Since the end of the Cold War, New Delhi has demonstrated greater willingness to engage in democracy promotion. This has been motivated by a desire for India to be recognized as a responsible global power through its championing of issues of global governance. India hosted the World Movement for Democracy conference in New Delhi in 1999, for instance, and was one of the founder members of the Community of Democracies in 2000 and its offshoot the UN Democracy Caucus in 2004. The IBSA Dialogue Forum, established in 2003, comprising three major democracies in the Global South – India, Brazil and South Africa – has also sought to strengthen South–South cooperation, although it has been overshadowed by forums such as the BRICS over the last decade or more.
India has also employed democracy promotion as a means to challenge China’s self-perceived leadership of the Global South. This is rooted in India’s belief that while China maintains a lead in its coercive (economic and military) hard power, New Delhi can challenge Beijing through its more co-optive soft power. The latter includes the country’s democratic credentials, but also its ‘civilizational’ identity. Reflecting this, then prime minister Manmohan Singh asserted in 2005 that:
However, non-interference and sovereignty considerations remain a key pillar of Indian foreign policy. As such, New Delhi remains reluctant to support more assertive forms of democracy promotion that entail the use of sanctions or regime change, and India’s conditions for development aid are not typically associated with expectations of democratic transition. Moreover, India tends to provide top-down assistance, working with governments (at their request), rather than bottom-up grassroots support for civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or rebel or separatist groups. There are no organizations in India that research and lobby for democracy promotion globally, as do, for instance, US-based foundations and NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy or Freedom House. While serving as India’s foreign secretary some two decades ago, the diplomat Shyam Saran noted:
India has also become more open in condemning the suspension of democracy in various countries, although it remains selective in doing so, as shown by its less vocal stance on democratic reversals or backsliding in countries such as Myanmar and Bangladesh (see below) compared with others, among them Pakistan and Fiji.
New Delhi will only pursue democracy promotion where this is congruent with other geopolitical priorities, such as questions of India’s international status, its relationship with the US, and/or where national interests and regional security considerations are at stake.
It is important to note that India will support state-building efforts that are under a UN mandate, and is one of the largest contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. However, India’s voting record at the UN on issues of democracy and human rights reflects its wariness and ambiguity as regards democracy promotion.
New Delhi will only pursue democracy promotion where this is congruent with other geopolitical priorities, such as questions of India’s international status, its relationship with the US (see below), and/or where national interests and regional security considerations are at stake. Where it perceives limited added value, India will remain reluctant to weigh in. This means that where an authoritarian regime does not maintain a hostile attitude towards India (e.g. Russia or Iran), and/or where a regime is seen as enhancing India’s national security (e.g. Myanmar or Bangladesh), the government will not push for democratic change.
Ultimately, pragmatism rather than principle will continue to guide the role India plays in democracy promotion. Given New Delhi’s ambition to be perceived as a leader or ‘voice’ of the Global South, India’s preference is for serving as a positive example to developing economies and extending what it regards as enabling rather than prescriptive assistance.
