Many Western governments continue to point to India’s status as the world’s largest democracy as one of the key justifications for deepening engagement with the country. Meanwhile, New Delhi employs its democratic credentials as part of its claim to an expanded global role. In this context, it is important to understand what India’s democratic status means for its foreign policy and the nature (and limits) of its engagement with the West.
India has long been wary of engaging in overt democracy promotion, concerned that such activities would be perceived as a form of interventionism that challenges the sovereignty of partner countries. India’s democracy promotion is often subsumed under broader nation- and state-building building efforts. The country’s firm adherence to principles of non-interference and sovereignty also means that democracy promotion will typically be limited to top-down technical assistance and institution-building activities rather than grassroots assistance to civil society groups. Unlike the West, India remains reluctant to use democratic transition as a condition of development aid. More assertive actions such as sanctions and regime change will generally be limited to countries within South Asia, and have often been driven more by geopolitical considerations than by a genuine desire to promote democracy.
India’s long-standing commitment to ‘strategic autonomy’ in its foreign policy means that it has generally been open to engaging with all countries, irrespective of the nature of the regime. It is not unique among democratic states in doing so, but New Delhi’s foreign policy often appears out of sync with many Western democracies.
Moreover, India’s long-standing commitment to ‘strategic autonomy’, or omni-/multi-alignment, in its foreign policy means that it has generally been open to engaging with all countries, irrespective of the nature of the regime. While India is not unique among democratic states in doing so, New Delhi’s foreign policy often appears out of sync with many Western democracies. Recent developments in Myanmar and Bangladesh provide examples of this, with New Delhi (similar to Beijing) more open to engaging these non-democratic and weak democratic regimes than the West. The reality is that while India and many Western countries have shared interests, their values may be different. India is a proponent of the rules-based international order, but its position as regards the liberal international order is more ambiguous.
At the same time, as a developing economy, India frequently has a better grasp of the priorities and needs of other countries in the Global South than do Western democracies. From training in constitution drafting to the provision of electronic voting machines and indelible ink during elections, along with the more recent promotion of DPI as a means of improving governance and access to welfare, India’s model of democracy promotion may be more resonant with other emerging economies.
India is also employing its democratic credentials as a means of challenging China for leadership of the Global South. The West has leveraged this as a way of cultivating a more ‘benign’ non-Western worldview that presents an alternative to the overtly anti-Western worldview of countries such as China, Russia and Iran. DPI is an obvious candidate for such collaboration, given that technology cooperation is a key component of India’s engagement with the West.
The challenge is India’s domestic political trajectory. So far, framed in the context of a long-term strategic rivalry between the US and China, Western governments’ concerns over the direction of India’s democracy have been secondary to those about China’s one-party state. It is also important not to conflate India’s increasingly illiberal trajectory with the state of the country’s democracy overall: India has become less liberal over the last decade, but its democratic foundations remain more robust than is commonly perceived.
So far, framed in the context of a long-term strategic rivalry between the US and China, Western governments’ concerns over the direction of India’s democracy have been secondary to those about China’s one-party state.
However, an erosion of these foundations (including through constitutional changes that undermine India’s federal structure and further centralize power), would have implications for how India’s democracy is perceived globally. This would prompt Western countries to review their cooperation with India. Already, there are some worrying signs as the BJP government pursues a more divisive, identity-driven path at home, and where the party’s Hindutva agenda spills over into India’s external engagements. India’s efforts to project itself as a civilizational state signal the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy, with the potential for New Delhi to seek exemptions from global norms and rules because of its special or exceptional status.
Ultimately, pragmatism rather than principle will continue to determine India’s foreign policy. Given New Delhi’s ambition to be perceived as a leader or voice of the Global South, India maintains a preference for serving as a positive example and enabler, rather than proselytizing when it comes to promoting democracy globally. As such, it will only pursue democracy promotion activities where these are congruent with other geopolitical considerations that are important to India’s worldview.
This will mean limits on the nature and extent of cooperation between India and the West. Concerns about democratic backsliding could also limit engagement between India and the West in third countries. At present, the West has been a strong proponent of India’s efforts to be a voice of the Global South. This is predicated on India’s support for the rules-based international order and its status as the world’s largest democracy. However, a weakening of these credentials would undermine this narrative.
Taking the example of DPI, India’s democratic credentials and climate of openness and innovation have so far made it a preferred partner for Western countries in the area of technology cooperation, especially when compared with China’s techno-surveillance state model. However, technology is not value-neutral, so DPI could be subject to growing scrutiny if privacy and data protection concerns become intertwined with broader concerns about democratic backsliding in India.
On a more fundamental level, a perceived erosion of India’s secular and democratic credentials would undermine the normative foundations of its relationship with Western countries. This is unlikely to diminish Western governments’ appetite to work with India in specific policy areas (e.g. technology, military and climate cooperation), especially as India continues to be seen as a bulwark against the rise of China. However, it could impose limits on the degree of cooperation in particularly sensitive areas such as intelligence sharing. In a worst-case scenario, a less liberal and less democratic India, with amplified human rights concerns and a growing geopolitical risk premium, could erode the attractiveness of the country as an investment destination and a potential beneficiary of the ‘China Plus One’ strategy of diversifying supply chains away from critical reliance on China.
Democratic credentials are not a prerequisite for countries to be perceived as attractive investment destinations (as shown by Vietnam – a one-party state – being a beneficiary of some Western countries’ push to de-risk supply chains away from China). However, in a climate of growing economic nationalism and a preference to work with ‘like-minded countries’ and ‘trusted geographies’, democratic backsliding in India could place limits on Western governments’ appetite for cooperation with New Delhi, particularly as regards critical and emerging technologies.
