The fall of Goma to Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in late January underlines the return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of a model of hybrid cross-border warfare that many hoped had been left in the past.
That it has been resurrected now suggests a rapidly changing geopolitical and security climate in Africa – one that established responses, from traditional peacekeeping to set-piece diplomacy, have proved inadequate to address. This nascent realpolitik is fraught with danger, not just for the DRC civilians caught in the conflict, but for regional and continental stability.
The ongoing crisis in the DRC’s eastern Kivu provinces marks the third time since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003 that a group receiving significant support from Rwanda has seized DRC territory.
The CNDP (2007-09) and the first iteration of the M23 (2012-13) achieved substantial military success against outmatched Congolese forces. But judged on their stated objectives – to protect Congo’s minority Tutsi population, destroy the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (FDLR), and reform DRC governance – they manifestly failed.
Instead, they tore up progress on security-sector reform, peacebuilding, development and investment, and left Congolese Tutsi embattled and isolated. The M23 was defeated by Southern African forces in 2013 after widespread international condemnation led to the removal of Rwandan support. That had seemed to sound the death knell for this blueprint of hybrid insurgency.
A shift in the bedrock of African geopolitics?
It was therefore a surprise to many observers when the same time-worn playbook was dusted off in 2022. The DRC had a relatively new leader in Felix Tshisekedi, who had prioritized normalizing relations with his neighbours. Eastern DRC remained volatile and home to scores of armed groups, but the FDLR (the remnants of the forces that carried out the Rwandan genocide) was by then reduced to a few hundred fighters in remote camps.
There had been no spike in anti-Tutsi attacks or rhetoric. The remnants of the M23 were a handful of men camped high on a volcano close to the tripoint of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, the rest having fled into exile.
It is impossible to be certain of the precise tactical logic behind the relaunch of the M23. But on a strategic level, it perhaps reflects tectonic shifts in the underlying bedrock of African geopolitics.
This could be the opening move in a new regional scramble to secure access to the DRC’s vast economic resources, including minerals that will be increasingly vital to the world economy.
The DRC’s globally important belt of copper and cobalt is firmly linked into a Southern African Development Community (SADC) economic and trading infrastructure via Zambia and Angola. As the world moves into an era of hard-power politics, the gloves may have come off in East Africa’s bid to secure a slice of the pie.
Realpolitik and regional tensions
This may in part explain why the international community has thus far failed to apply the concerted diplomatic pressure that led to a change in Rwanda’s calculations in 2013.
In a complex and increasingly multipolar Africa, Rwanda is seen as one of the few reliable security partners to the West. It is one of the largest contributors to peacekeeping forces, its reputation buttressed by President Kagame’s global profile, and the country’s post-genocide development achievements.
There have been much stronger statements made by the UK, France, China, the US, the G7 and others since the fall of Goma in January 2025, directly demanding the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC. But threatened suspensions of development assistance to Rwanda have yet to materialize.
Nascent regional competition has also been reflected in a muted and incoherent African response to the M23 crisis. Angola has repeatedly tried to mediate between Rwanda and the DRC but the resulting ceasefire agreements have proved toothless.
East Africa, through the East African Community (EAC), sent a short-lived and ineffective military mission and has half-heartedly pushed a parallel negotiating track to that led by Angola, seeking direct talks between the DRC and the M23 itself. SADC belatedly deployed a force to the DRC in December 2023, but it proved insufficient to prevent M23’s advance – despite the loss of 14 South African troops and sharp diplomatic exchanges between Pretoria and Kigali.
A summit in Tanzania on 7–8 February saw EAC and SADC leaders call for a ceasefire and for these twin negotiating tracks to be unified and strengthened. These outcomes have been broadly welcomed across the region, including in the DRC, and both blocs seemed to have backed away from confrontation, at least in the short term. But within this welcome de-escalation, there were few signs of willingness to address the core political dispute driving the conflict.