Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.
US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.
However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages.
But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.
Hamas’s ability to fight
At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.
But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.
Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.
The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility.
On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.
Reconciliation
Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’
But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.
Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar.
They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.
Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.
In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.
International efforts
That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.
The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.
