Bashar al-Assad has been here before. The fall of Aleppo last week in many ways resembles similar lightning advances made by rebel forces earlier in Syria’s long civil war. As in eastern Aleppo in 2012, Raqqa in 2013 and Idlib in 2015, Assad’s forces melted away within days.
But something feels different this time. The collapse was both unexpected and unprecedented. Aleppo is a valuable prize, as Syria’s second city and former industrial heartland. Assad was determined to cling onto the western half in 2012, and his troops spent years besieging the east before recapturing it at great cost four years later.
The weakness of Assad’s forces can be partly explained by the absence of Hezbollah, devastated by the recent Lebanon war, and the reduction in Russian fighters, redeployed to Ukraine. Both played a key role recapturing Aleppo. But even without allies the regime was expected to put up more of a fight, not least by the rebel coalition led by Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS).
With Assad’s forces fleeing to Hama, which HTS now has in its sights, what does this mean for Syria? Could Assad’s beleaguered regime be about to fall? And is HTS primed to take over?
Assad on the ropes
After years of international isolation, the signs had been looking better for Assad. The Arab League restored Syria’s suspended membership in 2023. Some European states, notably Italy, resumed ties in the hope that Assad would take back Syrian refugees, possibly in exchange for sanctions relief.
Turkey appeared keen to cut a similar deal – it hosts more than 3 million Syrian refugees. But talks stalled over Assad’s refusal to grant Ankara an extensive buffer zone inside Syria to keep Kurdish militants at bay.
In retrospect, Assad’s position was weaker than assumed. Four years after the last major fighting ended with a Turkish-Russian brokered ceasefire, Syrians under Assad’s control had received no ‘peace dividend’. The regime remained repressive. The economy was crippled by war damage and sanctions. Rampant corruption saw Assad’s cronies, Russia and Iran take what few spoils there were. This left soldiers, especially the many conscripts, demoralized and reluctant to fight. Former rebellious areas may be willing to join the rebellion.
As well as the recent weakening of Russia and Hezbollah, Turkey’s seeming approval of the HTS attack suggests Ankara’s patience with Assad has snapped, a fact supported by simultaneous attacks by Turkey’s own Syrian militia, the Syrian National Army, north and east of Aleppo.
All this could lead to the collapse of Assad’s regime. HTS has recently moved on Hama and from there it could take Homs, which rebelled earlier in the civil war. From there, the road to Damascus would plausibly be open.
However, this would be quite a feat. HTS has an impressive arsenal of homemade drones and other weaponry, but only a limited number of troops – and long supply lines from Idlib. And Iran has already sent Iraqi Shia militia into Syria to aid Assad, while Russia has deployed Africa Corps mercenaries which they will hope will stall or repel further rebel advances.
Alternatively, Assad might be toppled in a coup. But his regime is notoriously ‘coup-proofed’, making it harder for potential conspirators to go undetected. Some have mooted that Russia and/or Iran might seek to replace him to try and shore up their interests. But this carries the danger that disgruntled Assad loyalists would not accept the new figure, weakening the regime further. Assad may be on the ropes, but his removal is far from assured.
HTS on the rise
An alternative scenario is that this assault marks the opening of a prolonged new phase of Syria’s civil war. With help from Iran and Russia, Assad could yet stiffen his forces, reform a frontline with HTS, and stave off aggression from the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
But this would return Syria to its 2011-20 status: a multi-front ‘hot’ war. How sustainable this conflict would be is unclear: Russia and Iran have less capacity to aid Assad than in the 2010s. And HTS have fewer fighters than the rebel groups that previously fought Assad.
Russia, Iran and Turkey all fear that prolonged fighting would lead to more refugee flows and greater regional instability. Turkey would also worry that the SDF could take more territory in the chaos. The odds are therefore against a prolonged new period of fighting.
Most likely is some kind of ceasefire brokered between Russia and Turkey, with Iranian acquiescence. The moribund UN brokered peace process would probably be more likely to achieve a lasting settlement, but there is little evidence that regional or Western governments are sufficiently committed to make it happen, let alone Assad.