The foundational moment for this network was the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Since then, Iran and its allies have been ensnared in a relentless cycle of conflict and turmoil. The invasion of Iran by Iraq in 1980 marked the beginning of a series of security, economic and societal shocks that have continuously besieged Tehran and its allies. Iran began focusing on projecting power and implementing a strategy of ‘forward defence’ through asymmetric deterrence capabilities against perceived threats – primarily that of Israel. This pursuit led Iran to support the formation of armed groups elsewhere in the Middle East, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Badr Corps in Iraq and Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The IRGC’s Quds Force became a pivotal actor in reinforcing relationships with these groups. Over time, the IRGC’s efforts entrenched these groups within their own states through deepened economic, ideological and military connections, while the IRGC also sought to integrate them into a region-wide network dedicated to advancing mutual interests.
Shocks and disruptions in subsequent years forced the groups to adapt and develop coping mechanisms for survival, changing the shape of the network over time. Writing on Hezbollah, Amal Saad argued that ‘one cannot overlook the central role played by the logic of survival […] by considering both military and spiritual victory equal, it follows that Hizbu’llah considers both the Resistance fighter’s martyrdom and survival as ‘victories’ for the Resistance.’ Part of the evolution of the axis was its ability to adapt to crises at pivotal moments, changing shape and even expanding its reach.
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 presented an early test. At that time, Iran’s strategy to export the Islamic revolution and defend itself against Israel in the region was not yet fully crystallized into what would later be known as forward defence. However, the 1982 crisis presented an early opportunity, as Iran supported the development of Hezbollah in the wake of the Israeli invasion. Former US ambassador to Lebanon Ryan Crocker notes:
Hezbollah was eventually able to remove all Israeli troops from Lebanon in 2000 and claimed a victory over Israel in the 2006 war, marking the further strengthening of the alliance.
Another watershed moment for Iran and its networks came in 2003, when the US invaded and occupied Iraq. The threat of US forces on its borders pushed Iran and its allies to ensure the new government in Baghdad would never be a threat like Saddam Hussein’s regime. Since the early 1980s, Iran had established the Badr Corps, investing approximately $20 million annually to cover salaries and procure weapons, vehicles and food. According to Faleh Abdul Jabbar, the group ‘was under Iranian command. The commander of the force was an Iranian colonel.’ After 2003 and Saddam Hussein’s removal from power, the Badr Corps and other Shia armed groups became part of the new Iraqi state, and the Iran-allied network thus overcame the potential crisis of a US-dominated neighbour and developed formal and informal power in Iraq.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 presented further opportunities for expansion. The regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria fell into crisis after protests across the country called for Assad’s removal. At this point, Assad turned to Iran for support and offered to become a component of its axis. Although the Syrian regime had had mixed historical ties with Lebanon and Iran, this new dynamic pushed the relationship between Iran and Syria into a transactional alliance. In return, Hezbollah (alongside Russia) came to the Syrian regime’s rescue and helped solidify its hold on power. The participation of various axis groups in the Syrian conflict over the next decade, under Tehran’s guidance, significantly strengthened their coordination and deepened their reliance on each other as partners.
However, 13 years later, the ruling Assad regime imploded, primarily due to its inability to maintain legitimacy among its own public. In a matter of days during late 2024, the Idlib-based rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syrians from across the country had launched an uprising that reached Damascus and brought down the regime. This time, Iran and Russia – displeased by Assad’s failure to regain public authority following the 2011 uprisings and preoccupied with their own conflicts (in Ukraine in Russia’s case and with Israel in Iran’s) – did not come to Assad’s aid. Both ultimately decided it was not in their interests to continue supporting a regime that had so significantly diminished its own domestic authority, and that had always been a passive and transactional partner. This episode demonstrated that the resilience of the network depended on both domestic and transnational authority. Assad had lost too much of both to remain useful.
The 2011 uprisings also led to the rise of another member of the axis, the Houthis. Although the group’s relations with Iran were established much earlier, this pivotal moment helped to integrate it into a more formal transnational alliance. Following the overthrow of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih in 2014, the Houthis found an opportunity to take control of the government in Sanaa, and to do so worked closely with Iran.
The rise of Islamic State, which conquered almost one-third of Syria and 40 per cent of Iraq in 2014, presented another major threat to Iran and its network. Islamic State particularly targeted Shia groups and leaders, prompting Iran and the Iraqi government to support the formation of the PMF as part of the state’s fight against ISIS. The PMF formally institutionalized the many Shia groups that Iran was already working with in Iraq. Again, a crisis presented an opportunity to reform the make-up of the axis.
The reformed axis transitioned from a top–down, Iranian-driven organization to one in which constituent members enjoyed greater autonomy and interacted more independently with both Tehran and each other.
US president Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, which ended the Iran nuclear agreement concluded by his predecessor, enacted comprehensive and targeted sanctions on Iran and its allies, and led to the assassinations of the axis’s founder and leader, Iranian general Qassim Soleimani, and PMF leader Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis at Baghdad airport in January 2020. Soleimani had established a hierarchical regional network with himself and the Quds Force at the apex. This structure enabled him to direct Iran’s networks politically, operationally and logistically. Field commanders in various countries served as Soleimani’s right-hand men, ensuring the implementation of his directives on the ground. He had operated the axis as a top–down organizational structure, with members taking direction from Tehran. Many believed at the time that his death would be a major setback for Iran and the axis as a whole.
But, while the attack sent shockwaves through the entire network and in particular caused groups in Iraq to go into hiding, the axis eventually recovered and shifted its shape to do so. This reformed axis transitioned from a top–down, Iranian-driven organization to one in which constituent members enjoyed greater autonomy and interacted more independently with both Tehran and each other. While Soleimani’s successor, Ismael Qaani, upheld the core objectives, he struggled to replicate Soleimani’s charismatic leadership and deep-rooted personal connections with axis leaders. Instead, Qaani focused on institutionalizing Iranian policy across the region. This new formation was partly a response to the loss of Soleimani’s unique capabilities and authority. His significant command and control, rooted in personalized relationships, had exposed Iran to considerable risks, prompting Tehran to restructure the axis to be less reliant on individual leaders.
In this reformed version of the axis, Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah rose to become a pivotal broker, frequently providing strategic guidance even to Qaani. These changes allowed the axis to recover from the damage and reconfigure itself. This shift also allowed Iran to continue to benefit from ‘plausible deniability’ when other constituent groups carried out attacks.
The assassination of Soleimani or the other previous attacks on Iran and the axis seemingly paled in comparison to Israel’s total war that began on 7 October. These developments caught Qaani off-guard and disrupted his longer-term efforts to reform the nature of the networks. In light of the setbacks, the axis was once again forced to adapt and transform. Israel’s offensive against Hamas and Hezbollah prompted a stronger response from other members of the axis such as Kataeb Hezbollah (KH) in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. These groups had previously been peripheral to the broader regional conflict dynamics, and more focused on establishing their domestic influence and seeking state inclusion. However, following the regional upheavals post-7 October, they sought to enhance their cooperation and expand their regional influence.
For many years, the Houthis maintained a nominal presence in Iraq, with their sole representative in Baghdad often having limited activities. This presence appeared more symbolic than operational. However, since October 2023, the Houthis have significantly intensified their cooperation with the PMF, especially KH. This intensified cooperation encompasses joint military operations, strategic coordination, weapons-sharing and the establishment of joint operations centres. This enhanced collaboration has led to joint operations against Israel.
The Houthis also became the first axis group to use anti-ship ballistic missiles, targeting commercial vessels passing through the Red Sea. They disrupted global trade, forcing freight companies to reroute around Africa, which led to increased costs and delays in the delivery of energy, food and consumer goods. In this way, the Houthis were able to reshape the Iran-led axis using limited means so that it could present a new threat from the Red Sea.
Kataeb Hezbollah also demonstrated its increased autonomous decision-making amid Israel’s military campaign. Previously described by many as an Iranian ‘proxy’, the group attacked and killed three US service members in January 2024 at Tower 22 along the Jordan–Syria border. This action was undertaken against the wishes of the IRGC, which subsequently pleaded with KH to call a ceasefire. These examples demonstrate how shocks have led to greater horizontal autonomy and more independent actions from various groups within the axis.
Throughout its existence and even before the term ‘axis of resistance’ was coined, Iran and its networks have continually adapted to military, economic and societal shocks and existential threats. They have done this by leveraging domestic and transnational networks that connect its constituent groups and embed them within state structures across the region and beyond. The axis has faced multiple such threats since its creation. While these shocks have, at times, degraded and altered its standard operating procedures, the axis has demonstrated long-term resilience, provided that its component parts are able to maintain both domestic and transnational authority. As the following chapters show, this adaptability is evident in two key economic supply chains – those of finance and energy – which have been crucial to sustaining the axis despite external threats.
