Armed groups are seen to provide critical protection to the communities in which they operate, but those that operate outside of the city elicit distrust.
Local community views of armed groups within Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan vary depending on the roles these groups play, their footprint on the ground, and their level of social legitimacy and social accountability. Broadly, however, members of all three communities agree that the armed groups continue to play an important, if imperfect, role in protecting their city. While criticism of the armed groups is widespread, there is also a sense of reassurance that each group is wedded to the city in which it has its roots and must exist within that city’s ‘social umbrella’. If an armed group opts to leave the social umbrella, the local community largely distrusts its actions and sees it as jockeying for power at the national level.
In Zintan specifically, notwithstanding the divisions among the city’s armed factions and among the wider community, in-depth interviews with its residents revealed a considerable degree of alignment on the importance of prioritizing the city. They said that Zintan had suffered for its attempts to serve the national interest: for its citizens, the memory of the 2014 war endures.
The human cost of insecurity and outbreaks of conflict is felt in all three cities. The seemingly endless cycle of young men joining armed groups only to eventually lose their lives is devastating. The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme has recorded nearly 14,000 deaths from violent conflict in Libya between 2011 and 2022.
Presence of armed groups and their perceived role
The footprint of armed groups in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan varies considerably from city to city; this is reflected in community perceptions. Misrata and Zintan residents described armed groups there as having less of an overt presence on the streets. Interviewees in Zintan generally agreed that in daily life members of the armed groups keep to their civilian role, only assuming their military persona when circumstances require. One interviewee commented that they saw members of armed groups as civilians, and that the latter’s only military connection is drawing a salary while performing their regular jobs.
Residents of all three cities said that the primary and necessary function of armed groups was to provide protection for citizens.
In Zawiya, the constant presence of armed groups was seen as oppressive. A climate of fear prevails in the city, whose residents have been caught in the crossfire of violent battles for supremacy among armed groups. Of the 10 residents interviewed, four said that they had family members who had been killed in Zawiya since 2011. While Zawiyans found common cause in their support for the 2011 revolution, the years that followed the second civil war of 2014 have left civilians increasingly disillusioned. Between 2014 and 2018, fighting among Zawiyan factions was extensive, and the city also suffered from the closure of the coastal road to Tripoli as a result of the conflict with neighbouring Warshefana. Zawiya’s armed groups have coalesced since 2019, making it easier for civilians to move around, and contributing to a reduction in levels of crime in the city. One interviewee said this is why civilians reluctantly accept their presence. The fact that now they can travel without fear, and have access to Tripoli once again, is important to civilians.
Residents of all three cities said that the primary and necessary function of armed groups was to provide protection for citizens. In the view of civilians in Zintan, for instance, it is beneficial to have armed groups loyal to their city who would protect them if necessary. All interviewees expressed fear that Libya could relapse into violent conflict. They regard cities that do not have a strong security sector as underdeveloped and unprotected.
Misratans see the primary role of their city’s armed groups as defending it from external threats. While civilians in Misrata do not want armed groups to continue to exist separately from governmental structures, the lack of trust in the central government in Tripoli and the ongoing threat from Haftar necessitates the continuing existence of the remaining revolutionaries and their armed groups. Several interviewees spoke of threats against the city, the possible further overthrow of the government in Tripoli, and an existential fear of being subjected again to what happened in 2011. This is where the interests of civilians and armed groups intersect in Misrata. However, there were some signs that this collective fear is decreasing as younger members of armed groups are joining the police force or taking training courses and finishing their education. But opinions seem to diverge on this issue, and fear and lack of trust continue to be a major obstacle when it comes to the behaviour of armed groups.
In Misrata, interviewees spoke of threats against their city, the possible further overthrow of the government in Tripoli, and an existential fear of being subjected again to what happened in 2011.
In contrast with interviewees in Zawiya and Zintan, those in Misrata perceive a more national role for their armed forces. The relationship between the city and the central government in Tripoli is a complicated one, with most interviewees associating the government with the country as a whole. They regard the country itself as a work in progress, and they associate central government with corruption. Nonetheless, most interviewees agree that the armed groups have been supportive and protective of consecutive governments, and see this as necessary to prevent the image of the country Misratans would like to build from fading.
Beyond protection, armed groups in Zawiya and Zintan are seen to provide other services. Notably, there is an expectation in Zintan that armed groups contribute to the city as a whole. Certain armed groups play a big role in negotiating development projects with the government, and have brought construction contracts to the city. Contributing to society is considered to be an important role for armed groups, especially when the experience of Zintan is compared with that of cities that do not have armed groups.
In times of peace, Zintan residents said, armed group members act as ‘diplomats’ in other cities to support their fellow Zintanis, and they are seen as providers of social assistance outside the city. Instances of civilian conflicts, confrontation with other armed groups and kidnapping are often resolved by members of Zintani armed groups via tribal and familial connections.
Zawiya’s residents said that armed groups have sought to be facilitators of public services. Some of the services mentioned relate to enforcing the rule of law – something the city’s armed groups have a legal mandate to do through affiliations with the Ministry of Interior – through the provision of protection and the reduction of violent crimes such as hijacking and kidnapping. As in Zintan, civilians in Zawiya rely on armed groups to resolve crimes and mediate small conflicts. One interviewee said that armed groups had latterly begun to advertise their services, asking members of the public to come to them if they had any matter they wanted addressed. The interviewee described this development as the groups ‘inserting themselves’ in various issues so they would become indispensable to citizens.
The services provided by armed groups in Zawiya extend to political lobbying on behalf of the population, and negotiating with the Tripoli authorities for the release of salaries or to expedite passport applications. The armed groups are also taking on the role of intermediary between the city’s residents and the central government in Tripoli when it comes to the delivery of services such as banking. However, access to the ‘VIP services’ the groups can provide are seen as often depending on individuals’ connections.
Perceptions of social legitimacy and accountability
In Misrata, the social legitimacy of armed groups is rooted in social backing and acceptance of their decision-making and actions in times of crisis. In 2011, the groups were perceived by citizens as ‘protectors and saviours’. But in 2013–14, in the view of interviewees, the legitimacy of the armed groups’ decisions that led to Misratan fighters entering Tripoli was questionable. This reflects the broader, ongoing debate over what Misratan armed groups should proactively do on the national scene. It is notable in this context that the engagement of armed groups in the al-Bunyan al-Marsous operation against ISIS in 2016–17 and the Al-Burkhan al-Ghadab operation in defence of Tripoli from LAAF’s attack in 2019–20 were viewed as entirely legitimate.
The intervention of Misratan armed groups to resolve issues outside the city is perceived well only when the purpose is to stem or prevent bloodshed. This function is sometimes undertaken in collaboration with the council of elders and the municipal council, as was the case with the ending of a long-running dispute between the city of Zawiya and neighbouring Warshefana in 2019. There is a coordination of efforts between the municipal council and armed groups in their intervention to resolve conflicts outside the city. One interviewee described this as ‘putting out fires’ or ‘calming down of conflicts’, and as an important stabilizing role played by the city.
In Zawiya, individual perceptions of the social legitimacy of armed groups vary according to the degree of proximity to them – e.g. whether someone is a member of a family that is involved with the armed groups, whether they live in a particular neighbourhood, or which tribe their elders affiliate with. One interviewee expressed the view that the groups’ legitimacy was derived directly from their ability to make change on the ground by use of force. The view of residents who do not have specific ties with the armed groups is that the groups are not legitimate socially, even if they are affiliated with the central government. Fear may also be a factor: one interviewee reported that citizens of Zawiya do not feel comfortable talking about the city’s armed groups. Notably, a significant number of Zawiyans approached by Chatham House for interview declined to participate.
In Zintan, residents perceive armed groups as an extension of tribe, and say that interpersonal connections are the source of the groups’ legitimacy. Some people in the city do not recognize the label of ‘armed groups’ as such. One interviewee said that armed men are simply an extension of the five tribes in the area. They spoke of this in terms of ‘belonging’, explaining that the city’s armed groups are part of social structures that supersede notions of ‘us and them’. Others said that all the armed groups in the city had formalized their status. Armed groups perceive themselves to be part of an army, even if they have divided loyalties. However, one interviewee saw the armed groups as militias that, no matter how organized, remain too undisciplined and lacking in training to be considered as anything else.
In Misrata, most families have members who are part of armed groups that were referred to by interviewees as either ‘ours’ or ‘our sons’. This social connection has meant that, while armed groups may be divided politically, there is a consensus among them – the result of broad coordinated dialogue – that they should resolve their disagreements without recourse to violence or military means.
In Zawiya, interviewees broadly had a negative view of armed groups, but this was balanced by a perceived need for the city to have groups that could defend residents’ interests. One interviewee noted that Zawiya’s armed groups ‘belong to us at least’, which indicates that, even if trust is severely lacking, the groups are seen as belonging to some social structure. However, none of the interviewees considered that there were effective means of holding armed groups to account. One said that armed groups have their bases within civilian neighbourhoods, going on to say that these groups are seen as having used their extensive weaponry and equipment to intimidate people. The situation has improved slightly since 2019, although mediation efforts and the facilitation of humanitarian passage and assistance to displaced people still fall largely to civil society organizations such as the Red Crescent. Tribal elders and politicians adhere to the armed groups, not the other way round. The armed groups’ power relationship with the council of elders and the municipality is unbalanced, meaning that the groups have more sway in determining how conflicts are resolved.
Interviewees were unanimous in their perception that Zawiyan armed groups do not always represent the interests of civilians. Many groups are seen as being interested in material gain, influence and power. At times, these motivations might intersect with tribal interests, with the result that elements of the community benefit. Interviewees said that the situation is very volatile, and that conflicts occur on a regular basis among social groups and the armed groups that represent them. An activist working on women’s rights in Zawiya said that in certain cases female victims and survivors of domestic violence were able to receive help from the SSA’s Western Region. However, the interviewee said that such assistance would not be possible if an alleged perpetrator was a member of or connected to the group itself. While the armed groups perform the roles of the police, civil servants and military in the city, two interviewees doubted the motivation for this. One claimed that having inflicted street wars and destruction on Zawiya, the armed groups now wanted to regain the trust of civilians through provision of services. The other saw this service provision role as purely strategic, because being important and respected in the city serves the groups’ longer-term interests.
View of the central state and distrust of forces beyond the cities’ social umbrella
Residents of Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan made a clear distinction between armed groups that are based within their respective cities, compared with those based in Tripoli or elsewhere. It was widely assumed that armed groups operating outside of their respective cities would behave less accountably because they would not be subject to in-group codes of conduct. In other words, the social umbrella is seen as a means of conferring social legitimacy for an armed group. The social umbrella’s function in regulating armed group behaviours within a particular community is no longer in place when a group leaves its home city.
Misrata interviewees described groups based outside the city as illegitimate, describing them variously as ‘mercenaries’, ‘gangs’, and ‘pawns of politicians’. This indicated that some residents of Misrata had ‘lifted the social cover’ of these groups, which is akin to social disowning of the armed groups in question. One interviewee called the Misratan armed groups ‘the strong arm’ of the security sector, viewing them as a necessary ally for any central government. Yet, on a practical level, some see Misratan-origin armed groups operating in the capital as not being part of Misrata’s security space. They criticized these forces for providing personal protection to the government. Others see these groups as simply providing the services they are contracted to undertake.
Misrata interviewees described groups based outside the city as illegitimate, describing them variously as ‘mercenaries’, ‘gangs’, and ‘pawns of politicians’.
The (counter-intuitive) takeaway here for policymakers is that, in the eyes of the local community, those elements of the Misratan security sector that have revolutionary origins still have a greater degree of legitimacy than do the elements that have official state mandates. Many within the latter groups are perceived by interviewees as having been corrupted by money and politicians. Membership of government-related forces that offer services such as police, fire brigades and traffic control is viewed more favourably. For civilians in Misrata, joining such services is essential in making the city safer, and also helps rebuild trust in these institutions following the violations committed by the Gaddafi-led state police force and military. The SSF was highlighted here for its successes in fighting crime, protecting public buildings, coordinating emergencies and mediating disputes around construction projects.
In Zintan, armed groups are seen as a means of protecting the city’s interests beyond its boundaries. Even here, however, interviewees said that those groups that play an active role in aiding Zintanis in other cities are held in higher regard than those that are based in Tripoli and are part of the official state security apparatus.35 Zintani interviewees saw many of those that remain in Tripoli as self-interested. One alleged: ‘They take the money for themselves and protect politicians and their families in Tripoli.’
The communities of Zawiya view the relationship between the central government and the armed groups as transactional. The central government was seen by two interviewees as complicit in enabling groups to gain power in return for access to their fighters. This view has solidified amid the posturing between the GNU and the GNS. The involvement of armed groups from Zawiya in the August 2022 clashes in Tripoli to keep Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba in government raised concerns among Zawiya’s residents that another war would break out and spill over to their city. These fears were realized in May and June 2023, when the GNU used drone strikes against facilities in Zawiya (as well as in Zuwara and Warshefana) that included buildings linked to the Abu Zariba-controlled elements of the SSA. While the GNU Ministry of Defence claimed that the strikes targeted criminals in these areas, the fact that these targets were chosen was interpreted within Libya as a warning to the West Coast SSA of the risks of its continued opposition to the GNU.
