As Troika members, the UAE and Azerbaijan will share in the responsibility for COP30 in Brazil. That summit, which will mark a decade since the Paris Agreement was struck in 2015, will be an acid test for whether the Paris process can guide humanity back from the brink of climate catastrophe. All this at a time when Earth systems are in crisis and the global financial architecture is creaking under the strain of 21st-century challenges. Collectively, the Troika members also produce more oil than any single country other than the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia, meaning the incentives for the Troika to phase out fossil fuels are uncertain to say the least. At the ‘halfway to COP’ Bonn intersessional meetings in June 2024, which served both to help implementation of ongoing UNFCCC work and to prepare for the next COP, the Troika could charitably have been described as underactive.
Azerbaijan – a safe pair of hands?
President Ilham Aliyev is conscious that COP29 will put the global spotlight on Azerbaijan. The inadequate state of global climate action – as evidenced by the ‘report card’ from the first ‘Global Stocktake’, delivered ahead of COP28 in 2023 – presents Aliyev with an opportunity to demonstrate that Azerbaijan is a safe pair of hands for challenges of a global scale. Aliyev consciously broadcasts competency and strategic forward planning at every turn. At the ADA University conference on ‘COP29 and Green Vision for Azerbaijan’ held in Baku in April 2024, he said: ‘We are just building success after success. … All is based on thoughtful policy, on strategy, on proper tactics.’ He is likely to want to be seen to bring these qualities to Azerbaijan’s claims of climate leadership.
Yet the COP presidency, despite its hugely influential role, is not the only cog in the UNFCCC machine. Azerbaijan is working closely with the UNFCCC secretariat, and relying on the surrounding expert community to guide and support the conference to a successful conclusion. A huge mobilization of human, financial and diplomatic capital is under way in the country. Yet if Azerbaijan fails to provide adequate leadership, the UNFCCC must and will quietly muster parties to take up the slack. This would be an embarrassment for the Azerbaijani government, however.
Given Azerbaijan’s active pursuit of multiple climate and environmental leadership roles, a poor COP29 outcome could invite allegations of, at best, greenwashing. At worst, it could bring accusations of a dereliction of duty. The climate crisis persists regardless of qualifiers about the COP host’s lack of time, the complexities of transition, or the difficulties of reaching consensus. If COP29’s outcome is weak, climate-vulnerable countries and international civil society will be vocal in their criticisms, as will higher-ambition developed-country parties. Recriminations towards Azerbaijan would likely damage its international reputation and undermine goodwill towards its government, as opposed to strengthening or resetting the country’s international relations as the leadership might hope in the event that COP29 is perceived as successful.
Climate finance – the critical task for COP29
COP29’s specific objectives are drawn from the Paris Agreement and informed by progress (or the lack thereof) in the negotiations to date. The biggest ticket on the agenda in 2024 is climate finance. At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries committed to a collective goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020 to fund climate action in developing countries. At COP21 in Paris in 2015, the period of annual payments was set at 2020–25. Before the current goal expires in 2025, parties must agree a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance. Agreement of the NCQG is the most important task for COP29. To make a success of the summit, Azerbaijan must lead countries to a decisive outcome on the NCQG that is fit to enable achievement of the Paris Agreement goals.
The previous $100 billion goal was widely criticized both because the sum was far too small in relation to the scale of the need, and because the inadequate finance that was pledged was repeatedly delayed. The NCQG is critical to progress on the climate crisis, as its scale and function will underpin the level of ambition in climate plans – the so-called ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs) – from countries that lack the finance to make ambitious commitments alone, and that often suffer the heaviest climate impacts.
The NCQG also offers a political opportunity to repair the trust undermined by developed countries’ repeated failures to meet the previous $100 billion target. The international financial system also needs reform if it is to support rather than impede countries’ transitions to low-carbon energy systems. Technical and ministerial dialogues on the NCQG have been running since 2022, covering who should contribute and mobilize the new finance, who should access it and how, and for what ends. Final decisions and an agreement on the goal – including an overall target amount of financing – will need to be made at COP29, guided and presided over by Azerbaijan. Finance has long been one of the thorniest issues in the climate negotiations, beset by hollow promises and unmonitorable initiatives. Strong, concerted, constructive leadership on finance will be needed if COP29 is to result in an ambitious yet feasible NCQG (see Box 2).
