. Madi resigned his post as head of the LAAF Western Military Region.

There has been a nominal reunification of the Zintani security sector since Juweili’s ouster by the GNU. In the politicking that followed the LAAF’s failed Tripoli offensive, Juweili backed Bashagha’s GNS, forged as part of a deal between Bashagha, Haftar and Agila Saleh, the speaker of the House of Representatives. Juweili’s support for Bashagha signalled a reconciliation with Haftar, thereby removing a key obstacle to the reunification of Zintan’s security sector. Juweili subsequently announced that the Zintani security sector had been reunified, which has eased tensions in the city. Yet with the civilian leadership of Zintan aligned with the GNU, and the GNU’s acting minister of interior, Trabelsi, hailing from the city, the situation remains confused.

Zintan and the Greens

A further level of complexity is added by the support among some Zintani armed groups for the former regime. In some cases, LAAF-aligned groups have also professed support for actors from the former Gaddafi regime, collectively known as the ‘Greens’. They do not necessarily see a contradiction in this, even though Muammar Gaddafi’s son and erstwhile heir apparent, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, is seen as a threat to Haftar’s prospects.

Some members of Zintani forces have gone from being among the jailers of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to being part of his personal guard.

Some members of Zintani forces have gone from being among the jailers of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to being part of his personal guard. His capture, in November 2011, by Zintani forces provided significant political leverage for the city. Saif al-Islam was placed in the custody of the Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Brigade, which was then affiliated with the ZMC. Led by al-Ajmi al-Atiri, the brigade was formed of soldiers and fighters mainly from Zintan’s Awlad Issa tribe. In 2014, Atiri’s forces refused to hand Saif al-Islam over to the general prosecutor for trial in Tripoli, citing ‘security concerns’. They released him in 2015, and are said to have subsequently provided his protection.59 After aligning with the LAAF in 2014–17, Atiri’s forces have renounced any affiliation to a formal state entity. When, in late 2021, Saif al-Islam travelled to Sebha to register as a candidate for the presidency, it was members of Atiri’s forces who were widely believed to have provided the protection.60

Non-aligned forces

Zintan also contains a faction that has sought to remain neutral in these internecine disputes. At the security level, the key neutral armed group is the Nasser al-Hallak Brigade. Reminiscent of the Misratan revolutionary groups, the Nasser al-Hallak Brigade, which was formed in 2011, sees itself as a reserve force to protect Zintan in the event of conflict. It takes its name from one of its early leaders, who was killed in the civil war. The brigade includes a variety of volunteer fighters from Zintan with different tribal backgrounds, most of whom are Salafists but not adherents of Durman’s line.61

Formed in 2012, Libya Shield aimed to accommodate existing non-state armed groups under the state’s aegis. In response to the death of a prominent revolutionary fighter, a military campaign led by Misrata’s Libya Shield forces targeted the town of Bani Walid. These actions led to widespread criticism and effectively ended the project of professionalizing rebel groups under Libya Shield. Simultaneously with the formation of Libya Shield in 2012, hundreds of Misratans joined the Third Force. Many high school and university students went to join the operations of this new force in Sabha, Brak al-Shati, Sharara oil field and Jufra. The Third Force sought to expand the authority of the parallel GNS and to undermine armed groups affiliated with Haftar in the south following the 2014 war. These efforts focused particularly on Zintani groups stationed at al-Fil oil field and on Mohamed Ben Nayel’s force at the Brak al-Shati airbase. In May 2017, the killing of approximately 140 LAAF-affiliated fighters in Brak al-Shati, alleged to have been carried out by elements of the Third Force in collaboration with some members of the Benghazi Defence Brigades, led to public outrage and to the removal of the Third Force’s mandate. Libya Shield and the Third Force were considered resounding failures.

Since its formation in 2017, the Defence-affiliated Brigade 301 has remained in strategic positions in Tripoli around the international airport. Brigade 301 went on to play a prominent role in the battle for Tripoli in 2019–20.

Mohamed al-Hsan is a prominent field commander within Brigade 166, and played a leading role during the al-Bunyan al-Marsous operation in Sirte (2016) and the al-Burkhan al-Ghadab operation in Tripoli (2019–21). He currently serves as the commander of the field operations room, acting as a point of contact between Brigade 166 and troops affiliated with Haftar in areas of south Sirte and Shweirif.

The CTF has two main units: a regular unit that consists of state military troops with military numbers and ranks, and a reservists auxiliary unit that consists of civilian fighters/members of non-state-affiliated armed groups. In the beginning, the CTF mostly accepted individuals who had participated in the al-Bunyan al-Marsous operation against ISIS in Sirte in 2016. But it subsequently established a training centre in the city of Khums and allowed others to join under the auspices of the Defence. Since 2017, the CTF has been graduating batches of new troops after a series of practical and theoretical training courses. Yet, despite having this training centre, it has continued to assign critical missions to its reservists’ unit commanded by Mukhtar al-Jhawi, who is also the commander of the non-state-affiliated al-Bukhari Brigade.

Examples of cooperation with these forces include the securing of the coastal road between Tripoli and Misrata during the conflict in southern Tripoli, and drug and crime control missions. The JOF and SSF emerged after the city suffered increases in the crime rate and in violations against state institutions and public properties, including hospitals, between 2011 and 2015. The JOF has also conducted counterterrorism missions and implemented arrest warrants by the attorney-general in Misrata, as well as in Bani Walid, Khums, Sirte, Tripoli and other areas. The group often conducts missions and patrols in cooperation with the SSF.

Before it was reconstituted by the Ministry of Interior in 2020, the SSF was seen as monopolized by perceived Salafi elements led by Anwar Swaisi. However, since Swaisi’s departure the group’s leadership is no longer considered to be Salafi. The focus of the force is often on missions and patrols related to counterterrorism, drug control and securing state institutions, in addition to supporting the police and Ministry of Interior security directorates in situations that require special task forces (such as dealing with armed individuals on public roads). The most significant semi-combat/frontline mission that the SSF was deployed for was during the al-Burkhan al-Ghadab operation (2019–21), when it established checkpoints and patrols over the coastal road between Misrata and Tripoli in response to concerns about banditry and kidnapping by some members of the al-Kaniyat group (9th Brigade).

Amnesty International (2022), ‘Libya: State-financed militia must be held to account for extrajudicial execution in Misratah’, 31 March 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/libya-state-financed-militia-must-be-held-to-account-for-extrajudicial-execution-in-misratah.

The relative influence of Hadiya is open to question. In 2023, he returned to Libya and became a vocal critic of Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba, the GNU prime minister with whom most of his former allies in armed groups – such as Bahrun and Bin Rajab – are now aligned. His campaign, the ‘Resolve Uprising Movement’, claims to seek the removal of Dabaiba and the GNU together with the UN Special Envoy, and an end to corruption. Hadiya participated in protests in Zawiya in July 2023 as part of the movement. But his positioning did not persuade leaders such as Bahrun and Bin Rajab to renounce allegiance to Dabaiba. See Libyan Center for Security and Military Studies (2023), ‘Movement of July 27: To Where?’, 27 July 2023, https://lcsms.info/en/movement-of-july-27-to-where.

Cousins, M. (2017), ‘Clashes reignite in Zawia as both sides reinforce’, Libya Herald, 6 June 2017, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/06/06/clashes-reignite-in-zawia-as-both-sides-reinforce.

Wehrey, F. (2021), ‘A Libyan Revenant’, New Lines Magazine, 14 July 2021, https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/a-libyan-revenant.

The exact origins of the First Security Division are unclear. There are reports of an armed group operating under this name from 2011, and a First Security Prison has been administered by the group since this time. But it was following a bout of violent conflict in 2017–19 within Zawiya that the First Security Division appears to have emerged as a more substantive group and Bahrun established himself as a key leader.

The mayor of western Zawiya, Abdel Karim al-Abah, was said to have been pivotal to the negotiation for the release of Bin Rajab. Abah agreed to allow Haftar’s forces to establish a camp on the western front of the city in return for the release of Bin Rajab, utilizing the connections of his son, Qais al-Abah, to the city’s armed groups to negotiate the compromise. Haftar’s offensive, launched in April 2019, depended on gaining access to Tripoli from the coastal road via Zawiya, utilizing the base that Abah had permitted to be created. Zawiyan forces dealt a critical blow to Haftar’s campaign by capturing 128 Haftar-aligned fighters between Tripoli and Zawiya in the opening hours of the operation. This happened following an agreement between the Zawiyan armed groups brokered by Bin Rajab, who has since remained a strident anti-Haftar voice. See Libya Al-Ahrar (2019),‘مصادر متطابقة: 128 مسلحا يتبعون لحفتر يقعون أسرى’ [Multiple Sources: 128 Armed Men Affiliated with Haftar are Captured], 5 April 2019, https://libyaalahrar.tv/2019/04/05/مصادر-متطابقة-128-مسلحا-يتبعون-لحفتر-يقع.

Chatham House research interviews with security officials, September 2022.

Following its appointment in March 2021, the GNU left the post of defence minister vacant, with Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba holding the position on what was supposed to be an interim basis. To secure the support of the central Zawiya axis, Namroush was appointed as the commander of the newly created West Coast Military Zone. Previously, Ministry of Defence forces operating under the General Command in the Zawiya area fell under the authority of the Western Military Zone, which was led by the prominent Zintani commander Osama al-Juweili. The creation of the West Coast Military Zone enabled the central Zawiya axis to have greater control over access to resources and more authority within the General Command’s structures.

In addition to the CIU, three other distinct groups emerged from Bahrun’s faction. Force III was formed in 2019 as an armed group that brought together a small number of militants from the Awlad Saqr tribe under Mohamed Ali Khalifa Sulaiman (known as ‘Charlie’). The force was established to incorporate members of the Awlad Saqr tribe who were living near the Zawiya refinery, ostensibly in order to provide security for that area.

When he left the CIU, Bahrun handed over its command to a long-time associate. Bahrun kept his main headquarters in the Olympic Club in central Zawiya – though he has since sought to relocate to Tripoli – and held on to many vehicles and weapons, as well as transferring 300 active members of the CIU to his new agency. The CIU was left with a limited number of cars, weapons and non-armed members. As a result, it is now seen as a largely inactive force.

Zaptia, S. (2023), ‘Deadly militia clashes in Zawia – another short term ceasefire reached but underlying causes persist’, Libya Herald, 29 April 2023, https://libyaherald.com/2023/04/deadly-militia-clashes-in-zawia-another-short-term-ceasefire-reached-but-underlying-causes-persist.

Reuters (2023), ‘Libya’s Tripoli government targets more western towns with drone strikes’, 2 June 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/libyas-tripoli-government-targets-more-western-towns-with-drone-strikes-2023-06-02.

Al-Wasat (2023), ‘The Public Prosecutor: The Commander of the Support Company was imprisoned on charges of facilitating fuel smuggling’ [in Arabic], 13 August 2023, https://alwasat.ly/news/libya/408265.

Libya al-Ahrar (2023), ‘Namroush is Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Assignments in the West’ [in Arabic], 16 November 2023, https://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/2268267.html.

Chatham House interviews with security officials from Zawiya, June 2023.

In Tripoli, Gneiwa is also the commander of the Abu Slim Central Security Unit. As Gneiwa’s deputy, Hassan Abu Zariba commands the SSA’s Western Region. Abu Zariba’s forces provided military support for Gneiwa during the security tensions in 2021 between the SSA in Tripoli and rival militias.

GNU Council of Ministers, decision no. 185 (2022). Seen by Chatham House researchers.

Herbert, M., Horsely, R. and Badi, E. (2023), Illicit Economies and Peace and Security in Libya, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, July 2023, p. 8, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Matt-Herbert-et-al-Illicit-economies-and-peace-and-security-in-Libya-GI-TOC-July-2023-1.pdf.

Al-Wasat (2023), ‘The Public Prosecutor: The Commander of the Support Company was imprisoned on charges of facilitating fuel smuggling’.

Chatham House interviews with residents of Zawiya, December 2023.

Madkhali-Salafis are adherents of the Saudi cleric Rabee al-Madkhali, although they do not self-identify as Madkhalis. Madkhalis are typically seen as ‘quietist’ Salafis who focus on spreading the faith (daawa), privileging obedience to the ruler and neither employing violence against rulers nor participating in institutional politics. However, the lines between characterizations of Salafis are blurred. For an analysis of these dynamics, see Collombier, V. (2020), Salafi Politics: ‘Political’ and ‘Quietist’ Salafis in the Struggle for the Libyan State, Research Project Report, Fiesole: European University Institute, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/69113/QM-02-20-018-EN-N.pdf; and International Crisis Group (2019), Addressing the Rise of Libya’s Madkhali-Salafis, Middle East and North Africa Report No 200, Brussels: International Crisis Group, p. 10, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/addressing-rise-libyas-madkhali-salafis.

Landinfo (2014), ‘Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists’, 19 December 2014, https://www.landinfo.no/asset/3025/1/3025_1.pdf.

The ZMC was first led by Mukhtar Fernana, then by Mukhtar Shahub, and then by Osama al-Juweili who became defence minister in 2012. Juweili retained his influence over the ZMC and was seen to be the power behind it. Abdulsalam Abu Sitta, who headed the ZMC following Juweili’s government appointment, was killed in the 2019–20 war for Tripoli. Abu Sitta was a close confidant of Juweili, and the two men were closely aligned. The ZMC was then led by Abdul Hafiz Baziz, and it is currently led by Fathi al-Ghazil, also known as ‘Zghifendou’. Both also have good relations with Juweili.

The Zintani MPs are Tareq al-Ashtar, Abdul Salam Nasia, Musab al-Abed, Omar Qarmil and Fahmi al-Tawati.

Khalifa al-Madighou, one of the most important members of the State Council for Zintan, and Hadi al-Amyani, the brother of the current mayor.

Lacher, W. (2020), Libya’s Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict, London, New York, Oxford, New Delhi and Sydney: I.B. Tauris, p. 26.

At the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in November 2020, Juweili had aligned himself with Bashagha and Agila Saleh on a political list. But the list was defeated by Dabaiba in controversial circumstances.

Juweili’s forces suffered significant losses in their attempts to enter Tripoli, including many of their most experienced fighters. They were in significant part made up of fighters from the Tebu and Tuareg communities, leading to widespread allegations that Juweili was employing mercenaries. Chatham House interviews with Zintani and Tripoli-based security sources, March 2023.

After entering Tripoli in 2011, Trabelsi organized alongside other fighters from the western mountain towns of Zintan and al-Rujban, stationing himself at the headquarters of the Islamic Call Society. These forces were later formalized into the Sawa’iq Brigade. In 2012–13, it began to recruit former members of the armed forces of the Gaddafi regime and forged a close relationship with the National Forces Alliance of Mahmoud Jibril. The Sawa’iq Brigade provided the security for the GNC.

Chatham House interview with senior official, December 2022.

The events of August and September 2022 are disputed by Zintani sources and remain contested. Some contend that Trabelsi’s forces did not attack Juweili’s in the fighting in Tripoli while others claim that Trabelsi did not deliver adequately on a commitment not to oppose Juweili’s entry to Tripoli. One key informant suggested that members of Trabelsi’s forces were said to have manufactured an excuse to begin a skirmish with Juweili’s forces, contrary to a previous understanding, which contributed to Juweili’s failure to achieve his objective. Chatham House interviews with Zintani security sources, December 2022.

Chatham House interview with senior Zintani security source, December 2022.

Ibid.

The al-Gurj Battalion, the al-Ajmi al-Atiri Battalion, Ismail al-Samah, most of the fighters from the al-Mahariq and al-Jarwa tribes, Ramadan Abu Raqiqa and some fighters from the Abu Raqiqa tribe pledged their support to Haftar and subsequently left the ZMC.

The al-Aqraj Brigade is responsible for protecting and securing the oil valves in the al-Rayayna area east of Zintan. In the aftermath of the Libya Dawn war, it shut down the pipeline to the Sharara oil field, the country’s largest, from November 2014 until December 2016. In November 2014, it shut down the oil pipeline in al-Rayayna that links the Sharara oil field to the al-Zawiya refinery. Five months later, it also closed the pipeline that links al-Fil oil field to the Melitah complex. The closure of the pipelines allegedly led to $27 billion in lost revenue, according to the National Oil Corporation. The al-Aqraj Brigade lifted the blockade when instructed to do so by Haftar. Ben Ibrahim, A. (2016), ‘National Oil Corporation calls for pipelines reopening in south west of Libya’, Libya Observer, 20 September 2016, https://libyaobserver.ly/economy/national-oil-corporation-calls-pipelines-reopening-south-west-libya; Marefa (2023), ‘الريانة’ [al-Rayana], https://www.marefa.org/لرياينة،_ليبيا.

Eaton (2021), The Libyan Arab Armed Forces: A network analysis.

Lechner, J. A. (2022), ‘Will Zintan Determine Libya’s Future?’, Foreign Policy, 16 July 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/16/zintan-libya-militias-tripoli-dbeibah-bashagha-haftar.

Human Rights Watch (2014), ‘Libya: Gaddafi Son, Ex-Officials, Held Without Due Process’, 13 February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/13/libya-gaddafi-son-ex-officials-held-without-due-process. Atiri’s group allegedly received significant funds in return for this stance, with speculation that Gaddafi had used for this money hidden by the former regime. The Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Brigade fought in the 2014 war and subsequently became affiliated with the LAAF before withdrawing from the latter’s alliance in 2017. It was joined by pro-Gaddafi fighters from other areas, relying heavily on Tebu and Tuareg fighters from the south. Atiri’s brigade lost its position on the airport road in Zintan in 2017 for the first time, and then a number of its forces were stationed at the al-Watiya airbase. But it returned to its position in Zintan after a dispute broke out between it and the military command at al-Watiya when the brigade objected to the presence of ‘foreign forces’ (referring to the Tebu and Tuareg) at the base. The brigade did not participate in the fighting on the outskirts of Tripoli in 2019–20. The al-Gurj Battalion took control of its headquarters in 2022. In 2015, Atiri released Gaddafi, based on an amnesty law passed by the House of Representatives, and he announced that the Libyan revolution was a conspiracy, openly declaring its support for ‘Dr Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, whom Atiri claimed ‘is innocent and deserves to run for the presidency to complete the project of Libya al-Ghad [Libya Tomorrow, the project led by Saif to reform the Libyan state].’

Chatham House interviews with local security officials, January 2022.

The Nasser al-Hallak Brigade members, when demobilized, mainly work as guards of oil installations. Despite having fought in the 2014 and 2019 wars, the brigade does not interfere in political affairs, and it has no actual direct relationship with any prominent politicians. Its most prominent leaders are Mohamed Kamour, a moderate Salafi sheikh, and Riyadh al-Hubail. Marwan Saqr, the former leader of the Committee of the 200, and adherent to Durman’s line, is also a member of the brigade. The Committee of the 200 was demobilized following its open support for Haftar in the war for Tripoli. For years, the Nasser al-Hallak Brigade was an intermediary between the ZMC and the LAAF Western Military Region Joint Operations Room in Zintan. Security sources claim that the brigade is being reconstituted to protect Zintan and that it receives major military support from the ZMC, in coordination with the government in Tripoli.

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