Understanding Russia’s plans to upgrade its military hardware and capabilities – and the profound challenges it faces in doing so – is critical to evaluating the short- and long-term threats Russia will continue to pose to Ukraine, the US, NATO and their allies.
More than two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, understanding prospects for the regeneration of Russian military power is crucial to predicting the Kremlin’s ability to continue to prosecute the war, or even to escalate hostilities.
Moscow’s war against Ukraine has clarified the extent of Russia’s warfighting capabilities and the ability of the Russian Armed Forces to sustain prolonged, high-intensity warfare. Despite high rates of attrition across many domains and the destruction of substantial parts of the land forces, the Russian Armed Forces are rapidly reconstituting and continue to present a significant threat to the US, NATO and their allies.
Viewed across all domains, the Russian military remains a force capable of contesting peer and near-peer competitors. Its disregard for losses makes it a dangerous opponent even for more technologically advanced adversaries such as the US.
The question of how fast and how well Russia can rebuild its armed forces is therefore vital to understanding the future threat environment in the medium term – this can be defined as the timeframe of the next round of Russia’s State Armament Programme (GPV) after 2027, although the precise details and duration of the post-2027 GPV are yet to be determined.
Ongoing research on the Russian military must include deciphering current and future trends affecting, or potentially affecting, the regeneration of Russian forces in terms of manpower, force structure, and command and control. This research must also focus on the challenges and opportunities Russia faces in relation to the procurement of military hardware and platforms.
The complexity of the situation is compounded by several principal factors: the volatile nature of Russian operations in Ukraine; Western policy expectations with regard to a potential peace settlement; questions around the sustainability of international support and military assistance to Ukraine; and the impact of international sanctions on the Russian defence industry. However, this is not an exhaustive list.
This research paper provides a mid-term assessment of Russia’s continued regeneration of its forces, and of its efforts to replenish or modernize military equipment and hardware. The paper considers the scope, scale and successes of this process since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as well as the challenges and setbacks Russia has encountered to date. The principal analysis, after this introductory chapter, is divided into six thematic chapters respectively covering Russia’s underlying force structure, four key warfighting capabilities (land, air and naval forces, and asymmetric enablers), and the overall Russian military-industrial complex.
The intention of this research is to assist Western policymakers and military planners with understanding how Russia aims to adapt or develop its armed forces in the medium term, whether it may succeed, and especially in which domains and sectors it will continue to be a credible threat to Ukraine as well as to the US and its allies.
