As noted in previous sections, there have been mounting concerns about – as well as evidence of – democratic backsliding in India in recent years. Whether India has ever truly been a liberal democracy is open to debate, but under BJP governments the illiberal components of India’s identity have come to the forefront of the country’s politics. This presents limits on the degree of cooperation that is actually possible between India and West on the issue of democracy. It also underscores that while India is a proponent of the rules-based international order, this is not the same as the liberal international order: India’s position on the latter is more ambiguous. So, while India and the West undoubtedly have shared interests, these do not necessarily extend to the domain of shared values. This distinction is likely to become more pronounced if or when the BJP’s Hindutva agenda spills over into the foreign policy domain.
Democratic backsliding
Recent years have seen growing concerns about the health of Indian democracy. The government has been accused of pursuing authoritarianism by stealth through controlling key levers of power, including the security services, tax authorities and the media. This has been evident with tax raids targeting NGOs and media organizations, punitive actions taken against opposition politicians via government institutions such as the Enforcement Directorate; and concerns about media self-censorship. As regards the latter, between 2022 and 2023, India fell 11 places on Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, from 150 to 161 (it was ranked 140 in 2014), with RSF describing ‘violence against journalists, the politically partisan media and the concentration of media ownership [among a small number of sprawling companies]’. Freedom House has noted a deterioration in internet freedom in India, amid frequent internet shutdowns and efforts to censor online content, combined with growing use of digital platforms to harass critics of the government and drive self-censorship. Such concerns have been compounded by fears over the eroding independence of India’s judiciary and election commission.
Under the Modi administration’s ‘One Nation, One Election’ agenda, national and state elections would take place simultaneously. While this is ostensibly about improving the efficiency of the electoral process, it also offers a means to give an unfair advantage to the governing party at the centre over regional parties, potentially weakening India’s federal structure. Plans to redraw parliamentary constituencies by 2026, which will revise the number of seats allocated to each state in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of parliament), are also likely to give an advantage to the BJP. Additional seats will likely be assigned to the more populous northern states in the Hindi-speaking heartland where the BJP is well entrenched, while reducing the share of seats available to the country’s southern states which are not controlled by the BJP.
Communal unrest has also become an issue of growing concern. This has been illustrated by developments in the northeastern state of Manipur, where violence erupted in May 2023 between two ethnic-religious groups, leaving over 200 people dead and displacing some 70,000 people. This has prompted fears that violence could similarly break out along ethnic, caste and/or religious lines in other states, both in the run-up to the 2024 general election – as parties resort to divisive identity-based politics to shore up their position – and also beyond the election as the BJP doubles down on its Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) agenda. There are already signs of the former, not least in the consecration of a Hindu temple in the city of Ayodhya, in January 2024, on the site of a mosque that was demolished by Hindu mobs in 1992. (Almost 2,000 people were killed in months of rioting triggered by the destruction of the mosque, which was fuelled by claims that it was built in the 16th century on the site of an ancient Hindu temple marking the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram.)
When it comes to assessing the Modi government’s likely third-term priorities, the record of its first two terms in office, during which it pursued several divisive identity-based policies, is instructive. These included rescinding the special status of Jammu and Kashmir through the revocation of Articles 370 and 35(a) of the constitution; and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019, which expedites the citizenship application process for people from persecuted religious minorities in several neighbouring countries who entered India before 2015, but notably not for Muslims. A third-term Modi government is likely to double down on the government’s identity-based policies, including the possible introduction of a uniform civil code whereby there would be a single set of personal laws governing marriage, divorce and inheritance across religious communities. Such developments will continue to raise concerns in the West about India’s democratic and secular credentials.
Hindutva entering the foreign policy domain
Beyond concerns about the health of India’s democracy, there are also grounds for worry that the government’s Hindutva agenda may spill over into the foreign policy domain. So far, the signs of this drift have been more symbolic, such as use of the name Bharat rather than India during the G20 Summit; growing use of vernacular rooted in India’s civilizational identity, such as Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (‘world as one family’), India as Vishvaguru (‘world teacher’) and Vishvamitra (‘friend to the world’); and efforts to project India’s soft power through cultural ‘assets’ such as yoga and Buddhism. Such actions are largely benign, especially when compared with the more overtly anti-Western worldviews being propagated by countries such as China or Russia.
India’s ambition to project itself as a civilizational state signals the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy. But should this take the form of India seeking exemptions from global norms and rules because of its special or exceptional status, its assertiveness risks becoming more problematic.
However, India’s ambition to project itself as a civilizational state signals the emergence of a more assertive foreign policy. This is not a problem in and of itself, especially as the country seeks recognition of its status as a responsible global power. During its G20 presidency, notably, the country sought to offer Indian solutions to global issues such as climate change, DPI and health. But should the pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy take the form of India seeking exemptions from global norms and rules because of its special or exceptional status, this risks becoming more problematic.
The recent sharp deterioration in relations between the governments of India and Canada is of relevance in this context. Speaking in parliament in September 2023, Canada’s prime minister, Justin Trudeau, stated that there were ‘credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen’, in reference to the assassination, in June of that year, of a Canadian national linked to the Sikh separatist Khalistani movement. New Delhi dismissed the allegations as ‘absurd’, and as relations deteriorated in the following weeks India forced the departure of 41 Canadian diplomats after threatening to withdraw their immunity if a demand for a scaling back of Canada’s diplomatic presence in the country was not met. India also suspended visa services and issued travel advisories for Indians travelling to Canada. India’s response to the allegations made by Trudeau was in line with the more muscular Indian foreign policy in recent years, including its propensity to retaliate strongly against actions that challenge India’s sovereignty or status.
The unsealing of a US federal indictment, in late November 2023, subsequently allowed for public scrutiny of the case related to an alleged attempt to assassinate a prominent Sikh separatist in the US. India’s reaction to the allegations that emerged from the unsealing of the US indictment was notably more muted. While this was apparently consistent with New Delhi’s appreciation of the US’s more discreet handling of the investigation of this case, it also reflected recognition that it was more difficult for India to ‘punish’ the US in the same way as it had Canada.
