The Humanitarian Notification System in Support of Access and Protection in Syria, established in 2014 and coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, informs parties to the conflict of the location of civilian objects that fulfil a humanitarian function, of movements of humanitarian staff and supplies, and of critical civilian infrastructure, with a view to avoiding harm or impediments to them.
2.1 What are they?
Humanitarian notification arrangements are a voluntary system whereby humanitarian organizations share information, in a structured manner, with parties to an armed conflict on the location of facilities used for their operations, such as warehouses and offices, as well as on their movements, such as humanitarian convoys.
Notifications are intended to assist belligerents in identifying the notified facilities and movements, so that they can take those into account when planning and conducting military operations, in line with their obligations under IHL, and thus reduce the risk that the notified facilities may be targeted or damaged, or the movements impeded. Notification arrangements are a way of enhancing the safety of the notified objects and of humanitarian workers. In military terminology, they are a type of deconfliction arrangement.
Structured humanitarian notification systems tend to be established in situations when the party to which the notifications are being sent has limited ground situational awareness, most frequently when it is conducting air operations.
The provision of notifications is not the only exchange that is occurring between humanitarian organizations and belligerents during hostilities. Frequently, coordination in relation to humanitarian access is also taking place. Humanitarian notification arrangements must be distinguished from engagement for other purposes, even if these often take place in parallel. This distinction is important in order to maintain the strictly informative character of humanitarian notification, and to prevent it from being misperceived or misused as a mechanism to ‘approve’ humanitarian operations.
Humanitarian notification systems have been established in a number of conflicts – including Afghanistan, Gaza, Syria, Yemen and Ukraine. To date, this has not been done in a uniform manner. The precise details vary from context to context, including in terms of:
- Which actors gather and collate the information and convey it to the parties to the conflict. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) usually fulfils this coordinating role for UN agencies, funds and programmes, along with their implementing partners in the context in question.
Both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) always have their own bilateral arrangements, in line with their approach to neutral and independent humanitarian action. Operationally, too, neither organization wants an intermediary in their dialogue with belligerents, including when receiving security guarantees.
For example, MSF always establishes its own direct contact with belligerents to negotiate the modalities of its presence and operations and obtain safety assurances. Notification of the location of its facilities is the last step in this engagement rather than a ‘standalone’ exercise, as happens in the arrangements coordinated by OCHA.
- What is notified: Notifications usually include static humanitarian facilities such as warehouses and offices, and movements, such as convoys, for humanitarian activities. There is no uniform approach as to what constitutes a ‘humanitarian facility’ for the purpose of notification arrangements, and in certain contexts this has been interpreted extremely broadly. Medical non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as MSF also notify belligerents of the medical facilities they operate or support, as well as certain movements.
- Who is notified: This depends on who is coordinating the arrangements. Humanitarian arrangements operated by OCHA have principally been with state parties to armed conflicts, even in non-international armed conflicts such as Yemen. This is because, to date, only states have conducted significant air operations, and it is principally in relation to this type of targeting that notifications can play a protective role.
MSF notifies the location of its facilities to all parties to a conflict that are present or operating in a particular context.
- What the technical arrangements are for the transmission of information: Usually, notifications are sent in the form of GPS coordinates of relevant locations, and are conveyed by email or through a shared platform.
In addition, MSF places physical markings on its medical facilities – the red cross or red crescent if such use is authorized by the local national society, or its logo if not. These markings are particularly relevant for organized armed groups: as they are not conducting air operations, GPS coordinates are less meaningful.
2.2 What does the law say?
IHL does not mention humanitarian notification arrangements. They are simply a mechanism that can assist parties to armed conflict to comply with IHL, but that does not affect their obligations or the protections afforded to civilian objects. Nor does it modify the rules regulating humanitarian relief operations.
2.2.1 Obligations of distinction and verification
The principle of distinction lies at the heart of IHL. It requires belligerents to distinguish between civilians and fighters, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against fighters and military objectives. To give effect to these obligations, belligerents must do everything feasible to verify that the objectives they are attacking are not civilians or civilian objects.
The information provided by notification arrangements does not affect these obligations. It is just a way of facilitating their implementation. Importantly, the fact that a particular object has not been notified has no legal consequences and does not put its civilian status in question in any way.
2.2.2 Civilian objects
Most frequently, the objects that are notified are humanitarian facilities and movements of humanitarian vehicles and goods. These are civilian objects that belligerents are required by IHL to respect and protect. They must not be the object of attack, and incidental damage to them must be factored into proportionality assessments. Their protection stems from IHL. There is no obligation to notify objects, and notification is not a precondition for protection under IHL.
A civilian object may become a military objective and lose this protection if, by virtue of its nature, location, purpose or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action, and its total or partial destruction in the circumstances prevailing at the time offers a definite military advantage. In case of doubt as to whether an object that is normally dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it should be presumed not to be used in this way, and thus not to constitute a military objective.
Notification is not a guarantee by the notifying party that the notified objects are not or will not be used for military purposes in the future. Nor is the notifying party required to provide information about military action in the proximity of the notified objects that may affect their civilian status. Determining whether a particular object has become a military objective remains the responsibility of belligerents. Moreover, the provision of such information, which is likely to assist military operations, could undermine the neutrality of the notifying actor.
2.2.3 Humanitarian personnel
The movements of humanitarian convoys, which include personnel, are usually notified, as are static facilities where personnel work. The personnel of humanitarian organizations are civilians. As such, IHL requires that they must be respected and protected. They may not be the object of attack, and their incidental death or injury must be factored into proportionality assessments. Like all civilians, they are protected unless and for such time that they take a direct part in hostilities.
The protection of humanitarian personnel stems from IHL. Again, notification is not a precondition for protection.
2.2.4 Medical facilities
Medical humanitarian organizations such as MSF also notify the medical facilities they operate (hospitals, first aid centres, dispensaries, etc.). The notifications aim to enhance the safety of the facilities, medical personnel and patients. MSF may also notify the facilities that it supports but which are operated by other actors, such as national ministries of health, provided the latter agree to this. There have been instances when such agreement was not given as actors supported by MSF feared this would lead to their facilities being targeted.
Medical facilities benefit from special protection under IHL. Belligerents must respect and protect them, and the facilities must not be the object of attack. This special protection is lost if a medical facility is being used, outside its humanitarian function, to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Before this special protection is lost, a warning must be given, and where appropriate a reasonable time limit also given for complying with the warning.
Again, the protection stems from IHL. Notification is not a prerequisite for protection.
Notification is also not a guarantee by the actor providing the information that notified medical facilities are not or will not in the future be used to commit acts harmful to the enemy.
2.2.5 Notification of movements
Once offers to conduct humanitarian relief operations have been accepted by the state where the operations will be conducted, all parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief vehicles, supplies, equipment and personnel throughout the territory under their control.
Belligerents are entitled to prescribe measures of control for such passage. These measures serve numerous purposes: they can allow parties to assure themselves that relief consignments are exclusively humanitarian; and they may prevent humanitarian relief convoys from being endangered by military operations. Measures of control can include requirements that relief convoys use prescribed routes at specific times to ensure that they do not hamper military operations and are not hampered by them.
Importantly, however, once initial consent to operate has been granted, it is not necessary to obtain authorization for every activity or movement.
Movements of humanitarian staff and supplies are usually notified, as a practical way of enhancing their security. However, providing such notifications must not turn into a system that effectively grants the notified party the authority to approve or deny each movement. This would modify the underlying rules of IHL and lead to delays. Notification must not become a tool of access control, as opposed to a way of facilitating access.
2.2.6 Notification is not a guarantee of protection
Notification does not have legal consequences. As already stated, notification is not the source of the protection of the notified objects and movements: they are already protected under IHL.
Notification is simply a mechanism for facilitating the identification of certain civilian objects. It is not a guarantee that belligerents will not direct attacks against the objects, nor adequately take them into account in proportionality assessments.
Notification is also not a guarantee that the notified object has not lost its civilian status; nor does it address the fact that notified objects may be located in the vicinity of military objectives. Consequently, attacks that target or cause damage to notified objects are not necessarily violations of IHL: lawfulness depends on compliance with the provisions of IHL, not on whether or not an object is notified.
2.2.7 Notification is not an accountability mechanism
Notification arrangements are unrelated to mechanisms to investigate possible violations of IHL, even if it is notified objects that have been attacked or damaged. Although OCHA, for example, might be coordinating the notification arrangement, it is not its role to investigate possible violations of IHL.
Responsibility for investigating violations lies with the parties to the conflict. Independent fact-finding bodies may also be established to consider, inter alia, damage to notified objects and movements. The fact that a facility has been notified is one factor among many that an investigation is likely to take into account in reaching its conclusions.
2.3 Operation in practice – challenges, good practice and recommendations
In the past decade, humanitarian notification systems have been established in a number of contexts. Based on this experience, it is possible to identify some recurring challenges and some emerging good practice. The list below relates to the arrangements coordinated by OCHA, and not to the bilateral notifications provided by the ICRC or MSF. It is not intended to be exhaustive.
2.3.1 Should a humanitarian notification system be established?
Reservations have been expressed as to whether it is appropriate to establish humanitarian notification systems in all contexts. For such a system to be of use, a number of prerequisites must be met, starting from the good faith of the parties to the conflict.
Good faith is relevant in a number of ways. Most significantly, there must be confidence that belligerents will not abuse the system. An extreme example of such abuse would be where the information provided is used to target the notified humanitarian facilities instead of avoiding them, or to put pressure on organizations that operate in areas under opposition control. Such concerns led some medical NGOs not to participate in the humanitarian notification system in Syria.
There must also be confidence that belligerents will not abuse notifications of humanitarian movements by turning the arrangements into something that impedes or restricts humanitarian access.
Nor must belligerents abuse notifications by intentionally misrepresenting them to shirk their responsibilities under IHL – for example by justifying an attack against a civilian object by claiming that the object had not been notified. This occurred in Yemen in 2022, for example, when the Saudi-led coalition struck a detention facility. Coalition officials sought to justify the attack on the grounds that the facility had not been notified under the arrangements facilitated by OCHA or by the ICRC.
Whether or not a humanitarian notification system should be established is a difficult decision that must be taken based on a careful assessment of each specific context. Rather than automatically establishing such a system, relevant UN actors – the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator if they have been appointed, on basis of discussions in the UN Humanitarian Country Team and/or the Emergency Relief Coordinator, in consultation with partners – must consider whether this would actually contribute to enhancing the safety of notified facilities and not obstruct rapid unimpeded and safe passage of relief operations.
In certain contexts, it may be preferable to proceed without a notification system, focusing instead on reminding belligerents of their obligations. This was the approach that was adopted with the Houthis in Yemen, for reasons that included concerns that the notification of movements might be abused.
2.3.2 Which parties should be notified?
Ideally, all relevant belligerents in a particular armed conflict – including most notably those conducting air operations – should participate in the notification arrangements.
There was some criticism of the system established in Syria in 2014, as key belligerents did not participate in the notification arrangements. Syria itself was never a party to the arrangements, but it was assumed by OCHA, which was operating the system, that Russia, which did participate, shared the information with Syrian armed forces. Russia withdrew from the system of notification arrangements in 2020.
This said, comprehensive participation should not come at the expense of the requirement that the belligerents who are notified will use the information that they receive in good faith.
As already noted, MSF does not participate in collective humanitarian notification arrangements. Instead, it provides details of its facilities to all belligerents – states and organized armed groups – present in a particular context.
The capacity of belligerents to absorb the information provided and to communicate it to those conducting operations varies significantly. This is particularly the case where organized armed groups are notified. There have been instances during particularly intense hostilities when communications with armed groups were interrupted and it was not possible to reach the people who had acted as liaisons. This is regrettable, as notifications can play a crucial role at precisely such times.
Ideally, notifications should be shared directly with military hierarchies, to make the system as efficient has possible. There have been instances when states have not allowed such direct engagement with the armed forces, and notifications had to be provided through diplomatic channels.
2.3.3 What should be notified?
A central question is which objects should be notified. The approach adopted to date by the systems operated by OCHA has varied significantly. In some instances, the humanitarian facilities that are notified have been relatively limited. For example, the arrangements that have long been in place for Gaza cover only ‘humanitarian locations’ that are run by a humanitarian partner, and in relation to which the partner retains a high degree of confidence that the location is used exclusively for humanitarian purposes. These locations can be permanent, like an organization’s primary or district office or warehouses, or temporary, like food distribution points. Temporary humanitarian locations are removed from the system once the relevant activities have been completed.
A significantly broader approach has been adopted in other contexts, going well beyond humanitarian organizations’ facilities and movements. In Syria, for example, in addition to static facilities (such as offices and warehouses) that fulfil a humanitarian function, and movements of humanitarian staff and supplies, the notification arrangements cover camps for internally displaced people (IDPs), government schools supported by UNICEF, and private bakeries supported by the World Food Programme. ‘Critical civilian infrastructure’ – i.e. civilian objects considered indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, such as health facilities, and water and electricity stations – is also notified.
The most expansive approach to date has been adopted in Yemen, where more than 28,000 objects have been notified. In addition to humanitarian facilities, these include objects connected with development activities supported by the UN, as well as critical infrastructure, commercial facilities such as cement factories, and UNESCO World Heritage Sites. At times, ‘temporary’ notifications have been issued for all locations that UN staff visited, including government and Houthi offices, but also supermarkets, restaurants and hotels.
An overly broad approach to which objects are notified is problematic for many reasons. Although OCHA does not ‘guarantee’ that the humanitarian facilities that are notified are not used for military purposes, the information usually comes from UN agencies and NGOs participating in the UN humanitarian response plan and/or interagency coordination system. These organizations are trusted, and have a vested interest in the system working. Consequently, there can be confidence that they will have the necessary degree of control over their facilities. The same degree of confidence simply does not exist for a broader range of objects that do not have an immediate connection with humanitarian activities – even the residences of staff members that are not in a compound, let alone commercial enterprises, such as bakeries, run by private actors. OCHA and other humanitarian actors do not have the requisite oversight of them. Including such objects can undermine the implicit foundation of the system. The more a notification system expands beyond humanitarian premises and premises over which humanitarian actors have direct control, the greater the risk of ‘unreliability’ of the list of notified objects.
Moreover, notification of locations and movements is not an end in itself. It only serves its purpose if the belligerents who receive the data actually use that information to guide their targeting processes and military operations. It is questionable whether any belligerent has the capacity to meaningfully process tens of thousands of notified objects in addition to the ones it has already identified itself.
In view of this, the list of notified locations and movements should be narrow: limited to humanitarian premises and premises over which humanitarian actors have direct control. This scope should be clear from the outset and should not be extended incrementally in the course of operations.
At times, extraneous considerations can contribute to untenably broad approaches to notification. Senior UN personnel who bear ultimate responsibility for the operation of the system are unwilling to remove items from notified lists as they do not want to be in any way accountable should an object that was removed from the notified list be struck. Such concerns result in ever longer lists. These tendencies are even more marked as regards notifications of humanitarian movements, and underlie the ‘temporary’ notifications of the location of UN staff in Yemen.
Some belligerents pride themselves on the thousands of objects that have been notified to them, as though the sheer number is an indicator of the rigour of their targeting process – regardless of whether they take measures to factor the information into the targeting process. They too are unwilling to reduce the numbers of notified objects, as this could undermine their claims to rigour.
2.3.4 Change of use of notified objects
One very practical challenge relates to the use made of facilities once they have been notified. At times, an object that served a humanitarian function when it was notified can be subsequently used for military purposes – for instance a warehouse that is taken over by an armed group and used to store weapons. If this happens, the warehouse becomes a military objective and loses protection under IHL. The notifying actor may wish to remove it from the list of notified facilities, so that they are not accused of negligently notifying military objectives or attempting to shield them. However, doing so could indicate to the party to the conflict receiving the information that there has been a change in the use of the facility. This is military intelligence that could be of assistance to its operations; providing it would be inconsistent with the notifying organization’s neutrality as a humanitarian actor.
One way this dilemma has been addressed has been by updating the list of notified objectives at regular intervals without providing reasons as to why particular objects have been removed. Such periodic ‘scrubs’, or ‘clean-ups’, are useful in and of themselves, as they ensure that lists are kept up to date and as short as possible. They also allow specific objects that have lost their civilian character to be removed without being singled out.
2.3.5 Humanitarian movements
Another key concern relates to the notification of the movement of humanitarian organizations’ vehicles, supplies and staff, such as trips to carry out specific activities, convoys that deliver assistance, and, at times, UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flights. Obviously, notifying these movements can enhance the security of the personnel involved.
As in the case of notification of static facilities, the notification process should end with the provision of information of the planned date and route of the movement. In many instances, however, notifications of movements have turned into a mechanism that in effect allows the notified party to approve movements, as the notification is not considered ‘effective’ unless it has been ‘acknowledged’. This is not what the rules of IHL regulating humanitarian relief operations envisage; it is not the intended purpose of humanitarian notification systems; and it has led to delays and unwarranted interference in humanitarian operations.
Both sides bear responsibilities. At times, notified parties have been opportunistic, seizing on the possibility of controlling the movements and thus the activities of humanitarian organizations. But in some contexts, too, the UN has made the error of subsuming the notification arrangements into its in-country Security Management System. The system considers notification a protection mechanism, but requires acknowledgment by the notified party before movement clearance is granted by the UN. This is particularly limiting for UN agencies that must comply with UN security rules; less so for NGOs that participate in the notification system.
As is often the case for security measures, once a procedure has been put in place it is extremely difficult for the UN official with ultimate responsibility for security to step it down – even if it severely impedes operations. They are unwilling to face the risk of personal accountability for having done so should movements subsequently face security problems.
It is thus important to avoid procedures requiring receipt of acknowledgment of notification when arrangements are first established. And to stand firm should they be suggested subsequently. Doing so requires a good understanding of the objectives of humanitarian notification systems by UN humanitarian leadership in country, and support from headquarters if necessary.
2.3.6 The military perspective
The roles and challenges faced by humanitarian organizations that coordinate or participate in humanitarian notification arrangements have received considerable attention, particularly within the humanitarian community. Far less attention has been paid to the experiences of the states that receive the notifications. This is a shortcoming, as better understanding of how belligerents use the information they receive, and their views of how existing arrangements could be improved, are key to making the systems as effective as possible.
In practice, sophisticated armed forces are likely to assess or reassess the status of notified objects themselves. They will want to ensure that their own intelligence about the notified objects conforms with the notifications received, with the aim of ensuring their own compliance with IHL.
For notifications to have any value, it is essential that armed forces put in place a system to ensure that relevant information is passed from the force elements that receive the notifications to the forces planning and conducting operations. A central point for the receipt, collation and dissemination of notifications should be established. As already noted, the number of notifed locations and movements needs to be manageable.
As the March 2024 strike by the Israel Defense Forces on the World Central Kitchen vehicles in Gaza demonstrated, flowing down the information received is particularly important when humanitarian movements have been notified and authorization for them to proceed has been granted. If the information received is not passed to all the forces conducting operations, the consequences can be tragic, and trust in the system may be undermined.
Field-level civil–military coordination is crucial to promoting compliance with IHL and facilitating humanitarian action. This is now taking place in many contexts. However, opportunities for focused dialogue on thematic issues, and for elaborating general good practice, including on humanitarian notification systems, are still extremely rare. Organizations that have connections with, and the trust of, both humanitarian actors and the armed forces – and ideally also with armed groups – should consider convening focused conversations to share lessons learned and elaborate guidance.
2.3.7 Clear communication from the outset with all relevant stakeholders
As already noted, it may not be appropriate to establish humanitarian notification systems in every context. If, after careful consideration, the decision is taken to establish such a system, it is essential that there be clarity from the outset on a number of key constitutive elements, including:
- Which actor will be gathering and transmitting the information. At present, OCHA has played this role. Information should be provided directly by this actor to the parties to the conflict, rather than through an intermediary.
- Which facilities will be notified. These should be limited to objects serving a humanitarian purpose that are used by a limited group of humanitarian actors – usually those participating in the UN humanitarian appeals process and/or interagency coordination arrangements in the relevant country. Efforts to expand the list to other facilities should be resisted.
- Clarity that notification of humanitarian movements must not turn into a process of authorization of humanitarian activities.
- Periodic updating of the lists of notified locations.
From the outset, too, there needs to be extremely clear communication with all stakeholders: humanitarian organizations participating in the notification arrangements; UN in-country humanitarian leadership, including personnel responsible for security; the belligerents receiving the notification; any parties to the conflict that are not participating in the notification arrangements; and the media. The communications must include the purpose of the arrangements and their interplay with the rules of IHL, with emphasis on the fact that notifications in no way affect belligerents’ obligations under IHL.
2.4 In conclusion
Although they share the same objective of sparing civilians from the effects of hostilities as other humanitarian arrangements discussed in this paper, a central difference is that the establishment of humanitarian notification arrangements does not require agreement between belligerents.
This gives the humanitarian actors operating the system far more control over the details. An effective notification system is no guarantee that the notified objects will not be attacked or damaged. That is dependent on compliance with IHL by belligerents. But there are important lessons to be drawn from past practice that can enhance the efficacy of humanitarian notification arrangements.
