The struggle for the global order
There is broad consensus within the Chinese strategic community that the core drivers of Beijing’s deteriorating relationship with Washington cannot be reversed. However, influential scholars and policy practitioners differ widely on whether the US is in terminal decline and whether the global order is shifting in China’s favour. There are three main schools of thought in regard to the changing relative positions of China and the US in the global order.
The first can be categorized as ‘international pessimists’, this includes those who tend to travel regularly to the West and frequently discuss these issues with their Western peers. They seek to persuade the Chinese leadership that it should take a more measured approach to the US, based on an assessment of enduring US power. This group includes some of the country’s most prominent international relations scholars. They tend to argue that US decline is likely to be very gradual in nature, possibly nonlinear, and is less predictable as Washington acclimatizes to a more multipolar world.
A good example is Yan Xuetong, professor in international relations at Tsinghua University, one of China’s leading research institutions, and secretary general for the World Peace Forum, a security meeting backed by the Chinese government. As one of the most influential Chinese strategic thinkers, Yan has consistently argued that ‘the US decline is only in relative terms and such a decline might not always develop as China expects’.
Another prominent strategic thinker, Professor Zhu Feng at Nanjing University, a leading specialist on US foreign policy, who directly advises the Chinese government on South China Sea matters and security aspects of China–US relations, has presented a stark narrative that challenges the perceived view of US decline. Most notably, his view on China–US relations has shifted from being relatively favourable to a more pessimistic assessment of ‘qualitative change and protracted chill’ between Beijing and Washington. His change of outlook on Sino-US relations mirrors how the political elites in Beijing have come to view their Washington counterparts in the last few years.
As one of the most influential Chinese strategic thinkers, Yan has consistently argued that ‘the US decline is only in relative terms and such a decline might not always develop as China expects’.
The second school of thought emerges from experts in China’s government-affiliated think-tanks. They can be categorized as ‘cautious optimists’. They tend to explicitly assert that the US is in steady decline, resulting not only from China’s rise but also because of the growing political polarization within the US. They accept that competition will remain a permanent feature of Sino-US relations, but they equally advocate for the two sides to break the traditional security dilemma to find a path of peaceful co-existence.
For example, Dr Fu Mengzi, deputy director at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a prominent Beijing-based foreign affairs think-tank affiliated with the security apparatus of the Chinese government, falls into this category. In a long piece published in the Journal of National Security Studies, he made a strong case arguing that while the two sides might not be able to resolve their fundamental security dilemma any time soon, Beijing and Washington could find common ground pursuing elements of global human security – such as anti-drug campaigns, anti-piracy campaigns, and initiatives to tackle climate change and food security.
Likewise, his colleague Dr Chen Wenxin, who is director of American studies at CICIR, argued that the relative decline of the US and the rise of China have driven the two countries towards a period of ‘strategic stalemate’. This ‘stalemate’ can serve as an important prerequisite of peaceful coexistence. But it can also break down because of ongoing conflicts over economic and military power.
The third school of thought can be categorized as the ‘ultra optimists’. Most of them are not US foreign policy specialists unlike in the previous two groups, but they have a triumphalist view of China’s global role. They firmly believe that Beijing can and will outcompete the US because of China’s increasing economic power, unique political system, military might and technological prowess.
One such ‘optimist’ is Professor Zhang Weiwei from Fudan University in Shanghai, who is a social media influencer with millions of followers. He has been a leading figure in arguing that the US is in permanent decline and that the global power shift is travelling towards China. In 2021, he gave a lecture on China’s global communication strategy and the positive presentation of China’s own narrative to politburo members. In his regular social media appearances, he often bluntly dismisses the ‘end of history’ argument – the idea that liberal democracy has defeated other forms of government, such as fascism and communism after the Cold War – asserting that ‘both hard and soft power of the United States are declining significantly, and the world is destined towards a “post-America supremacy era”’.
Other pundits such as retired Major General Dai Xu, who served in the People’s Liberation Army and taught military strategy at the National Defense University in Beijing, has also echoed the view of US decline and argued, ‘Beijing should not be scared by the renewed strategic pressure from the US in regional flash points, one must let the US know that China should not be bullied’.
Judging from these three diverse viewpoints, it is rather difficult to conclude which school of thought is prevailing and shaping the country’s policy and influencing senior leadership. Beijing’s current US policy is influenced by all three perspectives. Chinese leaders are navigating a volatile external environment compounded by a domestic economic downturn, which sometimes drives Beijing to seek to lower the temperature with Washington and its neighbouring countries. At other times, Chinese leaders seek to turn up the rhetoric about the US, in order to pin the blame for China’s woes on Washington.
Economic security and technological rivalry
Although China has been promoting economic and technological self-reliance for at least a decade, the country has intensified this push in response to the expanding technological and industrial restrictions implemented by the Trump and Biden administrations. Unlike the past diplomatic lexicon created by Beijing to spin a positive light on Sino-US relations, senior officials in China quietly dropped the notion that ‘the economic and trade ties serve as a stabilizer for [China’s] ties with the US’. The Chinese strategic community has rallied around this push to counter what is seen as an attempt by Washington to choke off China’s access to the technologies of the future and stall its development.
Both scholars and retired senior diplomats from Beijing have extensively criticized Washington’s ever more stringent export controls on semiconductor, critical raw material and quantum computing sectors. Most notably, the former Chinese ambassador Cui Tiankai attacked the ‘small yard, high fence’ strategy asserted by Jake Sullivan, the US national security advisor, as ‘looking at the sky from the bottom of a well’, a Chinese idiom to reprimand those who are blinded by their own world view.
Scholars have also debated whether China can overcome restrictions and catch up with the US on high-end technology. One example is Li Wei, a professor of international relations at the politically influential Renmin University, where he leads the Center for American Studies and publishes extensively on China–US relations, particularly economic security issues. He recognizes the severe challenges posed by the intense US focus on slowing down China’s tech advancements. But rather than doubling down on self-reliance, he has argued that Beijing must find the right balance between government-led innovation and market innovation. He compared the situation to the arms race between the US and Soviet Union, and he warned that innovation cannot happen exclusively within an economically independent country or led by the state, it requires international talent to flow and market-induced investments in science and technology.
While some nationalistic commentators have called for China to take retaliatory measures against the US, there has been extensive debate within the strategic community about the need for a smarter response. One approach that has been regularly discussed, and is being implemented by Beijing, is to build a wider trade and critical materials supply chain network with other regions to counter US efforts to isolate China in technological and industrial terms.
The second proposed approach is to maintain a balance in investments between state-owned companies and the private sector in frontier technologies such as AI, quantum computing and semiconductors. This runs counter to the state-led innovation system that has been deeply embedded in China’s pursuit of scientific self-reliance under Xi.
Regional flashpoints: Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea
For both China and the US, disputes over Taiwan and the South China Sea are the thorniest and most risk-laden issues in the bilateral relationship. The Chinese strategic community blames recent increased tension in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea on the governments of the US, Taiwan and the Philippines for upsetting the status quo and furthering their bilateral cooperation.
Taiwan Strait
Despite speculation from some US political and military leaders and international media outlets, public sources in China do not suggest that Beijing is preparing a military escalation across the Taiwan Strait with any specific date. However, members of the Chinese strategic community consider the current situation with the incumbent pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government increasingly unsustainable and precarious, requiring stronger deterrence actions to send warnings to both Taipei and Washington.
The US is also taking a similar deterrence-centred approach to the cross-strait relationship. It is therefore clear that aspects of confrontation over Taiwan are well established, and may well worsen unless the two sides can agree on a crisis-prevention framework to reduce misunderstandings.
Overall, statements from Chinese leaders and government policy documents on Taiwan have been consistent in advocating China’s position, even before President Xi Jinping came to power. There has been remarkable consistency over the last 20 years between different iterations of Beijing’s two most important political planning documents, namely the National Congress Political Report of the CPC and the Chinese State Council Government Work Report. Both documents include one or two paragraphs on the topic of Taiwan for each edition. The standard wording is something like:
Although critical elements of Beijing’s Taiwan policy have not shifted fundamentally under President Xi Jinping’s stewardship, two new aspects have emerged in the last few years. The first noticeable element is the explicit link being made between reunification with Taiwan and Xi’s ‘China Dream’ and planned national rejuvenation by 2049. Yet, Xi’s two predecessors also made similar remarks. For example, President Jiang Zemin stated in 2002 that ‘China will be reunified, and the Chinese nation will be rejuvenated’.
The second noticeable feature is the growing sense of urgency to deter pro-independence supporters and the sharp criticism of ‘separatists’ inside Taiwan, as Xi and his lieutenants have made several official comments on various occasions – particularly after Nancy Pelosi, at the time speaker of the US House of Representatives, visited Taipei. Both changes reflect Xi’s own belief that there has been a serious deterioration of the Sino-US relationship. Related to this shift, Chinese leaders and official media use coded vocabulary, such as ‘external forces’, to criticize US interference in matters related to Taiwan under both the Trump and Biden administrations.
Beyond official rhetoric and statements, state media editorials serve as a useful window into Beijing’s position on the cross-strait relationship. These editorials are often blunt and tend to be more confrontational than public statements and official speeches. For example, Zhong Sheng, a pseudonym that literally means the ‘voice of China’, is named as the author of People’s Daily editorials that focus on China–US relations and China’s position on Taiwan. Under this name, the People’s Daily runs editorial pieces periodically when there have been major issues or disputes between Beijing and Washington.
Beyond official rhetoric and statements, state media editorials serve as a useful window into Beijing’s position on the cross-strait relationship.
In the last three years, Zhong Sheng has commented on the China–US–Taiwan
triangle dozens of times. In particular, Zhong Sheng published a series of commentaries to reprimand Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan and directly criticize the US political establishment’s abandonment of what was agreed with Beijing regarding Taiwan in 1979. All of these editorials were vociferously critical of the governing DPP party in Taiwan and the US government.
Overall, Chinese academics that focus on Taiwan have a fairly pessimistic assessment of the current situation. Apart from stating official lines, some scholars have also argued that so-called ‘peaceful reunification’ will only happen under a degree of coercion either in economic or military terms.
For example, Professor Zuo Xiying, at Renmin University’s School of International Relations, noted that, ‘the key feature of the trilateral relationship between Mainland China, the United States and Taiwan is that uncertainty is rising, and the probability of conflict is increasing.’ In agreement with this position, Dr Li Yan, another specialist focused on China, US and Taiwan dynamics, made a similar case in 2021.
One commentator who has millions of followers on Chinese social media platforms went even further. Hu Xijin, the former Global Times editor-in-chief, stated that reunification, ‘must be based on the condition that the DPP authority feels cornered and will perish if they do not accept reunification’.
While Chinese official statements about Taiwan scarcely mention how the changing power balance across the Taiwan Strait influences Chinese actions, the conviction of Chinese media commentators is that Beijing’s increasing military capability and regional influence means that time is on China’s side. In contrast, Chinese scholars express a clear sense of pessimism and believe peaceful unification will only happen when coupled with some form of coercion. Careful observation of such scholarly views, which might eventually translate into a policy blueprint for Beijing, offers particular value and insight for those monitoring the situation in the Taiwan Strait.
South China Sea
China’s position on the South China Sea is one of assertiveness, primarily driven by its historical claims and strategic interests in breaking out of ‘the first island chain’. China claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, demarcated by what is now known as the ‘ten-dash line’, which extends hundreds of miles south and east from the country’s southernmost province. The country’s activities in the South China Sea include a number of grey zone tactics, such as the construction of artificial islands, military installations and the declaration of an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the area. These actions have raised tensions with neighbouring countries, most notably with the Philippines, which has competing claims over parts of the South China Sea.
This ongoing dispute dates back to the second term of the Obama administration and has now become a permanent security irritant between China, several Southeast Asian countries and the US. Through its active military network in the Indo-Pacific and treaty alliance with the Philippines, the US is intricately linked to this tense situation.
When Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. was elected as president of the Philippines in 2022, Beijing presumed that he would continue to tilt towards China in line with his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. However, it soon became evident that Marcos was conducting a foreign policy U-turn and looking to boost the country’s alliance with Washington. From Manila, the perception of a maritime threat is ever present. China’s seizure of Mischief Reef in 1994–95 and Scarborough Shoal in 2012 is deeply embedded as an injustice in the collective memory of the Philippines. Marcos is determined to prevent a similar situation in the Second Thomas Shoal.
However, what really worries Beijing is recent US moves to strengthen its alliance with the Philippines in regard to Taiwan, while deepening coordination with other US allies such as Japan and Australia. The further involvement of US allies has only worsened Chinese fears of an opposing bloc formation. Wu Shicun, one of the most influential specialists on the South China Sea in the Chinese strategic community, lamented that, ‘Washington has conducted the most effective alliance building by playing the South China Sea and Taiwan cards simultaneously, it is a major disruption to China’s relations with ASEAN’.
A fear of encirclement by the US has emboldened China to be more assertive. In doing so, Beijing has further toughened its diplomatic rhetoric by directly suggesting that, ‘China will not tolerate the Philippines’s futile challenge, and therefore, will respond in kind’. Meanwhile, China has also increased the intensity of grey zone activities ranging from coastguard patrols to increased artificial island construction in recent years. None of these activities has directly targeted the US Navy. Instead, the focal point remains to deter activities launched by US regional allies.
Judging from the rhetoric and public statements from Beijing, China’s priorities are to articulate its position on South China Sea sovereignty and intimidate and threaten Southeast Asian countries, mostly the Philippines, which seek to challenge Beijing claims in the region. Similar to Taiwan, there is no clear timeline or favoured method for when and how Beijing will fully take over the South China Sea. Such ambiguity should not be read as China’s willingness to make a concession to the US or the Philippines. Beijing does not want to corner itself through its rhetoric and would like to have other options to assert its claims over the South China Sea, if the time and conditions are right.
A Chinese scholar associated with the People’s Liberation Army, Professor Li Chen, who is emerging as one of Beijing’s most influential experts on China–US military ties, recently led several of Beijing’s Track 1.5 dialogues between the two militaries. In 2020, Li noted that, ‘due to the lack of clear parameters for each other’s military activities in the South China Sea, both sides should upgrade their competition management mechanism as China and the United States have not yet found each other’s bottom line on South China Sea matters.’
The war in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has presented three intertwined challenges to Beijing’s diplomatic priorities. First, China’s support for Russia contradicts the former’s traditional policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Second, China values its closer relationship with Russia resulting from the war, particularly as both countries share concerns about perceived Western encroachment and resentment towards the US hegemony. Third, and most challenging, is how Beijing can balance its economic and diplomatic support for Russia with its desire to maintain stable relations with the US and Europe, which are China’s two main trading partners.
The key aim of Beijing’s approach is to prevent a sustained, simultaneous deterioration of its ties with the US and Europe. Yet, its damage limitation efforts have not been very convincing in Washington and European capitals.
Since February 2022, Beijing made several attempts to justify its position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and communicated this with US and European leaders. The key aim of Beijing’s approach is to prevent a sustained, simultaneous deterioration of its ties with the US and Europe. Yet, its damage limitation efforts have not been very convincing in Washington and European capitals. Chinese leaders and diplomats have attempted to deflect US criticism of China and the accusation of Beijing providing military support to Moscow. For example, Qin Gang, the former Chinese ambassador to the US, wrote a piece for the Washington Post on 14 March 2024 explaining that China’s position was an example of Beijing’s efforts to differentiate itself from Moscow. However, all of Beijing’s explanations have stoked a sense of deep mistrust between China and the US. In the eyes of Chinese officials, it was the US and US-led NATO that provoked Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia.
The Chinese strategic community has also intensely debated the three challenges related to the war in Ukraine. The subject has raised many questions that have proven difficult to answer, including: to what extent can China support Russia and maintain stable ties with both the US and Europe, while not facing secondary sanctions from the collective West? When and how will the war end? Should China play a more active mediation role between Russia and Ukraine given the current stalemate on the battlefield?
But opinions are divided on the fundamental questions of whether China should align with Russia and what the likely repercussions would be for China’s ties with the US and Europe. Arguments by the academics Feng Yujun and Sun Zhuangzhi are a good example of the contrasting views. The former is a professor at Peking University, who recently published a long commentary in the Economist, which argued that China should not get any closer to Russia, as this will increase strategic pressure on China’s neighbours and unite the West more than ever. Meanwhile, Sun Zhuangzhi, who is the director of the Russia and Eurasia Institute at the state-affiliated Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), advocated closer ties between Beijing and Moscow as he believes that Russia is merely addressing its own justifiable grievances against a US-led NATO over the last decade.
As Beijing focuses on damage limitation, the US is keen to limit the extent to which China can support Russia, particularly with respect to substantive military assistance. Washington has continued to send warnings to Beijing with a threat of imposing secondary sanctions against Chinese companies and financial institutions that have close relationships with Russia. Repeated strongly worded warnings from a string of US senior officials over the last two years has increased the level of strain and mistrust in this fragile China–US relationship.
Diplomatically, war in Ukraine has firmly united the collective West while straining ties with China. As competition between Beijing and Washington continues, China wishes to avoid a rift with Europe. In order to maintain its diplomatic and trade channels with European capitals, Beijing’s main strategy is to reassure Europe that it seeks to restrain the Kremlin from entertaining the idea of deploying nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Beijing is on a charm offensive with the Global South where many governments do not view this war in black and white moral terms as is more common in the West. So long as the war continues, Beijing will have to navigate through a contradictory set of interests while attempting to prevent the country’s bilateral relations with the US from worsening further.
