The growing economic interests of armed groups have become one of the most challenging hurdles to overcome in efforts to remove coercive practices from economic relations.
The deep engagement of armed groups in the economy is a significant impediment to reform of the security sector and prospects for DDR. How armed groups in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan generate revenues varies considerably, depending on both the nature of each group – permanently mobilized state forces require a more stable revenue base than might a force that mobilizes only in times of crisis – and differences in the operating environment. The latter are perhaps more significant in terms of implications for DDR: factors such as social relations between armed actors and the community, or variations in local economic structures, condition how armed groups interact with a city’s economy. Where alternatives are limited, most notably in Zawiya, and where armed groups play an accepted role in economic relations, as in Zintan, extracting armed groups from the local economy is an uphill challenge.
Economic opportunity structures
Some cities offer a broader array of economic opportunities than others. Misrata is a historic centre of commercial activity in Libya and is home to a thriving business community. Although the Gaddafi regime effectively eviscerated the private sector in Libya, the development of Misrata’s port from the 1980s, the presence in the city of the country’s largest steel mill and the establishment of the Misrata Free Zone in 2000 helped underpin the city’s position as the nation’s economic hub. The business community within Misrata includes wealthy individuals who have the capacity to shape the import/export, wholesale and transport/storage sectors at national level.
Zawiya is home to a significant fishing industry as well as the country’s largest oil refinery and power-generating station. However, its formal economy is seen to be in decline by its citizens. Factories that were operational prior to the revolution have shut down, making the region more reliant on imported goods. The illicit sector has developed rapidly, by contrast. The city has become known as the centre of smuggling – including lucrative fuel-smuggling – and trafficking operations on the northwestern coast, with its strategic location on the coastal highway between the Tunisian border and Tripoli ensuring that Zawiya has the ability to dominate Libya’s principal overland trade artery.
Zintan’s economy has boomed since 2011. The city’s business actors used Zintan’s influence in the capital and in government to develop its economy in 2011–14. After Zintani forces were ousted from Tripoli, Zintan’s airstrip became the connection between the forces of western-based actors and the eastern-based authorities. Zintan’s hinterlands are also strategic, with key oil and gas infrastructure either based in or passing through areas under Zintani control. Key trade routes through Libya’s western border also run via the city.
Benefiting through the state
Whether an armed group is mobilized permanently or only in periods of crisis has a significant bearing on the nature of its funding from the state. Regular forces with state mandates are reliant on ongoing funding, while those that are largely dormant outside of wartime need only more sporadic funding.
‘Regular’ armed groups have used their affiliation to the state to secure revenues by obtaining state salaries and lump sums to cover their operating costs. In the capital, armed groups provide material support in return for funding from the state, a key driver of Libya’s security ‘market’. Tracking the institutional affiliations of the forces provides an insight into their political affiliations. For example, during the 2019–20 war for Tripoli, a number of armed groups such as the CTF and the JOF came directly under the aegis of the Presidency Council, and they have subsequently developed direct funding relationships with the Prime Minister’s Office.
On the other hand, the General Command of the army under the leadership of Mohamed al-Haddad has struggled to mobilize funding following the conclusion of the ceasefire in October 2020. The army’s regular units continue to be offered fewer supplies than the state-affiliated forces – such as Brigade 301 and Brigade 166 – created from the revolutionary factions. These dynamics reflect the perception that the security sector remains a competitive market for the ability to exert political influence, rather than being primarily concerned with the conduct of official tasks mandated to the forces in question.
Revolutionary forces from Misrata and Zintan have generally mobilized and then sought to obtain compensation from the state once a campaign is under way. The period when Osama al-Juweili was defence minister was a particularly profitable period for Zintan’s business community, as prominent Zintani traders benefited extensively from contracts issued by the ministry. This group of traders has long-standing relationships with Juweili and the ZMC, and has provided key items such as fuel and food for the ZMC’s deployments. The relationship is seen as being so close that goods are often supplied on credit, with the understanding that the ZMC will pay for them when it receives funds from the state.
Monetizing territorial control: protection markets, trade routes and trafficking
Unlike cities such as Tripoli and Zawiya, territory within Misrata is not subject to the dynamics of a competitive security market. As already noted, most armed groups in Misrata are not permanently mobilized, with groups such as the JOF and the SSF providing security. The role of armed groups in the economy is thus very different in Misrata. However, Misratan factions remain active outside the city, and control access to its main entrances (east, west and south) and the seaport. Control of these access points provides some actors with a potential means of generating revenues. For example, the seaport is secured by the Misrata Security Directorate, which is listed under the Ministry of Interior. It was claimed in key informant interviews that some members of the forces in charge of the seaport had benefited directly and personally from their positions by facilitating the release of goods for a financial compensation from business owners.
Some elements within Zawiya’s security sector can almost be considered to operate like organized crime groups, some of which are perceived as having become consolidated as mini illicit empires. Members within the major factions in the city are seen as having close connections to the smuggling of goods such as fuel, illegal drugs and weapons, and they are also said to have also been linked to actors involved in migrant-smuggling and people-trafficking. Money-laundering and a vibrant protection market have also been prominent activities for some armed group members. Key informants note that some members of Zawiya’s armed groups are seen as linked to drug dealers and smugglers in the city, and that, where such members have not been directly involved in the running of such a business, there are concerns that protection fees have been extracted to allow others to participate in the market. Critically, the same armed groups, particularly those with Ministry of Interior affiliations, are responsible for enforcing the law. As the influence of Zawiya’s armed groups has increased since 2019, the control that they wield over state institutions has increased, and in some quarters there are concerns that a culture of impunity may have set in. In such circumstances, any meaningful effort to clamp down effectively on the behaviour of members of these groups is seen as unlikely, beyond partisan attempts motivated by securing the support of one group to prevail over another.
Community members in Zawiya note that some of the fighting in the city has principally been viewed as being linked to control of illicit markets, as illustrated by clashes over the control of warehouses, checkpoints and other physical infrastructure. The economic dimension of such local fighting is unmistakable. For example, key informants highlight that the tensions began to escalate between some members of the SSA and the CIU when the SSA took the control of checkpoints in Ajilat, which it was believed had been used by smugglers.
Zintan’s prominent position in the post-Gaddafi period was enabled by the control of Tripoli by its armed groups from the summer of 2011 until the spring of 2014. Control of Tripoli International Airport, in particular, generated significant revenue for some members in return for allowing the flow of goods in and out of the country.
Physical control of oil and gas infrastructure is also believed to have provided some within Zintan’s armed groups with significant revenues from protection fees.
Physical control of oil and gas infrastructure is also believed to have provided some within Zintan’s armed groups with significant revenues from protection fees. The city continues to hold locations of strategic and economic value in terms of trade routes and oil and gas infrastructure. The Petroleum Facilities Guard South West is based in Zintan. It is responsible for securing the oil facilities located from the beginning of the mountain range in the north to the border with Niger in the south, to the borders with Algeria and Tunisia in the west, and to Jufra in the east, in addition to the oil concessions located in the areas of Murzuq and Ubari. Al-Rayayna and the Wafa oil and gas field remain under the influence of members of Zintani armed groups.
Some members of Zintani factions based at the Wafa oil and gas field in the southwest are seen as having used their influence to pressure the authorities. Gas from Wafa is transported by pipeline to the coast and is supplied to the western region, particularly to the al-Ruwais power station. It appears that a few actors seen as associated with the Petroleum Facilities Guard South West have sought to gain many of the service contracts for oil companies operating in its areas of influence. A degree of control over heavy machinery enables them to fulfil market needs and secure lucrative contracts. Furthermore, the Petroleum Facilities Guard South West has used its physical control over the Wafa oil field to exert pressure on oil companies and the government to help fulfil its aims. Such actions have caused significant disruptions to the economy.
Successful operations for members of Zawiyan armed groups active in the illicit sector depend on the control of territory and the ability to establish and protect the movement of illicit goods. In essence, largely the same infrastructure and capacities are required for successful engagement in the various forms of smuggling. A notable feature of the key informant interviews was that members of nearly all armed groups are seen as having participated in multiple forms of smuggling.
Zawiya’s oil refinery and port complex is the most important piece of economic infrastructure within the city. It is the largest in Libya, producing around 120,000 barrels per day (b/d) of fuel. It is also directly connected to the Sharara oil field, which produces 300,000 b/d of light crude, roughly a quarter of Libya’s crude production. The refinery complex also houses a port that functions as an oil terminal. The port is one of only two terminals in western Libya, the remainder being in the eastern region. The refinery and port are widely seen as having been critical to the illicit sector in Zawiya, and to have formed an important node of fuel-smuggling in the western region. The National Oil Corporation estimates that up to one-third of petroleum and diesel provided by the state is smuggled, equivalent to 1.3 million tonnes per year. The port has also functioned as a major launch point for migrants seeking to reach Europe. The refinery complex houses a detention centre that continues to operate. Control of the refinery is widely seen as the major prize in Zawiya’s conflict economy. Yet, as the activities that take place from the refinery have substantial and long onward supply chains – fuel has to be transported overland, and migrants by sea – the networks of smugglers operating from the refinery must maintain working relations with members of armed groups that control territory in the remainder of the city. This leads to a bargaining process among networks of armed actors and their social constituencies. The refinery is located in an area between those seen as controlled by the Bin Rajab-Bahrun axis and the Abu Hamyra axis.
The refinery complex has become a site where these groups seek to apply their shifting institutional mandates to justify their presence. By 2023, a tense modus vivendi had emerged. Given the mandates of various elements of the Ministry of Interior to combat illegal migration and provide border security, the port had become heavily securitized. The Directorate of Combating Illegal Migration, the General Administration for Coastal Security and the Border Management Department all claim a right to operate there. Key informants indicated that both the Bahrun and Abu Zariba forces maintain a presence in the refinery complex. In addition, the Libyan Coast Guard unit, led by Abdulrahman al-Milad (also known as al-Bija) and under the Ministry of Defence, was present. As noted, following its bombing campaign in Zawiya, in August 2023 the GNU sought to place the West Coast Military Zone – dominated by the central Zawiya axis commanders – in charge of the Zawiya refinery, although at the time of writing it remains unclear what changes have taken place in practice. Such shifts have the potential to significantly impact the workings of the illicit sector in Zawiya, and fit a broader context of GNU affiliates seeking to consolidate their control of vital trade corridors on the northwestern coast.
The increased tension within Zawiya has driven some armed groups to seek to expand their territory beyond the city’s boundaries. Neighbouring Surman is reported to be more or less fully under the control of Zawiyan armed groups, while those connected to Bahrun have also engaged in battles for control within Sabratha.
Zintani control of territory has also been monetized through the establishment of protection rackets. Notably, some smugglers and traffickers are said to pay Zintani armed groups for protection to move their goods through Zintani controlled territory, as part of a model based on profiting from granting safe passage. Where a group has strong control over a territory, traffickers are in a position to broker safe passage for a fee. Control of border posts is a critical source of influence in this regard. Since 2011, members of Zintani factions have sought to increase their influence and role on the western border, as evidenced by the movement of Zintani forces to the city of Jamil in 2014 as well as continuing efforts to wield influence over the town of Ghadames.
Constraints on economic behaviour: local and external
Significant differences are perceived over the degree of social accountability to which members of armed groups from the three cities are subject. Notably, armed groups in Zawiya are subject to fewer constraints over the economic activities that some participate in. For example, trafficking and smuggling activities by some members are reported to take place in plain sight within the city’s boundaries. In contrast, such activities are more likely to be clandestine and carried out beyond the city limits of Misrata and Zintan to avoid social pushback.
The economic activities of members of Misratan and Zintani armed groups based outside of their local community are viewed as more expansive. Local residents in the Kirimiya Market area of southwest Tripoli reported Zintani armed group members as informally taxing merchants in areas in return for protection services and even approaching local residents to press them for money for phone credit or meals from restaurants. In both cases, these activities would likely generate significant pushback if they were attempted within the groups’ home city.
To maintain their business model, some armed groups have also sought to mitigate pressure being applied by external actors. The management of irregular migration via Libya to Europe has been of key interest to international players. Zawiyan armed group members have been placed under UN sanctions for alleged involvement in human trafficking. In response, Zawiyan factions have sought to present themselves as effective in countering people-smuggling to the international community; yet flows of irregular migration have continued from Libyan shores, and Zawiyan groups have continued to participate in the activity. Rather than halting flows altogether, Zawiya’s armed groups appear to have regulated the movement of irregular migrants from western Libya. This has allowed them to achieve a manageable flow whereby the armed groups can continue to (indirectly) receive international support for disrupting irregular migration while also profiting from engagement in people-smuggling and trafficking.
Those who have been subject to detention by Zawiyan armed groups allege significant and ongoing abuses of human rights. Former detainees at the al-Maya detention centre, administered by the SSA, report being placed into forced labour, being subject to ransom demands, and being re-trafficked. An important goal behind the establishment of the al-Maya centre was reportedly to attract attention by detaining a large number of migrants in order to secure the political, financial and material support of the international community.
