The impacts of insularity
For any COP president-designate, the limited time available for preparation ahead of the conference is challenging – both in terms of logistics and for ensuring local officials have the skills and background knowledge to manage the negotiations. In Azerbaijan’s specific case, however, a combination of an abbreviated lead-in period, years of official reticence to engage with climate change, and tight government controls on civil society and academia has left the country with a paucity of skills and expertise in climate change, climate finance and negotiation. While the government has been working hard in recent months to develop its capacity in some of these areas, the crucial capacity and expertise that Azerbaijani civil society might have offered ahead of COP29 have been suppressed. The government has heavily restricted freedom of association, and the list of political prisoners has continued to grow.
Azerbaijani NGOs and CSOs face barriers at the point of set-up. There are constraints on who may establish such organizations, and registration procedures are burdensome. The Ministry of Justice has powers to supervise, inspect and dissolve NGOs. A broad interpretation of legal instruments is often used against NGOs, including to hinder freedom of expression. Financial barriers to operation include limited access to funding, and restrictions on who can donate to NGOs. The government, which believes that civil society should serve state interests, is sceptical of foreign funding, claiming that this is a threat to national security and the national interest. Barriers to freedom of assembly include requirements for advance notification of gatherings, restrictions on who can organize and assemble (and in what location), and ‘excessive criminal penalties’ for arranging gatherings deemed by the authorities to have breached regulations.
During a visit to Berlin in April 2024, President Aliyev dismissed criticisms of Azerbaijan for jailing journalists. Addressing questions from the audience in a press conference with the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, Aliyev said the government was not censoring media and that recent investigations were simply within the scope of Azerbaijan’s laws. The president added that the country ‘must protect’ its media ‘from external negative influences’. But to many observers, Aliyev’s remarks will simply have confirmed the repressive impulses that seem to motivate Azerbaijan’s political leadership.
From nationalism to flawed elections – many levers for perpetuating rule
Azerbaijan’s leadership has said for decades that politics could not be reformed while the conflict over Mountainous Karabakh continued. In September 2023, Azerbaijan took control of the territory, following a 24-hour blitzkrieg military operation. On 7 December 2023, the same day on which Armenia announced it would back Azerbaijan’s hosting of COP29, President Aliyev called a snap presidential election for 7 February 2024; this vote resulted in his re-election and the extension of his presidency for another seven years. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said the election itself ‘took place in a restrictive environment’, ‘was devoid of genuine pluralism’, and was compromised by the country’s ‘shrinking space for independent media, civil society, and political parties’.
In light of the government’s rhetoric presenting the conflict with Armenia as the obstacle to political pluralism in Azerbaijan, the resolution of the conflict over Mountainous Karabakh raised hopes among some in Azerbaijan that greater political openness could now come. Instead, since the military victory over Armenia, and in the lead-up to COP29, Azerbaijan’s leadership has been cracking down even further on political dissent, restricting the activities of opposition parties, limiting free speech and tightening control over the media.
In the lead-up to COP29, Azerbaijan’s leadership has been cracking down even further on political dissent, restricting the activities of opposition parties, limiting free speech and tightening control over the media.
Throughout Aliyev’s 21 years in power, the Azerbaijani government has silenced independent voices, including through restrictive legislation, physical intimidation, arrests and blackmail. According to the remaining human rights monitors in the country, more than 300 political prisoners are behind bars. Among them are journalists, academics, civic and political activists, and human rights defenders. The run-up to the 2024 presidential election saw renewed crackdowns targeting independent and opposition media outlets.
These trends have understandably raised concerns about political repression associated with the forthcoming COP29 summit. On 20 February 2024, a group of Azerbaijani NGOs published a manifesto establishing the ‘COP29 – Climate of Justice Initiative’ with a vision to ‘promote civil liberties, public participation, and environmental justice in Azerbaijan’. The document detailed obstacles to genuine climate action and civil society participation in Azerbaijan, and called for government action to address political incarceration, remove restrictions on freedom of association and movement, combat corruption and end violence against women. The initiative also called for a roadmap for Paris-compliant action up to 2030; measures to reduce pollution (including in oil-contaminated areas); and free, fair and efficient use of water resources.
In April, Anar Mammadli of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre, one of the initiative’s co-founders, was arrested on what Amnesty International described as ‘bogus’ and ‘fabricated’ charges of conspiracy to commit smuggling. Mammadli is far from alone. Since the beginning of Aliyev’s most recent presidential term, scores of civic activists, rights defenders and journalists have been placed behind bars on charges ranging from smuggling to hooliganism, drug possession, extortion and fraud. Many more have been questioned, and some have been subjected to long ‘exposés’ published in pro-government media outlets accusing them of spreading anti-government narratives and spying for foreign governments.
Amid a wave of pre-COP crackdowns in which journalists and environmental and peace activists have been imprisoned, the Azerbaijani authorities launched a ‘COP29 NGO Coalition’ in July 2024. This coalition consists mainly of foreign NGOs, yet excludes most major international environmental groups. A ‘grant competition’ for joint initiatives between foreign and local NGOs was also announced, with the support of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Together, the purported aim of these initiatives is to offer ‘a clear demonstration of how Azerbaijan is sensitive and caring towards the concept of inclusivity’. Yet given the lack of transparency around who can be included in such initiatives, the detention of prominent Azerbaijani environmental activists, and the oppressive environment in which those who remain free must operate, the prospects for meaningful engagement between Azerbaijani civil society and the state, or even between Azerbaijani civil society and international stakeholders, look poor.
Token inclusivity?
The principle of ‘inclusivity’ in climate action features prominently in international policymaking. This reflects a consensus on the importance of recognizing and addressing the disproportionate burdens that climate change and the energy transition place, or are likely to place, on under-represented, deprived or excluded groups in society. It also reflects a consensus on the consequent importance of engaging marginalized groups in the development of climate and clean-energy solutions.
The international community has already made clear that it intends to scrutinize the extent to which COP29 is genuinely inclusive, and the Azerbaijani government has shown signs that, in certain cases, it is willing to respond when pressure is applied. For example, when Azerbaijan announced a 12-strong COP29 organizing committee that was entirely male, an outcry ensued. Representation of women has been shown to correlate with more ambitious environmental decision-making, and Baku evidently heard concerns that the initial absence of women on its organizing committee was a threat to the COP’s success. The committee was subsequently expanded twice ‘to ensure inclusiveness’, and by May 2024 it consisted of 24 women and 31 men. Nigar Arpadarai, a non-aligned member of parliament, was appointed as an official ‘COP29 High-Level Champion’, a role established at COP21 in Paris, in 2015, to advance dialogue between government and non-government COP participants. Arpadarai was joined on the COP presidency team by two more women: Narmin Jarchalova, a former member of Azerbaijan’s presidential administration, who was appointed chief operating officer for COP29; and Leyla Hasanova, chair of the Non-Aligned Movement Youth Organization, who was appointed Youth Climate Champion.
Eco-protesters vs ‘eco-activists’
The constricted and selective operating space for environmentalism in Azerbaijan should be seen in the context of previous government crackdowns on, and endorsements of, eco-activism. During the summer of 2023, Azerbaijani authorities called in riot police to disperse village residents in Söyüdlü; the villagers were protesting about waste from a nearby gold mine being dumped into a lake. Violent arrests by riot police ensued, with the use of rubber bullets, tear gas and physical force. Those arrested included journalists, politicians and village residents.
This forceful response contrasts starkly with the government’s treatment of other ‘eco-activists’ when this suits political priorities. Also in 2023, the Lachin Corridor was blocked in apparent protest at the environmental impacts of ore mining operations; yet the protest continued long after mining operations in the area had ceased. The one-way blockade of this sole route connecting Mountainous Karabakh to Armenia left the Armenian population of the contested region with limited access to healthcare and on the brink of starvation. President Aliyev praised these ‘eco-activists’, yet the government alleged that the Söyüdlü village residents protesting against pollution of their lake were acting on the orders of provocateurs. Following the Söyüdlü village protests, the government launched a further crackdown against investigative journalism platform Abzas Media, online media outlet Toplum TV, individual journalists, civic groups and political activists.
Prospects and tests
It is hard to take Azerbaijani promises of climate leadership at face value when many in civil society and academia consider the energy transition too ‘political’ to speak about, while others who have spoken out remain behind bars. The correlation between political openness and effective climate action is not necessarily a straightforward one – democratic states have themselves miserably failed to address climate change adequately, while the experience of authoritarian states in responding to environmental challenges is arguably mixed (see Box 10). It is nonetheless reasonable to argue that more transparent internal debate of Azerbaijan’s climate and energy transition challenges would be beneficial. Azerbaijani environmental activism will not thrive, or provide the momentum and challenge to official policy that might aid ambitious and inclusive climate action, while oppression of civil society remains pervasive. If Azerbaijan wishes to be seen as serious about climate leadership, it should begin by lifting government-imposed repression of civil society as a whole, and of CSO-led environmentalism in particular.
The government’s holding of an ‘inaugural’ Baku Climate Action Week from 30 September to 4 October 2024 provided a first test of the government’s willingness to open its streets and ears to civil society. Beyond official announcements, it is difficult to get insights into the inclusivity and openness of the event, which was held in partnership with London Climate Action Week, a thriving hub of civil society and open, challenging debate about climate action. Meaningful Azerbaijani civil society participation in future gatherings would require the government to be open to criticism, even though, according to one academic: ‘It is harder to have conversations about weaknesses here, and climate change is the ultimate threat that no one is on top of, which makes it a less attractive conversation for rhetoric.’ Such events also require believable protections for civil society actors, to assure them that if the government doesn’t like what they have to say, they won’t be silenced behind prison cell doors.
By hosting COP29, the government of Azerbaijan wants to ‘improve its reputation on the world stage’ and rebrand itself just as it has done in the past when hosting other, less political international events such as the European Games, the Eurovision Song Contest, Formula 1 motor racing and the Islamic Solidarity Games. COP29 also provides an opportunity for foreign-based rights watchdogs and climate organizations to highlight the country’s egregious human rights and freedoms record, as they have done during other international events hosted by Azerbaijan. Although the situation on the ground is oppressive, there are opportunities for international civil society to work with exiled Azerbaijani media and civic groups, which remain committed to holding the leadership in Azerbaijan to account.
If President Aliyev continues to shrug off international criticism, the need for international civil society groups and the UN to cite evidence that Azerbaijan’s civic space has virtually disappeared will be all the greater. If the UNFCCC model of a rotating COP presidency is to add value to, rather than detract from, the multilateral process, then drawing attention to problematic aspects of a host’s governance, particularly towards vital constituencies such as civil society, will need to be much more of a priority for external observers and the UN. External critical scrutiny during events such as COP29, while no substitute for domestic activism and a vibrant civil society, is all the more valuable when, as in Azerbaijan’s case, the governance environment makes it so difficult for CSOs and NGOs on the ground.
