On 18 July the new UK government announced it would conduct a Strategic Defence Review (SDR), shaped by three external reviewers: Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Dr Fiona Hill and General Sr Richard Barrons.
Parameters have been set out which are consistent with the previous government. And much of the threat analysis in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh will likely still stand – although it is inevitable that any definitive statement of security threats risks being overtaken by events. The SDR will stress the importance of NATO, retain the UK’s nuclear weapons system, and ensure continued support for Ukraine.
Prior to the 2024 election, the Labour Party also said they were committed to continuing the AUKUS partnership on nuclear submarines and on new technologies (AUKUS Pillar 2). The UK government will also presumably look to set out a timetable for hitting their 2.5 per cent GDP target on defence spending.
However, some shifts in emphasis are evident. The appointment of the external reviewers suggests that the focus will be even more on the practicalities of European security in the face of a more unpredictable United States: Dr Hill has extensive Russia expertise and knowledge of US politics; General Sir Richard Barrons has deep military experience; and George Robertson, the first secretary of defence in the Blair government, was a highly regarded secretary general of NATO.
Statements from when Labour were in opposition also suggest there will be a firm focus on recruitment and personnel, and on ensuring defence spending has a return in terms of jobs at home.
Defence reviews can be lengthy processes with bureaucratic and practical pitfalls, and this one is being conducted at a time of fiscal pressure and growing international risks. To be effective, the review should focus on clearly articulating goals for the defence of the UK and ensuring that the resources available match these goals.
To do this, the review should aim to build on existing work, rather than reinventing the wheel, address persistent failures in procurement and recruitment – and make tough choices between competing service priorities.
What is essential is that the SDR builds adaptability into its strategic aims to future proof investments, and ensures that UK industry and society are resilient.
Learning from the past
Some in the opposition Conservative Party have said the review is unnecessary and the new government should focus on increasing spending now. The range of risks facing the UK and its poor state of defence readiness mean increased spending is desirable – as Chatham House research has indeed previously called for.
But there are few other areas of public spending where the government would commit to more funds without asking: On what? For what purpose? And in what way?
The UK’s defence spending is among the highest in Europe but it does not spend enough on personnel, military housing and basic equipment – whereas many long-term big-ticket investments run over time and over budget.
The new government has already said the government will act before the review to address the challenges facing armed forces personnel, including numbers.
That means improving recruitment, housing for serving individuals and families, and career pathways. It also means providing training which delivers the skills modern armed forces need.
The Haythornthwaite Review of UK Armed Forces personnel has 67 recommendations on just these issues and was only published in June 2023 so retains its relevance.
It’s also well-known that defence procurement faces serious problems. Recent parliamentary committee reports have itemized some signal examples across the MOD’s portfolio, including the delays, technical problems and spiralling costs related to the Ajax armoured vehicle and the Type 26 frigate. These highlight some specific recent problems: there has been high turnover in political leadership (eleven Ministers of State for Defence Procurement since 2016), and scrutiny and transparency could be better.
But they also illustrate wider tensions in any procurement process. Industry partners have been held to specifications that are all too often obsolete by the time of delivery. UK jobs can become dependent on complex long-running projects, and optimism bias can stymie effective planning.
But there are ongoing attempts to learn lessons from these experiences. The (February 2024) Integrated Procurement Model set out under the last government details some clear approaches.
These include focusing on ‘spiral’ procurement – where teams aim to reach a minimum viable product with industry partners quickly, and then test and learn over time, rather than relying on expensive, detailed specifications that can take years to deliver and cannot easily be adapted to changing needs.
The challenge for the review team will be to avoid simply re-diagnosing the problems in UK defence or restating the same recommendations. Finding creative, effective and cost-effective solutions that will be resilient in the long-run should be the focus of the SDR.
An effective process
In reviews of this nature, the heads of the different services tend to advocate for their own force. This can turn the process into a ‘spread-the-love’ exercise which avoids real joined-up choices.
These internal arguments can be driven by narratives about the type of military power the UK ‘should’ be, with attendant pressures about sunk costs and commitments already made, rather than a genuine assessment of the threats and risks the UK faces.
The decision to appoint three external reviewers indicates the hope that they can better assess these demands. George Robertson, who leads the team, was the originator of the modern strategic defence reviews in 1997-98 and will be wise to all these pressures.
But perhaps the most important thing that this SDR could achieve is to find a way to future-proof defence spending by building adaptability and resilience into strategic decisions.
For example, harnessing the new spiral procurement approach by investing in interoperable, multi-purpose adaptable platforms and increasing the investment in cheaper drones to operate in all domains.
Taking tough decisions not to further sink costs in equipment that might well be obsolete by the date of deployment will take courageous decision-making. And debates about where to continue spending on existing programmes remain difficult, as recent media and political arguments about whether the review will jeopardize the Global Combat Air Programme, or force choices between it and AUKUS show.
