Israel has consistently pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Russia. Even after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when most Western nations implemented comprehensive sanctions, Israel chose a more calibrated response and maintained working relations with Russia.
The Israeli government argued this position was due to practical security considerations – particularly Russia’s significant military presence in Syria, where Israel regularly conducts operations against Iranian-linked targets – rather than ideological alignment with Moscow.
This measured approach has persisted even though Russian policy towards Israel might have justified a harsher stance. Moscow’s lack of clear condemnation of the 7 October 2023 Hamas terror attacks, its continued engagement with terrorist organizations hostile to Israel – such as Hezbollah and the Houthis – and occasional antisemitic rhetoric from Russian officials have not fundamentally altered Israel’s calculus.
Rather than viewing these as insurmountable obstacles, Israeli policymakers have treated them as manageable irritants within a necessarily complex relationship.
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, this dynamic looks set to evolve further, as both the US and Israel signal an openness to engage with Russia despite significant underlying tensions.
A changing regional landscape
Recent developments suggest Israel is not merely maintaining but potentially strengthening its engagement with Russia. Reports that Israeli officials lobbied Washington to preserve Russian military bases in Syria – ostensibly to counterbalance Turkish influence over the Assad regime – indicate Israel sees value in Russia’s continued regional presence. The dispatch of Netanyahu’s military secretary, Roman Gofman, to Moscow for discussions on this matter underscores the seriousness with which Israel approaches this relationship.
This Israeli position aligns with an apparent shift in Washington’s stance towards Russia under Trump’s leadership. Both countries appear to be calculating that engagement with Moscow could yield strategic benefits, potentially including efforts to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran – a long-standing objective for both Israel and the US.
The Iran factor
The strategy of separating Russia from Iran faces significant historical challenges. In Syria, despite occasional friction between Russian and Iranian forces, their strategic alignment in supporting the Assad regime has remained intact, to the detriment of Israeli policymakers.
Moscow has demonstrated an ability to compartmentalize its relationships, maintaining ties with Israel while simultaneously deepening cooperation with Tehran and its proxies – actors fundamentally hostile to Israeli interests. Russian support for the Houthis in Yemen, who have directly targeted Israel with missiles and drones while disrupting international shipping lanes, exemplifies this contradiction.
The question remains whether Israel will manage to alter this dynamic through strengthened engagement with Russia. Historical evidence suggests limited prospects for success, as Russia has consistently prioritized its strategic partnership with Iran.
Hedging against American withdrawal
Concerns about America’s diminishing regional footprint is perhaps the most significant driver of Israel’s Russia policy. The first Trump administration signalled a clear desire to reduce American commitments in the Middle East, with repeated attempts to withdraw forces from Syria and broader messaging about ending ‘forever wars’.
These tendencies are likely to accelerate during his second term, with senior administration officials already signalling support for significant force reductions across the region.
This prospective American retrenchment creates profound strategic challenges for Israel. US forces in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere have served as critical counterweights to Iranian expansion and provided important intelligence capabilities. Their reduction or withdrawal would create security vacuums that Iran and its proxies will undoubtedly seek to fill, potentially increasing threats to Israel’s northern border and broader regional interests.
In this context, Russia emerges as one of the few external powers with both the capability and willingness to maintain some form of military presence in the region. While Russia’s objectives often diverge from Israel’s, its continued presence may serve as a partial constraint on Iranian ambitions, particularly in Syria. Israel appears to be calculating that even an imperfect Russian presence is preferable to a complete power vacuum that Iran could exploit.
Moreover, Russia’s expanding relationships with Arab states – including Israel’s Abraham Accords partners in the Gulf – create additional incentives for engagement. As Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others pursue multifaceted relationships with Moscow spanning energy, defence and diplomacy, Israel risks diplomatic isolation if it adopts a significantly more confrontational stance towards Russia than its regional partners.
Israel–Russia relations during a second Trump presidency
Israel–Russia relations during Trump’s second presidency are unlikely to change dramatically, but there will be intensified engagement responding to regional dynamics. Three key conclusions can be drawn about this evolving relationship.
First, Israel will continue to compartmentalize its approach to Russia, separating areas of cooperation from significant disagreements. This requires sophisticated diplomatic manoeuvring but allows Israel to maintain necessary security coordination while navigating Russia’s relationships with adversaries like Iran and its proxies.
