Without an internationally mediated forum, successes in DDR efforts across Libya will remain isolated, and conversations about security sector reform between Libyan state authorities and international donors will continue at cross purposes.
This paper has explored how the security apparatuses of Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan have developed since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, demonstrating that significant local variation remains in terms of the social composition of the area, the experience of conflict, the structure of the local economy and economic opportunity, and relations with neighbouring localities and with the state’s formal institutions.
Over more than a decade, there have been extensive discussions among both policymakers and policy analysts over the prospects and potential pathways for security sector reform (SSR) in Libya. Studies of the failures of SSR attempts to date have identified a series of strategic failures, including an overemphasis on foreign-sponsored ‘train and equip’ interventions by external states that betray a prioritization of short-term interests over long-term solutions for meaningful reform of Libya’s security sector. Libyan officials, meanwhile, have been criticized for undertaking cosmetic reshufflings within ministries relevant to the security sector that are informed by internal power struggles rather than a holistic view of SSR. Ultimately, these reshuffles can be seen as having obstructed reform plans while being portrayed as SSR.
Reform of Libya’s security sector is acknowledged as a critical component of bringing functional governance to the country. The Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan case studies in this paper underscore the scale of the challenges still to be overcome.
Reform of Libya’s security sector is acknowledged as a critical component of bringing functional governance to the country. The Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan case studies in this paper underscore the scale of the challenges still to be overcome. Effective reform of the security sector is also widely accepted to be wedded to the establishment of a sustainable political settlement, meaningful institution-building and the establishment of a functioning rule of law. None of these conditions is in place at the time of writing. In this context, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) has advocated for the pursuit of security sector stabilization (SSS) in Libya, involving amalgamating interim informal stabilization measures with security arrangements to create the conditions necessary for longer-term SSR. In a 2021 report for DCAF, Emadeddin Badi and Archibald Gallet argue that this can ‘simultaneously lay the foundation for SSR, reconstruction, and development, and encourage the buy-in of many domestic and international stakeholders’.
Successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of armed actors hinges on these broader SSS and SSR efforts. A proper needs assessment of Libya’s security sector must be followed by a political consensus on how to meet these needs through training and force development, before demobilization and disarmament pathways can be determined. Without an agreed vision for the sector, trying to implement DDR is unlikely to be successful – and may cause harm. DDR has been described as:
Within Libya, state-led efforts to pursue DDR have been largely dormant since the collapse of the Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development (LPRD) in 2015. The LPRD failed to demobilize significant numbers of combatants: according to the programme’s own figures, only 1,400 individuals received vocational training under its auspices, while 38,000 ex-combatants were integrated within security institutions. Internationally supported efforts to support DDR have been undertaken in several cities, including Misrata, Tripoli and Zintan, but they have remained on a limited scale in terms of the geographies they cover and the numbers of combatants they engage.
In the absence of meaningful SSR and SSS, DDR may be regarded as premature in Libya, but there is a body of evidence that cautions against such a view. First, the situation is not static within Libya: the country’s already sprawling security sector continues to grow, with fresh cohorts of recruits signing up to join state-affiliated and non-affiliated armed groups. Such dynamics make it clear that policymakers cannot wait for a ‘post-conflict’ situation to begin planning for DDR.
Second, the ongoing crisis reflects a continuing process of state formation, so policy interventions in the security space must be part of that process in order to achieve their ultimate objectives. Here, there are signs of progress: the Ministry of Labour has been tasked with developing a programme for DDR, while the international community is currently exploring what can be done in terms of ‘pre-DDR’. The UN defines the concept of pre-DDR narrowly, focusing on combatants, and states that it is a ‘local-level transitional stabilization measure designed for those who are eligible for a national DDR programme’. However, there is a broad range of interpretations over what constitutes pre-DDR, and discussions often widen to include elements more traditionally associated with DDR itself, such as transitional management of weapons and ammunition as well as reducing community violence.
Third, trends in DDR are moving towards a more expansive programmatic approach and away from limited interventions that envisage a linear, stage-by-stage process. Emerging lessons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo – while contested – suggest that more diverse and forceful ‘next-generation DDR’ merits consideration. Unlike traditional DDR programming, next-generation DDR contains components that are highly relevant to the Libyan context. It often begins before peace agreements are brokered; it is broader in scope, moving from limited interventions to activities connected with national development objectives; it is connected to SSR, transitional justice and state-building efforts; and, finally, it is conceived as a dynamic political process that is determined by local conditions.
Mirroring policy discussions on the Libyan political process – where it is unanimously agreed that the political, security and economic tracks should be interconnected, but there is no agreement over how this can be achieved – effective DDR must be wedded to broader objectives and processes. Yet, in reality, the discussion over the scope of DDR programming reflects a debate over what is achievable in the current circumstances and with the resources currently available to the Libyan state and to international actors. This leads to a challenge in determining the bounds of any programme for pre-DDR or DDR proper.
Drawing on the findings of the analysis of the Misratan, Zawiyan and Zintani security sectors, the following sections of this chapter identify potential options for DDR programming that could be introduced in the current circumstances rather than limit recommendations to pre-DDR programming alone.
Trust and the continuing absence of a national settlement: the case for greater inclusivity
Greater inclusion of the Libyan people in the political process that is supposedly determining the country’s post-conflict transition is a precondition for successful DDR. The testimony of residents of Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan makes it clear that there is a lack of trust in national-level institutions and in political developments taking place outside of their respective cities. They see a political process that remains the preserve of political and security elites who negotiate among themselves to hold on to power while offering little in the way of public goods. An environment in which political and security elites bargain with one another to divide access to and control of the state is enabling consolidation of authority in the hands of a few, and further empowering armed actors at the expense of the wider population. International actors should refrain from seeking to secure ‘intra-elite’ deals, and be careful about the extent to which they include armed actors in any discussion over the shape of Libya’s future governance. Experiences in Iraq and Lebanon, as well as the last decade in Libya, show that internationally mediated efforts to forge bargains among political and security elites, in the interests of promoting stability, have perpetuated political systems that benefit those elites at the expense of citizens.
Lack of trust means that there is little support among community members interviewed for the demobilization of local armed groups, which are seen as providing necessary protection for the interests of each city. Perceptions may vary – with Khalifa Haftar’s forces being viewed as an existential threat by Misratan revolutionary factions, or residents of Zintan seeing armed groups as necessary guarantors of the city’s economic interests – but it is social forces that continue to underpin the armed groups.
As this paper has emphasized, armed groups in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan remain reliant, to varying degrees, on social legitimacy to be able to mobilize and to justify their actions. Previous analysis published by Chatham House argued that, rather than viewing Libya as a constellation of armed factions, it would be more accurate to note that it is an armed society. Given these societal underpinnings, the most effective way of disempowering armed groups is to turn towards a broader, inclusive process to debate Libya’s future, building momentum by ensuring civilians have agency within their own communities rather than continuing the drift towards the further empowerment of armed actors. Moving from limited discussions of stabilization to address more positive issues such as development and pursue more substantive discussions over the future of the security sector within the political process is also more likely to create momentum for DDR.
Locally calibrated approaches instead of a national strategy: arms for development?
Policymakers considering action to support DDR in the current context must deal with the reality that there is no accompanying national programme for SSR, for development or for governance reform of Libya’s bloated and ineffective state structures. This places severe limitations on what can be achieved in the interim. For instance, the lack of an SSR strategy means that there is no clarity over the future structures of the security sector, or the number of people required in the service, or the criteria for selecting them. Without this, the parameters and requirements for a national DDR programme remain unclear. Meanwhile, the absence of a national development plan makes it harder to support the creation of viable and attractive economic alternatives to joining armed groups. Moreover, while there is a degree of consensus over the need to decentralize political authority, the decentralization of the security sector presents distinct challenges. Without a concept of the desired structure of the security sector, it is not possible to design SSR efforts at the local level.
There is, however, a growing realization internationally that the most workable structure for Libya’s security sector will be one tailored to the country’s highly localized status quo. For example, a study for the Clingendael Institute assesses that Libya requires a decentralized model of security provision that places ‘territories and communities in charge of their own security based on a shared set of principles and rules’. DCAF’s in-depth 2021 study concluded that there can be ‘no one-size-fits-all process’ for designing a nationwide SSR blueprint in Libya. Such framing is beneficial for the development of DDR programming.
The only workable solution in this context is to calibrate DDR efforts to the specificities of local contexts, and to mobilize resources into a flexible programme that might be replicated in other locations and expanded to the national level. This paper has illustrated the stark differences between the local contexts in Misrata, Zintan and Zawiya. Such differences highlight the need for any DDR programme to be designed according to the local context, with a recognition that what is required in one area is different to that in another. Here, it is important to note that specific dynamics in Tripoli and Benghazi – where heavily militarized armed groups control territory beyond the reach of the local social umbrella – are not mirrored across the country as a whole.
In determining how best to tailor DDR approaches to each context, it is critical to diagnose what elements will be most applicable in local circumstances.
In determining how best to tailor DDR approaches to each context, it is critical to diagnose what elements will be most applicable in local circumstances. Reflecting the structure of this paper, the discussion below identifies three key variables and suggests how differences in those variables might be reflected in programming objectives.
State of mobilization of local forces
The first key variable is the extent to which the forces in an area are permanently mobilized. In Misrata and Zintan, a large number of members of armed groups operate on an auxiliary basis, and thus may contend that they are already demobilized. In this context, DDR work is more feasible. The emphasis becomes centred on disarmament, or on weapons and ammunition management. Dialogue – perhaps facilitated by the UN and/or other international agencies – in cities such as Misrata and Zintan should seek to improve the management of weapons and ammunition as well as put in place safeguards and checks and balances to limit their use, in partnership with local communities. The creation of committees that provide an interface between citizens and armed groups to mediate these discussions could be beneficial. This will help alleviate issues surrounding the distribution of weaponry and seek to put an end to the shows of strength by non-state-affiliated armed groups in a city’s vicinity. In Zintan, now that the majority of the city’s armed actors are aligned against the GNU, there is currently an opportunity to engage armed groups to talk collectively about these issues for the first time since 2014. This may create problematic dynamics politically, given the antagonistic relationship of those groups to the GNU, but it also creates opportunities for consolidation of the local security sector.
In locations such as Zawiya, where armed groups are largely permanently mobilized, initiatives on weapons and ammunition management are likely to be more difficult to implement and should therefore not be a key focus. Moreover, these permanently mobilized groups are state-affiliated and therefore can argue that there is no need for them to demobilize; thus, DDR efforts must be wedded to broader SSR.
The degree of local social accountability
DDR programming efforts should seek to directly enhance local social accountability – the second key variable – in accordance with a shared set of principles and rules. In Misrata and Zintan, where social accountability mechanisms remain strong, internecine violence has remained limited. Particularly notable in this context are the dynamics around social mobilization in Misrata, and the efforts of social leaders in Zintan to avert direct fighting between factions supporting rival contenders for national government.
Such social accountability places meaningful checks on the behaviour of armed group at local level, while also tackling entrenched problems of impunity for abuses committed by their leaders. However, it also prevents the consolidation of the security sector under the formal chain of command of the state. The best way of navigating this conundrum is to pursue the agreement of a ‘core’ code of conduct that can be applied across Libya’s territories, and that aims to provide citizens of any area with equal treatment, setting a common baseline with which a national SSR programme might engage. This is an area that international donors might consider supporting through partnerships with Libyan civil society and local government officials. Such an initiative should not be seen as a substitute to formal oversight of the sector as would ultimately be delivered through an SSR programme.
In cities such as Zawiya, the degree of violence witnessed in the community is significantly higher and social accountability is lower. There it is critical that programming efforts centre on reducing community violence through dialogue between armed groups and the community in order to increase social accountability. Again, as mentioned above, the creation of committees bringing together citizens and armed group representatives could provide a forum for such discussions. Existing funding of activities to demilitarize civic spaces and set up alternatives to recruitment into armed groups for young Libyans also provides a fertile route for ‘pre-DDR’.
Economic opportunities
The third key variable is economic opportunity. Particularly in locations where armed groups are closely connected to organized crime dynamics, there is a need to foster alternative livelihoods not just for armed group members but also for the community as a whole. The absence of a national development plan and the limitations to work to decentralize political and financial authority complicate efforts in this area.
There is a need to set in place a programme to provide training and opportunities for former members of armed groups, as the defunct LPRD previously sought to do. This is something that the Ministry of Labour should explore in its efforts to take the government lead on DDR, and international co-funding and support could be utilized effectively for the initiative. In planning for such a programme, it will be important to understand why the LPRD had limited success in this area so as not to replicate any shortcomings. It is common for members of armed group to demobilize even without specific programmes to support them, so DDR should be seen as a continual process rather than a one-time opportunity. However, such efforts must go beyond money alone. One of the common errors of DDR thinking in Libya to date has been the assumption that combatants can simply be ‘bought off’. The financial incentives for remaining in an armed group may be very strong, but this is also not the only factor. Interviewed for this paper, a former member of one Zintani armed group noted that young men are highly attracted to the social status associated with belonging to a group.
A more ambitious route to pursue progress would be to provide economic incentives to local communities, via municipal councils, in return for progress on issues such as demobilization, weapons management and reducing community violence.
In keeping with the localized approach, training opportunities should be structured based on assessments of the local context, rather than on the basis of a ‘one size fits all’ national programme. The creation of local units that are afforded a degree of autonomy to develop context-specific initiatives may be the most effective way of doing this.
A more ambitious route to pursue progress would be to provide economic incentives to local communities, via municipal councils, in return for progress on issues such as demobilization, weapons management and reducing community violence. There is debate among practitioners and policymakers over the extent to which DDR programming should be voluntary on the part of armed groups, yet in the Libyan context it would be a logical step to seek the buy-in of communities to place pressure on armed groups to participate.
Previously, there have been suggestions that the Libyan state could offer development funds in return for the relinquishing of arms. While such proposals should be treated with caution, the relative absence of economic alternatives for communities where the participation of armed group in economic activities is high poses a considerable problem. The creation of a pot of funding for local development – potentially co-funded and overseen by the international community, and disbursed in return for commitments by communities and local armed groups to, for example, a moratorium on recruitment, or to no longer engage in commercial deals – could set in train a virtuous circle. Such support could form part of the emerging decentralization agenda, working through municipal councils that might apply for government grants or even put forward proposals for how development support would help their communities achieve DDR. Examples of successful use of such funding could then encourage other communities to pursue similar efforts.
Kickstarting a DDR agenda
In appraising potential pathways forward, a central dilemma remains. How can localized and disparate efforts at DDR be wedded to national approaches? Answering this question will require concerted coordination and dialogue between the Libyan authorities and international donors. The Libyan state’s conceptions of DDR (and SSR) remain focused on a centralized approach that is ill-suited to realities on the ground. And while international donors have sought to fund projects at the local level, sharing a broad consensus on reducing community violence and increasing the accountability of armed groups to communities, they lack an agreed framework for cohering these efforts and replicating them. This gap highlights the need to transform the ongoing knowledge-sharing of international donor-funded activities into an internationally mediated forum with the ambition to craft a strategy in partnership with Libyan authorities. Without this, successes will remain isolated, and the conversation between Libyan state authorities and international donors will remain at cross purposes.
