Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Donald Trump’s first administration was the president’s personal summitry with North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un.
Trump’s unpredictable leadership style means that another such meeting cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, substantial outcomes, such as nuclear concessions from Pyongyang, look to be unlikely.
Over the past four years, North Korea’s appetite for talks with the US and South Korea has waned considerably.
Instead, it has accelerated its nuclear and missile development and abandoned its long-standing commitment towards reunification with the South. In January this year, Kim Jong Un designated South Korea as the North’s ‘primary foe’.
Pyongyang has also undertaken a significant rapprochement with Moscow. North Korea is now an active participant in the war in Ukraine, having deployed over 11,000 troops to assist Putin’s war effort. More troops could yet be sent.
Even if Trump is successful in his ambition to quickly end the war, the revived relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang is likely to endure, irrespective of Russia’s need for North Korean artillery, missiles, and troops.
Trump and Kim 2.0: deterring adversaries
Kim’s government now views its nuclear programme as non-negotiable, irrespective of who is sitting in the Oval Office.
Although the regime is yet to react to Trump’s election, state media did anticipate the outcome several months beforehand. In response to Trump’s claim, in July, that he would invite Kim Jong Un to a ‘baseball game’, North Korean news stressed that for all Trump’s personal ties with Kim during his first presidential term, Trump ‘did not bring about any substantial positive change’ in relations.
Indeed, not unlike past US administrations, the first Trump administration was unsuccessful in achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programmes.
Whilst the second Trump administration is likely to continue pursuing this long-standing US policy, the likelihood of North Korea providing any nuclear concession has only lowered (and was never high in the first instance). Pyongyang’s negotiating strategy has been consistent: reap maximum rewards in return for minimal concessions.
The Yongbyon nuclear facility, long a central focus point for negotiations, was closed in December 2018 after several summits involving North Korea that year, including the first summit between Trump and Kim in Singapore in June and three inter-Korean summits in April, May, and September. But operations at Yongbyon restarted in 2021 and crucially, it is now only one of many North Korean nuclear facilities.
The second, inconclusive Trump summit, held in Hanoi in February 2019, catalysed a steep decline in North Korea’s desire for dialogue with the West.
Were Kim Jong Un to provide Trump with any olive branch – and were the president to reciprocate – he would not wish to return empty-handed. The North Korean leader would likely insist on tangible concessions from the US, whether sanctions relief or a suspension in US–South Korea joint military exercises. Furthermore, now – unlike in 2018 – negotiating with Trump will be a far from novel experience for Kim Jong Un.
The importance of reassuring allies
The administration of President Joe Biden neither prioritized nor addressed the North Korean nuclear threat successfully. Yet, it did reassure South Korea and Japan of the US’s security commitments.
In contrast, Trump has repeatedly asserted his disdain for the US–South Korea alliance – on the grounds of financial cost – rightly causing anxiety in Seoul over the stability of the bilateral relationship.
Questions have been raised about the durability of recent agreements, such as the Washington Declaration of April 2023, and the resultant establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group, the latter of which seeks to strengthen US–South Korean extended deterrence, joint military exercises, and contingency planning.
Seoul will also be concerned that Trump might renegotiate the recently concluded Special Measures Agreement – effective from 2026 – in which South Korea agreed to raise its financial share for maintaining the presence of US troops to $1.19 billion in 2026.
These concerns of US retrenchment are occurring at a time when inter-Korean relations are at a nadir. In October, North Korea accused South Korea of flying military drones over its airspace to drop anti-DPRK leaflets.
Shortly afterwards, Pyongyang ordered its border troops to be prepared to fire, and South Korea outlined its readiness to respond. Such developments have furthered existing debates in South Korea about the possibility of developing an independent nuclear deterrent.
Rhetoric versus reality
In analysing the future trajectory of US policy on North Korea, rhetoric must be separated from reality. Trump’s recent appointments to his cabinet indicate a likely hawkish approach towards China, but also an eagerness to distinguish his administration’s foreign policy from that of his predecessor.
For all Trump’s rhetorical contempt for alliances, however, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo face a growing number of common threats, whether from an increasingly aggressive North Korea and China, or the heightened partnership between North Korea and Russia.
Thus, the likelihood of any dramatic deterioration in relations between Washington and Seoul, such as the removal of US troops stationed in South Korea – a prospect that Trump has raised – looks to be small.
It is vital that the US remains vigilant with respect to the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat. Doing so demands maintaining close cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo, not least by continuing defensive bilateral and trilateral military exercises.
