Once the war stops or ends, Ukraine must ensure that it does not lose the peace. The danger is that a combination of war fatigue and a process of political renewal in challenging economic conditions will lead to a slowdown of reform efforts and a gradual reduction of focus and support on the part of key Western allies committed to Ukraine’s rapid integration with Europe and adaptation to EU standards. Deviation from this ambitious path of modernization would have serious consequences for Ukraine’s relations with its Western partners and their support. By extension, it would risk creating a very serious long-term security problem in the heart of Europe.
Regardless of the outcome of the war, Ukraine’s allies need to prepare themselves for the fact that much of Ukrainian society is traumatized by Russia’s invasion. Whether it is families who have lost sons and daughters, young people who have lost limbs, or children who have lost parents, politics will carry anger, grievance and a desire to bring about radical change to make life better. The longer the war continues, the deeper the trauma and the greater its consequences.
British history has some important lessons. The landslide victory of the Labour Party in Britain in 1945, which led to the creation of the welfare state and nationalization of one-fifth of the economy, is a reminder of how war can trigger rapid and far-reaching social and political change. The Second World War had taken a huge toll on the economy leaving it nearly bankrupt and heavily dependent on the US for financial support. There was also a critical shortage of housing and key personnel as well as widespread social problems related to the war, manifested by high levels of divorce and crime, including domestic violence and drug use. Some of these challenges will inevitably confront Ukraine.
There is widespread fear in Ukrainian society about the stability of the country’s institutions when the war pauses or ends. Although Ukraine has an impressive history of non-violent political protest in recent times, levels of public anger and pain will be particularly high. Similarly, resentment at the failure of Western countries to support Ukraine more effectively in its hour of need is likely to come to the surface quickly and may drive opposition to the type of reforms required for EU accession that are already underway.
The EU will need to treat Ukraine with a combination of patience, generosity and toughness, but, above all, with sensitivity. To maintain elite and popular support for the reforms required, the country will need to believe that membership is achievable and that the further sacrifices required will be quickly rewarded. It is not hard to see how constituencies whose interests are threatened by reform will raise the question of why Ukraine fought a war for independence only, in their view, to end up with external governance from Brussels.
If US neo-isolationist trends accelerate and undermine the credibility of NATO, Ukrainians’ belief in the value of their country joining the Western community of nations will suffer and they may feel disproportionality reliant on those European countries that have shown the greatest commitment to defending them and are in no hurry to rebuild relations with Moscow.
A key stabilizing factor will be civil society and its ability to continue to plug the gaps of the state whether in the delivery of services or the development of reforms. No other post-Soviet country has Ukraine’s level of social organization. However, it is important to recognize that civil society itself has also been diminished and damaged by the war. It will bear divisions visible elsewhere among Ukrainians, between those who stayed in the country and those who did not. There will also be strained relations among those who have experienced different levels of fighting intensity during the war.
Restarting the economy and attracting investment from home and abroad will also be essential for ensuring social stability. Welfare expenditure will be high because of the cost of caring for those victims of the war who are no longer able to work. The development of the defence industry during the war and the proven ability of Ukrainian engineers to innovate at speed suggest that the defence sector could become an important area of growth for the economy.
The capacity constraints already clearly visible in government and business are likely to be the biggest challenge facing Ukraine’s recovery. Creating an environment to which refugees feel safe to return and where investors have confidence to put their money are the pre-conditions for tackling this problem.
To address their collective trauma and seek ways to overcome it, Ukrainians will need to feel that their sacrifices were not in vain. For this reason, improving the country’s governance at all levels will be a key priority, including reform of the judicial system so that the population feel able to assert their rights and are no longer at the mercy of the arbitrary behaviour of Ukrainian state agencies.
Understanding the psychological impact of the war on the Ukrainian population and offering ways to alleviate this trauma should be a priority task for Ukraine’s international partners. The horrors experienced by the citizens of Mariupol, Bucha, Irpin, Kharkiv, Kherson and other cities and towns exposed to high levels of Russian violence are just a small indication of the suffering experienced by Ukrainians. The Prosecutor’s Office estimates that close to 90 per cent of Ukrainian prisoners of war have been subjected to torture, rape, threats of sexual violence and other forms of cruelty.
Public fury with Russians who supported the war and a collective desire for justice will be a dominant feature of Ukrainian politics in the years to come. This anger will complicate any effort to find a settlement to the war short of Russia’s defeat and its political and military leadership facing trial for their crimes.
To embrace the opportunities of the future, Ukrainians must feel that recovery is possible, that exhaustion will pass and that trauma will gradually subside.
