The above analysis has sought to shed light on changes in the views of China’s leaders and policymakers towards the US. Overall, the approach of Chinese leaders to the US is hardening as a direct result of Washington’s continuous pursuit of a China containment strategy, as well as China’s own domestic economic downturn. A reactive cycle is further exacerbating mostly competitive elements of China–US ties, such as in economic security, military capability and global influence.
There are three emerging trends in China’s US policy evident from this research paper. Firstly, China’s foreign policy decision-making has become more centralized under President Xi Jinping, like all aspects of China’s policymaking today. Beijing’s US policy has inevitably followed this pattern.
The ruling communist party and President Xi Jinping himself have had decisive roles in Beijing’s policy towards the US. President Xi’s twin policy priorities of comprehensive national security and self-sufficiency have not only diminished cooperation with the US but also accentuated competition with Washington. Despite the centralization of decision-making, Chinese leaders still seek a range of expertise from the Chinese strategic community to inform decisions. As a result, these experts still have perceptible impacts on the final policy outcomes.
Meanwhile, party-led institutions have become more involved in setting the tone and terms of China–US relations. The group of agencies directly managed by the CPC central committee, such as the International Liaison Department of the CPC and Central Foreign Affairs Commission, are not only implementing foreign policy decisions, as would be the convention, but more importantly they are shaping the direction in which decisions are being made at the highest levels in Beijing.
Linked to the first trend and President Xi’s policy priority of achieving self-reliance, the second trend is that, as has happened on the US side, Chinese leaders have deprioritized the typical buffers and stabilizers of the China–US relationship such as trade and investment. The tangible benefits of the China–US relationship in the past, namely trade and investment, have rapidly diminished due to increased commercial competitiveness and Beijing’s decisive pivot from low-end, export-led growth to a high-end manufacturing growth model. China’s rapid progress in manufacturing electric vehicles and end-consumer focused semiconductors have now become a source of economic contention rather than a buffer to stabilize bilateral relations with the US.
China feels strongly about the importance of its major technological progress and innovation capability. The country is explicit about its need for technological self-reliance and its desire to become a global champion in certain tech sectors. Efforts to achieve have been severely disrupted by the waves of US sanctions imposed on Chinese tech companies and individuals, with the aim of denting Beijing’s innovation ambition.
The third trend is emerging from certain regional flashpoints. Beijing is anxious in regard to US attempts to connect matters in the South China Sea with issues related to Taiwan. At the same time, China’s close alignment with Russia in the war in Ukraine has further strained Beijing’s relations with Washington.
Taiwan remains the most sensitive subject in bilateral relations. Despite no formal changes of wording in Beijing’s political blueprints, on balance Chinese political elites and influential scholars consider the current situation to be precarious with the pro-independence DPP government in Taiwan, which is likely to result in more active Chinese deterrents to confront the Taiwanese government as well as the incoming US president, irrespective of who that is. To avert the worst-case scenario, it is necessary for there to be clear, face-to-face conversations between President Xi and his US counterpart on a regular basis.
With a similar deterrence-centred mind-set dominating in Washington, it is accurate to say that elements for a potential China–US confrontation over the Taiwan Strait are in place. Yet both sides should show more maturity about managing the most sensitive elements in their bilateral relationship to avoid conflict that they would all regret.
Similarly on the South China Sea, Beijing continues to articulate its position on sovereignty in the region and the country remains reluctant to direct its grey zone activities towards the US military. To date, neither China nor the US has established any crisis prevention mechanism, so a local confrontation between Chinese and Filipino fishermen might well precipitate a direct great power conflict between the US and China.
Looking ahead, it would be naive to assume Beijing and Washington can work towards a reconciliation. Clearly, Beijing is unwilling to make any concessions to what it perceives as the US’s containment strategy. Yet, their bilateral relationship should not be viewed with excessive pessimism. China’s US policy has always been and will continue to be a product of China’s own evaluations of what is happening at home and abroad. Despite major changes in China’s political landscape under President Xi Jinping, the country’s elites will continue to decide Beijing’s US policy based on a balanced examination and deliberation that takes into account China’s own national needs. The varied voices of the Chinese strategic community will contribute to this important process.
China’s ultimate goal is to ensure that the further erosion of China–US relations does not hinder domestic economic growth, which is key to giving the ruling regime legitimacy. The overall strategy for Beijing to deal with the US is to minimize damage from Washington by maximizing China’s economic and political influence in the rest of the world, most notably with large parts of the Global South. Such a move might well buy time for China to speed up its own economic resilience and technology development.
Global foreign policy practitioners outside of Beijing and Washington must pay continuous attention to the China–US dynamic. Only through thoughtful and balanced assessments can countries in the West and Global South formulate effective policies to navigate a world dominated by a strained China–US relationship.
