For Ukraine, there are five key variables that will determine the nature of any peace arrangement.
- How much territory it will control;
- The extent of economic damage;
- The level of population loss;
- The level of security it can maintain; and
- The level of investment it must make in its defence to deter further aggression.
At present, it is too early to say whether Western countries will eventually agree to underwrite Ukraine’s security. For now, neither NATO nor the EU has a definition of victory or a long-term view of how to provide for Ukraine’s security.
All five variables apply to the possible outcomes of the war.
‘Long war’
The ‘long war’ scenario would require Ukraine to continue fighting with limited resources while trying to rebuild damaged infrastructure and sustain the economy and social welfare system. Lifting martial law would not be possible in these conditions unless the fighting became less intense over a long period, influenced perhaps by internal events in Russia, or Moscow committing forces to another theatre as it did in Syria in 2015, a move that appeared to distract Putin from immediate further intervention in Ukraine. ‘Long war’ would condemn Ukraine to further destruction of its economic, human and social capital, further limit possibilities for economic growth and slow down the reforms needed for EU accession.
A combination of society’s exhaustion, its growing impoverishment and tensions between the civilian and military authorities over resource choices – amid fraying relations with Western partners because of their limited support – could create a dangerous political cocktail. Some Ukrainian commentators fear that this situation could lead to anarchy and civil war as experienced previously in Ukrainian history. However, this dark scenario is unlikely since such a large majority of Ukrainians holds Russia responsible for the war and to date this unity in society has defied Russian efforts to destabilize it from within.
Ukraine’s Western allies would succeed in preserving a consensus to continue providing military and economic assistance to Ukraine, but the overall levels of support would gradually decline because of other spending pressures. Proportionally, US support would be reduced while Europe’s would increase.
‘Frozen conflict’
Faced with the choice between a ceasefire that might give a few years’ respite and a continued war of attrition, many Ukrainians might understandably opt for the former if they believed that Western support was waning and no immediate progress on the battlefield was possible.
After all, the Minsk Agreements, even if they did not stop the fighting in Donbas, bought time for Ukraine to introduce key reforms that strengthened state institutions, including the armed forces and security services, and helped create resilience capacity at the regional and local levels. It is widely believed in Ukrainian policy circles that without the decentralization reform that began in 2015, which devoted significant decision-making power to the local level, Ukraine would not have been able to withstand the full-scale Russian invasion.
It is widely believed in Ukrainian policy circles that without the decentralization reform that began in 2015, Ukraine would not have been able to withstand the full-scale Russian invasion.
If Putin genuinely intended to restart negotiations, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s challenge would be to sell a ceasefire domestically. He would need to explain to the country why the price of a pause in hostilities would outweigh the costs of continuing to fight with dwindling supplies of weapons and growing uncertainty about the true intentions of Western allies. The price to be paid would likely be the acceptance of the front line at the time and the need to abandon in the short to medium term any prospect of regaining territory ceded after the start of the full-scale invasion.
Such a move would spark accusations of defeatism in the army, the security services and large sections of society. This would be advantageous to Moscow because it would severely weaken Zelenskyy’s legitimacy and divide the public. It would bring out into the open frustration with the decisions that led to heavy military losses, including the defence of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Divisions on the issue would extend to Ukraine’s allies. Complaints in Kyiv that some Western countries forced Ukraine to the negotiating table would increase tensions within NATO and spark concerns about the capability of the alliance to provide credible defence of the Baltic states and other parts of Central Europe.
The acceptance of a ceasefire deal would have significant implications for the presidential and parliamentary elections that would follow the lifting of martial law, assuming the ceasefire held.
If Zelenskyy were to seek re-election, he would face severe examination of why the country was poorly prepared for the invasion, why Mariupol, for example, was not evacuated and why Russian forces were able to seize large swathes of Kherson region at the outset of the full-scale war. It would not be hard to foresee public anger leading to criminal investigations of those civilian and military leaders responsible for the country’s defence, including potentially even Zelenskyy himself.
Perceptions of defeat would demoralize the army, demotivate society and spark accusations of the West’s betrayal of Ukraine that Russian propaganda would amplify. Admittedly, Zelenskyy and his generals could argue with justification that Western allies failed to provide the weapons that Ukraine needed when it needed them, and that the Russian Army was able to build battlefield defences that even well-trained and -equipped Western armies would have struggled to overcome. Such fair explanations would probably count for little in an atmosphere of vicious recrimination that would bring new political players to the fore.
The ‘frozen conflict’ scenario would undoubtedly raise serious questions in Ukrainian society about Western allies’ commitment to continue supporting Ukraine, and the sincerity of the EU’s invitation to Ukraine to join the organization. Perceptions of defeat would also bring a widespread sense of disillusionment with the country’s prospects and provoke further emigration. Not only would Zelenskyy’s personal ratings suffer greatly as noted above, his Servant of the People Party would cease to exist as a political force.
It would be hard to imagine that Putin would not use a pause in the fighting to try to rebuild the Russian Army, which has suffered such serious losses of equipment and personnel in Ukraine, while also seeking sanctions relief. The issues of sanctions, reparations and war crimes could become contentious in Ukraine, if Western allies were to attempt to soft pedal them to improve relations with Moscow.
Defence spending would need to remain high to prepare the country for the likely resumption of hostilities and could lead to disagreements with Western partners anxious that Ukraine might inadvertently provoke further conflict with Russia.
The Western partners would be split on how to manage relations with Russia. Some would advocate continuation of containment polices, while others would want to de-escalate tensions and try to restart relations.
‘Victory for Ukraine’
While Zelenskyy and his team would be crowned as heroes abroad, ‘victory’ would not guarantee Zelenskyy’s re-election if society felt that consolidation of peace required a different type of leader. Zelenskyy is reportedly worried that he could repeat the fate of Winston Churchill as an inspirational wartime leader who saved the country but lost the election that followed.
Inflicting defeat on the Russian Army would give Ukrainians a massive confidence boost and encourage the return of refugees and greatly increase the likelihood that Ukraine would receive credible security guarantees from its Western partners. The reopening of Black Sea ports would restore the country’s export potential and help encourage investment in reconstruction.
‘Victory’ on the battlefield would by no means guarantee progress on dismantling systema. On the contrary, it might lead to a consolidation of the established model of governance but with a new group of economic players dictating the rules. However, the EU accession process would be a highly effective instrument for countering such efforts and breaking the grip of big business on politics and the government system.
Managing territories that had been occupied for a long period would be a particularly challenging task in terms of persuading refugees to return and removing collaborators from local administrations.
‘Victory’ would restore the confidence of Western countries in their ability to face down threats from authoritarian states to their values and institutions, even if the price had been paid with Ukrainian blood.
‘Defeat for Ukraine’
‘Defeat’ would have devastating consequences for Ukraine’s viability as an independent state and could lead to the country fracturing, driven in part by the movement of economically active people from occupied territories to safety in the west of the country or abroad. Unless Ukraine could reconquer these territories in a relatively short space of time, the displacement of this section of society would risk becoming permanent.
A collapse of the armed forces would contribute to an overall weakening of central authority and increase the risk of the deeply feared outcome of anarchy. ‘Defeat’ would encourage the development of small-scale insurgencies against Russian rule and the use of violence against Ukrainian leaders ready to collaborate with Moscow along the lines already seen in the territories occupied by Russia since 2014. At the
same time, there would be a risk of large numbers of Ukrainians swelling the ranks
of the Russian Army either because they would be forced to join up by the occupation
authorities, or because they would choose to serve voluntarily on account of their
dire economic situation. De-population, the breakdown of public services in some cities and the paralysis of the economy would create a highly volatile situation that might draw in some neighbouring countries to protect their borders and prevent the overspill of violence.
The moral authority of the US and its allies would be in tatters as countries in other parts of the world reflected on the meaning of assurances by G7 member states to support a country in distress ‘for as long as it takes’. NATO’s cohesion would also be severely tested with Central European member states confronted by a marked deterioration of their security situation and uncertain of US commitment to mutual defence.