The previous chapters of this paper have included specific recommendations with regard to each of the humanitarian arrangements discussed. There are general points that apply to all of the arrangements. Four are set out in this concluding chapter.
8.1 The preparedness of armed forces and humanitarian organizations: guidance and personnel
In various contexts, humanitarian organizations have frequently been involved in the establishment and implementation of the humanitarian arrangements discussed in this paper. Such organizations are familiar with what is required operationally, and with the recurring challenges entailed. Some have elaborated internal guidelines, and increasingly there is a sector-wide discussion of arrangements to enhance civilians’ security in armed conflict. General guidance still needs to be elaborated.
Armed forces do not have a similar level of preparedness. Most do not appear to have policies, doctrines or instructions that address their role in establishing or implementing humanitarian arrangements. These should be elaborated, ideally in consultation with humanitarian actors, and drawing on lessons learned in contexts where the arrangements were established.
Considerations of relevance to humanitarian arrangements such as safe corridors, temporary suspensions of hostilities and protected zones should be included in the assessments of the civilian environment conducted as part of states’ strategic planning.
In addition to doctrine, proper staffing is essential. There have been instances when, in peacetime, units in the armed forces have been assigned responsibilities for civil–military coordination, including in relation to humanitarian arrangements, and have received relevant training, but have been redeployed when conflict broke out. States must not lose capacity in this area when it is most needed. And those providing security cooperation support should give funding and support for maintaining these capabilities in times of conflict.
More generally, civil defence measures that states may have adopted – also referred to as civil protection or civil contingency arrangements – can play an important role in ensuring that states have mechanisms in place for implementing humanitarian arrangements such as evacuations within their territory, and allocate roles and responsibilities for emergency preparation and response.
8.2 Creating opportunities for thematic civil–military engagement
Civil–military engagement is essential for the implementation of humanitarian arrangements. It is taking place in numerous contexts, but principally to address country-specific issues.
Opportunities for focused dialogue on thematic issues, and the elaboration of general good practice, including on humanitarian notification systems, are still extremely rare. Stakeholders that have connections with and the trust of both humanitarian actors and the armed forces – and ideally also with armed groups – should consider convening focused conversations to share lessons learned and elaborate guidance.
8.3 Intermediaries
In order to provide security, most of the humanitarian agreements discussed in this paper require agreement between belligerents. This is the case for evacuations, humanitarian corridors, suspensions of hostilities and protected zones. An intermediary plays a crucial role: to propose the establishment of a particular arrangement; to facilitate reaching agreement on details; and ideally to remain engaged in the operation of the arrangement, either in a supervisory capacity or to assist in resolving problems that may arise.
Some humanitarian organizations play this role for their own operations: the ICRC, for example, in relation to releases or exchanges of prisoners; and MSF for medical evacuations. It is difficult to find actors willing and capable to play this role for operations more generally that are acceptable to all parties in a particular context.
In resolution 46/182, the UN General Assembly specifically tasked the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to conduct certain of these negotiations when necessary to facilitate humanitarian access. But in recent years at least, the ERC does not appear to have been successful in facilitating the establishment of the arrangements. One reason for this could be that although they represent the ‘humanitarian arm’ of the UN, the ERC is nonetheless inevitably perceived as too political and associated with positions adopted by the Security Council.
Similarly, in recent years UN humanitarian leadership at field level – i.e. Resident Coordinators/Humanitarian Coordinators, heads of OCHA offices and heads of agencies – have also not facilitated discussions between belligerents to establish humanitarian arrangements. A number of factors contribute to this, especially in non-international armed conflicts, where one of the parties to the conflict with whom it would be necessary to engage to reach agreement is an organized armed group.
Contact with organized armed groups is not prohibited by law. It is essential for many purposes, including promoting compliance with IHL and to conduct humanitarian operations in a manner that is safe and in accordance with humanitarian principles. Nonetheless, in many contexts there is a marked reluctance by UN humanitarian leadership at field level to engage with such groups.
Often, UN common positions have been elaborated that minimize the possibilities of engagement for reputational reasons or to promote the UN’s political objectives, or because the host state has put pressure on the UN at field or headquarters level to limit contact. While these restrictions may be understandable politically, they undermine the capacity of the humanitarian parts of the UN to facilitate negotiations to establish humanitarian arrangements.
Recently, it has been states that have played this intermediary role on a number of occasions. Rather than those traditionally associated with humanitarian action, such as Switzerland or Norway, it has been other states playing this role: the US and Saudi Arabia, for example, in relation to Sudan in 2023; and Qatar in relation to ceasefires for hostage releases in Gaza in 2023–24. These negotiations were not exclusively for humanitarian purposes, and they thus present an additional challenge: i.e. whether state intermediaries are willing to conduct negotiations that are exclusively related to humanitarian issues and not connected to political dimensions. The US and Saudi Arabia have attempted this in relation to Sudan in the Jeddah talks, establishing two separate strands of mediations: one focusing on humanitarian issues, and access in particular; and the second on a generalized ceasefire. But this is rare.
There have been instances of other actors playing an intermediary role, like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a separatist movement in the Philippines, that facilitated a suspension of hostilities and ‘peace corridor’ between government armed forces and an Islamic State affiliate group, to allow civilians to leave the besieged city of Marawi.
In view of the centrality of intermediaries to the conclusion and safe implementation of humanitarian arrangements, consideration could be given to reviving the notion of ‘protecting powers’ for the specific purpose of facilitating agreement on the establishment and implementation of humanitarian arrangements. However, belligerents will need to agree to a state or other actor playing this role.
8.4 Good faith
The adoption and implementation of the arrangements requires good faith from belligerents. There must be a willingness to spare civilians and facilitate humanitarian action. The arrangements cannot work if a party intends to harm civilians or to prevent or instrumentalize humanitarian action and the arrangements themselves for military purposes. At times, it is precisely because parties are not complying with IHL that the arrangements are being considered.
It is not only parties to armed conflict that must act in good faith. Other actors, most notably third states, must avoid interference for extraneous political motives with what should be exclusively humanitarian arrangements and negotiations to establish them.
8.5 Final words
At times, not establishing a particular humanitarian arrangement has been perceived as a failure and an indication of the inhumanity or intransigence of belligerents. But this is not necessarily the case. Circumstances on the ground may have changed, making the proposed arrangement unnecessary, or what was called for was not actually the type of modality that was necessary and would have hindered instead of facilitated humanitarian response.
The kinds of humanitarian arrangement discussed in this paper can play an important role in giving effect to the protection to which civilians are entitled and to facilitating humanitarian operation. But careful consideration must be given as to whether attempts to establish particular arrangements should even be made, and as to which arrangement is actually required. This depends on the specific circumstances of each situation. A number of factors must be considered, including humanitarian needs; whether simpler alternatives for providing assistance exist; the willingness of the parties to the conflict to agree to a particular arrangement; the capacity of humanitarian or other actors to implement any arrangement safely; and, most importantly, whether the arrangement will actually have a protective effect. So, too, the relevant actors must consider the likelihood of any negative or unintended consequences.
