Just as the war in Ukraine has highlighted both weaknesses and resilience in the Russian military, the lessons for the West are equally mixed. Signs of Russian vulnerability offer no grounds for Western complacency – but point to the importance of reducing Russia’s war-making capacity by attrition. Above all, continued Western support for Ukraine will remain crucial.
More than two years into the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains able simultaneously to continue to prosecute the war and to effect wartime adaptations to its command structure. With varying degrees of success, the Kremlin has been able to rapidly mobilize reservists, employ private military companies, sustain military-industrial production for basic systems, and heavily militarize the public information space in support of the war.
In terms of command structure, the separation of the Western Military District into Moscow and Leningrad districts in March 2024 is also telling. Moscow is now reverting to its ‘comfort zone’, namely Soviet-era command structures in the European theatre. The new Moscow Military District will concern itself exclusively with Ukraine, Belarus and Kaliningrad, which will inevitably be of direct concern to the US and NATO in the Baltic theatre as well as on the eastern flank of the Alliance.
The pace of implementation and the efficiency of continued reforms in the command structure, however, remain to be seen. They will partly depend on the effectiveness or otherwise of the new minister of defence, Andrei Belousov, appointed in May 2024. Similarly, it is unknown if the Russian Armed Forces can be a ‘learning organization’ able to implement genuine changes, whether structural or cultural.
On top of wartime adaptations in the command structure, the military industry has displayed resilience in its ability to deliver military equipment and hardware in the war against Ukraine. The ongoing reconstitution of military equipment and hardware will inevitably inform the next cycle of the State Armament Programme (GPV) after 2027, as well as future plans regarding modern military technology and military innovation.
The Russian Armed Forces remain a credible threat to NATO and its allies. In Ukraine, the Russian military has shown it can absorb losses and maintain tactical-operational credibility despite strategic failures. Russian forces can count on improved reconnaissance fire and strike complexes equipped with a vast arsenal of long-range precision munitions, as well as larger quantities of improved uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Russian long-range strike and stand-off munitions, coupled with multi-layered air defence systems, represent the biggest conventional threat to NATO.
The Aerospace Forces (VKS) and the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) remain critical parts of the nuclear and conventional strategic deterrence force, potentially holding NATO assets at risk of destruction. Finally, asymmetric capabilities – especially the use of cyber and information warfare; electronic warfare for counter-UAV and counter-precision-guided-munitions operations; and space-based assets – are still able to offset NATO and US conventional superiority.
Russia’s prospects for regenerating its military machine remain mixed, both in terms of speed and effectiveness. Yet as the war against Ukraine continues, and regardless of the depth of the reconstitution of Russia’s military power, the current Kremlin leadership will remain a threat to European and transatlantic security as well as a strategic competitor to NATO and its allies.
Analysis of Moscow’s nuclear declaratory policy suggests that if Russia were to suffer sufficiently severe degradation of its conventional military power, such that the leadership deemed the existence of the Russian state to be under threat, this would create conditions under which Russia might consider the use of nuclear weapons. However, this possibility remains remote, especially while Russia’s air arms, and its naval forces beyond the Black Sea, remain relatively intact.
Furthermore, Russia will continue to exploit its toolkit of asymmetric capabilities and ambiguous sub-threshold tactics. These tools must no longer be analysed as part of a ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ range of measures aimed at blurring the line between war and peace. They are fundamentally part of Russia’s continued low-intensity warfare against Western interests.
Continued assessments of Russia’s military reform and of its ongoing reconstitution of equipment are vital to understanding in which sectors Moscow still represents a threat to Western interests. Such assessments will be essential for the US and NATO in terms of retaining both a technological and overall deterrence advantage against the Kremlin.
The single most significant factor that can impair Russia’s ability to reconstitute its overall military power and leverage asymmetric capabilities in coming years will be ongoing Western support for Ukraine.
Finally, the single most significant factor that can impair Russia’s ability to reconstitute its overall military power and leverage asymmetric capabilities in coming years will be ongoing Western support for Ukraine. Western countries must continue to work together to provide Ukraine with arms, ammunition, financial support and refugee assistance, and to show moral solidarity with the Ukrainian war effort.
Denying Russia victory and forcing it to continue in a long attritional struggle will further degrade all elements of its war-making capacity, including its ability to invest in and produce cutting-edge technological enablers. Critically, these efforts will also further undermine the Kremlin’s informational strategy both at home and abroad, diminishing its ability to destabilize Western democratic systems and, ultimately, weakening its long-term hold on power.
