Migrant smuggling revenues influence conflict dynamics in southern Libya
Just as conflict dynamics in Libya had a profound impact on the migration boom in Agadez, the revenues generated by migrant smuggling influenced conflict dynamics along the Libya–Niger border and in southern Libya. Prior to the 2010s, levels of conflict in the migration economy in Niger and Libya were particularly low, as the industry was marked by fairly high levels of organization and state complicity on both sides of the border. Competition over key transit hubs and routes was minimal. After the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, however, criminal networks that smuggled people to Europe via maritime routes proliferated in Libya. As a result, the migration economy and associated profits in both Libya and Niger grew dramatically. This in turn created greater competition among various actors based in southern Libya, most notably armed groups associated with various Tebu, Tuareg and Arab communities.
When migrant smuggling linking Agadez to Libya reached its apex in the years spanning 2014 to 2016, competition between Tebu and Tuareg or Arab networks increased considerably. During this period, Tebu from outside the city of Agadez, often referred to as ‘Chadians’ or ‘Libyans’ by local non-Tebu, became increasingly visible in Agadez, where most of the population are ethnic Tuareg and Hausa. Conspicuous displays of newfound wealth by Tebu individuals and their more prominent presence in the city, for example, were a source of animosity for communities who considered them foreigners.
Crucially, the revenues generated by Tebu smuggling networks operating in Agadez translated into greater economic, political and military power in southern Libya, where violent confrontations among rival ethnic-based militias were widespread as they vied for control over various transportation routes and associated licit and illicit economic activities.
Local and international interventions to control migration
From the late 1990s onwards, irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa became an increasingly salient political issue in Europe. The EU and individual member states first began partnering with Sahelian states on issues of migration in the early and mid-2000s. The expansion of the US-led War on Terror into Africa in the 2000s, combined with concerns over the potential for ‘mass migration’ from Africa to Europe in the mid to late 2000s, pushed the Sahel higher up the EU agenda and caused a shift in EU and EU member state engagement in the region. Increasingly, the issue of migration was reframed within the context of national and international security policy.
The clearest expression of this conceptual shift came in September 2011, with the publication of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. Focusing on Mauritania, Mali and Niger, the document asserts that ‘security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated’ and calls for more robust EU engagement in tackling nascent security challenges in the region to facilitate longer term outcomes such as economic growth, poverty reduction and the development of state capacity.
The 2012 conflict in neighbouring Mali, combined with the surge of migrants transiting through the Sahel to North Africa, further entrenched the prevailing security-development paradigm that informed EU policy towards Niger.
The 2012 conflict in neighbouring Mali, combined with the surge of migrants transiting through the Sahel to North Africa, further entrenched the prevailing security-development paradigm that informed EU policy towards Niger. By some estimates, three-quarters of all migrants arriving in Italy transited through Agadez in the years that followed. Without a viable partner in Libya to prevent boat departures from the Mediterranean coast, European policymakers sought to stop the movement of people further down the supply chain and turned to the government of Niger. Under the presidency of Mahamadou Issoufou, Niger had proved a willing partner on matters of counterterrorism, notably with France and the US, and represented a relative pillar of stability in a region beset with political crises and insurgencies.
While much of the narrative surrounding ‘irregular migration’ and ‘criminal networks’ at this time was heavily shaped by European priorities, Issoufou did face some domestic pressure to better control the movement of Nigerien women and children. After a 2013 tragedy in which the bodies of 92 Nigerien migrants were found near the Algerian border, for example, senior ministers in the Nigerien government called for action against the ‘tragedy of clandestine migration’ that was ‘driven by networks of traffickers of all kinds’. The government responded by making several arrests and temporarily closing a number of migrant ghettos in Agadez, although these actions were not sustained and Agadez continued to grow as a hub of migrant smuggling activity.
In 2012, the EU launched a capacity-building mission called EUCAP Sahel, which initially focused on strengthening Niger’s ability to combat terrorism. However, the mandate was later expanded in 2015 to include surveillance and border control, with a permanent presence in Agadez starting in 2016. EU documents state that the mission was conceived as an effort to better control and fight irregular migration and associated criminal activity in partnership with the central and local authorities in Niger, as well as with Nigerien security forces.
Amid an increase in migrants reaching European shores via North Africa, the EU announced the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in 2015, in which Niger featured heavily. Of the €2.2 billion allocated to the Sahel and Lake Chad region, Niger has received €294 million as of December 2022, making it the largest recipient within the region. The EU also launched the Partnership Framework with Third Countries, which conditioned aid and the prospect of trade deals for transit states like Niger in exchange for cooperation with the EU on reducing migration. The same programme also references the possibility of penalties for those that do not cooperate in curbing irregular migration.
All told, Agadez – a small city of roughly 120,000 people, separated from North Africa by the Sahara Desert and situated roughly 1,800 km from the Mediterranean coast – came to be seen by EU policymakers as a ‘perfect target’ for policies that aimed to reduce migration to Europe by implementing controls in transit states.
Law 2015-36
A pivotal moment for the migration economy in Agadez came in May 2015, when the government of Niger, in consultation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and with technical and financial support from the EU and individual EU member states, passed Law 2015-36. The legislation outlines clear consequences for those engaged in human trafficking, with punishments of up to 10 years and fines of up to 5 million CFA (€7,600) for ‘any person who intentionally and for the purpose of deriving, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, procures the unlawful entry into or exit from Niger of any person who is not a national or permanent resident of Niger’.
The circumstances under which Law 2015-36 was passed and its actual content were highly controversial, both domestically as well as within humanitarian circles. Critics warned of the economic repercussions of restricting irregular migration and argued that the law effectively criminalized providing transportation or accommodation to foreign nationals anywhere north of Agadez, in contravention of the rights of ECOWAS citizens. Another likely impact, critics noted, was that the law would push migrants – even those who were in Niger legally – to take more dangerous, circuitous paths through the desert to avoid detection by the Nigerien authorities. Commentators also warned that the economic fallout could destabilize northern Niger’s tenuous security equilibrium.
In 2016, under considerable pressure from European leaders, the Nigerien authorities carried out mass arrests in Agadez, arresting over 100 people and confiscating hundreds of vehicles. Following the mass detentions and confiscation of vehicles, the number of migrant departures from Agadez plummeted. With long-established methods of migration through Agadez no longer feasible, actors involved in migrant smuggling either chose to leave the sector altogether or change their tactics. As could have been expected, much of the sector was driven underground, with smugglers now operating in a more clandestine manner as new patterns of mobility and methods of transport have emerged, many of which circumnavigate Agadez.
